CHANGING ATTITUDES SLOWLY TAKING HOLD ON THAI-BURMESE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 CHIANG MAI 000049

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PREF PGOV TH BM
SUBJECT: CHANGING ATTITUDES SLOWLY TAKING HOLD ON THAI-BURMESE
BORDER


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(SBU) SUMMARY. Thai government and refugee camp officials in the
Thai border district of Mae Sot increasingly view political,
refugee, and immigration problems as long-term issues. While
this realization that the more-than two decades-old refugee
situation is no longer a "temporary problem" has led to a
dramatic shift in Thai policy toward Burmese refugees, this same
sense of permanence to the refugees' status in Thailand has
compounded the problems exile leaders face in maintaining
influence inside Burma. Faced with diminishing contacts inside
their home country, many dissidents have become fixated on a
misguided hope that the U.S. military will help overthrow the
regime. END SUMMARY.


2. (U) Mae Sot today is a classic boomtown, with new
developments, shops and markets springing up around town, all
driven by refugees, illegal immigrants, and one-day permit
holders crossing the Friendship Bridge that links Mae Sot with
Myawadi in Burma. Burmese nationals of varying ethnicities now
make up an estimated 80 percent of the Mae Sot area's
population, including refugee camps, and are the muscle behind
the area's economy. Embassy Rangoon Charge d'Affaires Shari
Villarosa traveled with ConGen PolOff in February to the Mae Sot
border district in Tak province to meet with Thai government
officials, NGOs, and members of the Burmese dissident community
- one of many frequent visits in recent years by USG officials.
Over the course of these visits, officers have noted the growing
and significant role played by Burmese refugees in the area's
economy and culture.


3. (SBU) No one expects the flow of refugees into Thailand to
slow down any time soon. Col. Kasem Thanaporn, commander of the
Royal Thai Army's 4th Infantry Task Force in Mae Sot, observed
that Burma's military control over the border area was being
consolidated and that armed opposition groups were gradually
being surrounded by Burmese military forces. The recent move to
a new capital in centrally located Pyinmana was due, in part, to
the State Peace and Development Council's (SPDC) effort to
better consolidate its grip on the ethnic border states, he
suggested.


4. (SBU) Representatives of the Karen National Union (KNU) in
Northern Thailand have stated that the SPDC's move to Pyinmana
has strengthened the regime's hand against rebel forces, noting
that the new capital is located in what had been Karen
territory. Refugee activists and opposition groups say the
Burmese regime is actively driving ethnic groups out of Burma,
in part to remove ethnic minorities from the vicinity of
Pyinmana and also to provide land to retired Burmese soldiers.
These activists say the SPDC is using landmines and destroying
bridges and crops to drive refugee movements toward and across
the border, eliminating return routes back in to Burma for the
Karen and other groups. They expressed gratitude that the Thais
had recently been more lenient in giving refuge.

The Good News: Thai Government and Refugee NGOs Adapting


5. (SBU) After long treating the refugee situation as a
temporary problem - one that would eventually be solved when the
refugees returned to Burma - Thai government officials involved
with operating the Mae La refugee camp have accepted that
Burma's economic decline and political conflicts are unlikely to
reverse themselves anytime soon. Likewise, officials have begun
taking basic steps to address the Burmese population in Mae Sot
as more than temporary residents.


6. (SBU) Officers from the 4th Infantry Task Force have
established productive contacts and communication with their
Burmese counterparts on the other side of the border - a
positive development when contrasted with the threats of armed
skirmishes or Burmese shelling of refugee camps in Thailand a
few years ago. Officers estimated that nearly 2,000 Burmese
cross into Mae Sot from Myawadi each day on one-day passes, and
that given the bustling, Burmese-centric economy in town, there
was no doubt many more are coming in and staying. Col. Kasem
said he did not personally see the situation in Burma improving
soon and expected more refugees to find their way into Thailand.


7. (SBU) The Thai government's decision to begin teaching
Thai language in the Mae La camp, an effort begun just in the
past year, is a further encouraging sign that officials are
looking at the refugee situation in a new light. Despite having
become an overwhelming majority of the local workforce, Burmese
ethnic groups and their children have had very little access to
Thai language schooling. By teaching refugee children Thai, Thai
officials are finally admitting that the refugees will be here
for a while and taking steps to facilitate their assimilation.


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8. (U) Also encouraging is the extent to which civil society
is active in Mae La. With some 50,000 residents, the camp counts
as one of the North's largest population centers, and within it
live various ethnicities, Christians, Buddhists, and Muslims
under more or less stable circumstances. Initially a refuge for
the Karen, Mae La and other camps in the region are now home to
other ethnicities, dissident Burmans, and Muslim Rohingyas, who
found their way from western Burma. Karen leaders have seen the
numbers of Rohingyas climb from 1,000 to 10,000 in the past five
years and say they have been accepted and recognized as good
traders. Some groups, such as the Karen Women's Organization,
are developing an increasingly stronger base of support for
their target populations and finding opportunities for them away
from the refugee camps. Charge and PolOff spoke to several young
people working on their English in the hopes that they would
receive scholarships or be accepted into resettlement programs.


9. (SBU) These changing attitudes among Thai officials
reflect the important policy shift by the central government
that has led to enhanced vocational and educational programs, as
well as possible income generating opportunities for camp
refugees over the past year. But despite these new attitudes
among the Thais, many refugees continue to perceive the Thai
government as solely interested in their return to Burma. During
a Feb. 4 visit to Mae La with international diplomats, Prime
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra reportedly focused some of his
questions to the refugees on whether and when they would feel
comfortable enough to move back to Burma. Two weeks after his
visit, it was the perceptions of these comments - and not the
increased Thai funding for educational and economic
opportunities - that refugee leaders were discussing. Many
refugees made it clear they have no interest in going back until
their safety could be guaranteed, relating continued stories of
rapes, forced labor, and forced relocations inside Burma.


10. (SBU) In addition, talk from Thai military officers that
contacts have improved between border units and that cooperation
is growing with Burma must be taken with a grain of salt. These
warm statements toward their Burmese counterparts, for instance,
were made in a room dominated by a statue of King Naresuan, the
16th century monarch who famously liberated the Thais from
Burmese invaders, facing toward the border - a noteworthy symbol
that the centuries-old Thai-Burmese rivalry is far from
forgotten.

The Bad News: Dissident Groups Unfocused


11. (SBU) Meanwhile, exile groups are struggling with the
effects of their long-term presence in Thailand on their overall
goals for a future democratic Burma and their potential roles in
the country's future. Rangoon Charge visited several
organizations, among them the Assistance Association for
Political Prisoners, the National Council of the Union of Burma,
Karen National Union, Karen Refugee Committee, National
Democratic Front, Burma Fund, All Burma Students Democratic
Front, and Dr. Cynthia Maung's Mae Tao health clinic. These
exiles see themselves as fervently working for democracy and
assuming leadership roles inside Burma when democracy comes.


12. (SBU) After many years in exile, it may be inevitable that
Thailand-based opposition groups are losing touch with their
counterparts inside Burma and their influence is diminishing.
Given the chance to rebut these criticisms during recent
meetings, many opposition leaders came off as unduly focused on
non-productive or unlikely scenarios. After Charge observed that
exiles needed to focus more on a few areas of common agreement
and less on unimportant issues, one NGO member replied that such
action was proving to be difficult given the inability to agree
on a name for an umbrella organization that would satisfy all
Burmese ethnicities. Another said people must agree on a flag
first. When the Charge asked how exile groups planned to heal
ethnic divisions caused by Burmese military divide-and-rule
policies, one political dissident responded that exiles worked
well with all the opposition groups in Thailand and had not
caused those divisions.

The Bad News for Them: Sorry Guys, the Cavalry is Not Coming


13. (SBU) Many opposition figures place misguided hope in the
use of U.S. military assets to support their cause, citing
everything from U.S. involvement in Iraq and increased U.S.
pressure on the Burmese regime to the recent movie "Stealth"
(which features a U.S. Navy airborne attack on terrorists in
Rangoon). Nearly every group visited asked either subtly or
directly when a U.S. attack would come. One exile leader warned
that U.S. military planners would need to take into account
rumored plans by the Burmese regime to assassinate Aung San Suu

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Kyi and other prominent opposition leaders in Burma in the event
of an invasion. Rangoon Charge replied each time that such an
invasion was not in the cards and that opposition groups should
face the reality that only through uniting themselves could they
overcome the current government's hold on power. The reaction
was generally "we can't; we don't have guns."

What Can Be Done Inside Burma


14. (SBU) The National Council of the Union of Burma (NCUB) is
a broad-based umbrella organization of ethnic and political
opposition groups that has been organizing Thailand-based exiles
since 1992. Several leaders from the NCUB, including General
Secretary U Maung Maung, outlined some of the organization's

SIPDIS
recent efforts to coordinate the widespread Burmese dissident
community into coherent action, including efforts this past year
to build international opposition to Burma's holding of the
ASEAN chair in 2006. When Charge asked how the USG could better
help those inside Burma, Maung Maung and other leaders responded
that they needed increased funding for their National Endowment
for Democracy grant ($85,000 in 2006) to build connections in
the international community. When pressed about what could be
done inside Burma, the NCUB requested 50 satellite phones to
distribute inside Burma and recommended establishing more
American Centers throughout Burma.


15. (SBU) Other Burmese activists working in Mae Sot are also
making efforts to assist those inside Burma, such as leaders of
the Mae Tao health clinic, which serves more than 50,000
refugees in the border area. Clinic leader Dr. Cynthia described
her program of sending trained medical personnel into the areas
near the Thai border. She also noted that one-third of her
patients now come from inside Burma from as far away as Rangoon
and Mandalay. She suggested NGOs be encouraged to provide
training for doctors and nurses inside Burma. The Assistance
Association of Political Prisoners, an organization that
monitors more than 1,500 Burmese political prisoners, described
their plans to increase the number of scholarships inside Burma
for the children of political prisoners from 75 to 200. They
suggested that the U.S. could reach out to educate former
political prisoners who cannot come to Rangoon for classes at
the American Center.

COMMENT:


16. (SBU) After nearly 20 years of increased inflows, the
impact of Burmese refugees in western Thailand will continue to
grow. Thai officials have realized that the economic and
political situation in Burma is increasingly grave and unlikely
to recover to the extent that refugees will return, as the
Burmese economy will need a long time to recover from the damage
that has been wrought. In fact, no one denies that more and more
will find their way into Thailand. Teaching Thai to refugee camp
children is an encouraging first step, as are enhanced
educational and vocational training and work opportunities.
Programs that focus on greater healthcare access and labor
rights could further improve the quality of life and potential
for those who have sought shelter in Thailand.


17. (SBU) Meanwhile, exile leaders must search for ways to
refresh their understanding of and contacts with the opposition
inside Burma if they hope to play a role in a future democratic
government. Many dissidents rely primarily on family members for
information about political developments inside Burma; it is
apparent that most have only a surface understanding of recent
events inside Burma. Opposition leaders based outside of Burma
will face competition from those now on the inside to form a
democratic government; a future democratic Burma will need the
resources of both groups to succeed.


18. (SBU) Much of the exiles' focus concerns their role in a
future national government at the expense of other issues, such
as re-building the economy and establishing the rule of law in a
post-SPDC Burma. Although exiles have had some successes
organizing the varied ethnicities and interest groups of the
Burmese dissident community in Thailand, the leaders of these
organizations place too much faith in outside saviors (U.S. or
otherwise) to solve their problems and not enough attention on
uniting those to present a common front against the Burmese
regime.


19. (U) This cable has been coordinated with Embassy Rangoon.
CAMP