AFTER HELPING TO PLOT COUP, THIRD ARMY COMMANDER CALLS THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CHIANG MAI 000159

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/26/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KDEM MOPS ASEC TH
SUBJECT: AFTER HELPING TO PLOT COUP, THIRD ARMY COMMANDER CALLS THE
SHOTS IN THE NORTH

REF: CHIANG MAI 120 (THIRD ARMY COMMANDER CHALLENGES THAKSIN'S NORTHERN POWER BASE)

CHIANG MAI 00000159 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Beatrice Camp , Consul General, Consulate Chiang
Mai, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (C) Summary. The general in charge of northern Thailand came
out blazing Friday with allegations that coup planning began
months ago and that the former government wiretapped the Privy
Council and the palace. He asserted a need to clear out Thaksin
loyalists in the region and proposed that the military help
screen out bad political candidates. These statements and others
by 3rd Army Commander LTG Saprang Kalayamitra portray him as a
key instigator of the Sept. 19 coup. With most of former Prime
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra's politically connected relatives
and allies effectively shut out of power, Saprang is calling the
shots in his northern fiefdom. End Summary.


2. (C) Gen. Saprang, by his own account one of the most
committed coup plotters, made his first post-coup appearance in
the north on Sept. 22 after returning from Bangkok to his
headquarters in Phitsanulok. In anticipation of his return,
media figures and heads of government agencies were summoned to
Phitsanulok for two separate Friday sessions. Northern media and
government Public Relations Department officers met with Saprang
in the morning, followed by an afternoon meeting with heads of
government agencies, including governors from all 17 northern
provinces, to explain why the coup was staged, how it was
conducted and what further steps the military-led Council for
Democratic Reform under the Constitutional Monarchy (CDRM) would
take in this region.

Anger Over Wire-Tapping
--------------


3. (C) The outspoken general vowed to revamp the police and
National Intelligence Agency (NIA),which he accused of
monitoring anti-Thaksin individuals rather than focusing on
counter-terrorism or counter-narcotics information gathering.
He claimed that these agencies had wire-tapped him after his
headline-generating criticism of Thaksin in July (reftel). In a
separate conversation with the director of the Office of
Narcotics Control Board-North (ONCB-North),Janya Sramajcha,
Saprang went further, accusing Thaksin's brother-in-law Pol.
Gen. Phriewphan Damaphong and former NIA chief and Thaksin
classmate Pol LTG Jumpol Manmai of wire-tapping not only
military leaders but also members of the Privy Council and the
king "via highly sophisticated devices exclusively procured for
the Thaksin camp." He described these actions as "beyond
toleration" and "a breach of professional intelligence
etiquette."


4. (C) At the Sept. 22 afternoon meeting, Saprang warned
provincial governors from Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai that they
will "pay the price" for their "excessive" loyalty to the
Thaksin regime, most likely by being transferred. Saprang also
singled out for attention certain local politicians and
community radios for their potential provocative role against
the CDRM.

Coup Was Planned Months Ago
--------------


5. (C) In contrast to the impression given by coup leaders in
the media, Saprang said that the overthrow of the Thaksin
administration had been mapped out since early this year.
Citing internal instability, the lack of decent political
leadership, and widespread cronyism, Saprang described how for
several months he "sent messages via the media" that went
unheeded by politicians and government officials. As political
polarization intensified and crept into the military
establishment, "administrative reform" became necessary to
prevent the nation from breaking apart, Saprang told his
afternoon audience.


6. (C) According to Saprang, only he and army chief Gen Sonthi
Bunyaratkalin were truly committed and contributed to the
success of the Sept. 19 coup. Other commanders played
supportive roles, he said, describing the 2nd army commander as
"too gentleman-like" during and even after the coup by allowing
freer movement of Thai Rak Thai party (TRT) leaders and
anti-coup broadcasts from some community radios in the
northeast. Meanwhile, in Chiang Mai, Saprang positioned armored
vehicles in front of the municipal office early on Sept. 20 just
hours after the coup and that morning issued instructions to the
Governor to shut down all community radio stations.


CHIANG MAI 00000159 002.2 OF 002



7. (C) Reports from Saprang's address to provincial leaders said
the general named individuals and agencies the CDRM is targeting
for their roles in the Thaksin regime, including former cabinet
ministers Newin Chidchob and Yongyut Tiyapairat - both targeted
for mobilizing the pro-Thaksin/TRT grassroots activities.
Saprang also called out three government agencies - Forestry
(under Yongyut's supervision),NIA, and the Police Narcotics
Suppression Bureau (PNSB) - for what he labeled "anti-royal"
actions. The latter two, he said, were involved in the phone
tapping. According to Drug Enforcement Administration officials
in Chiang Mai, military units raided local PNSB offices on Sept.
20 and confiscated weapons.

Military Will Help Guide Thai Politics
-------------- -


8. (C) During his Sept. 22 meetings, Saprang made it clear that
he intended to purge Thaksin loyalists out of Chiang Mai. In his
meeting with Janya, he spoke of cleansing Thai politics, saying
"we need to create a system that would encourage and screen good
people to enter politics. The military can help with this idea;
we would offer to stop or ward off those 'bad guys' from the
contest while we are ready to canvass for the 'good guys.'"
Saprang also asked Janya to take good care of the U.S. Consulate
General in Chiang Mai, as "I see the U.S. as our great ally."


9. (U) As earlier reported in the media, Saprang is moving to
Bangkok as assistant army chief. He said 3rd Army corps
commander LTG Jiradet Kocharat, a close ally, would be his
successor.


10. (C) COMMENT: As a long-time and well-known Thaksin foe,
Saprang is taking advantage of his position as key power broker
in the North. In comparison to other regional commanders,
Saprang has acted much more aggressively to rein in Thaksin
allies and stifle potential opposition to the CDRM. In this
Third Army fiefdom, media figures and officials are being
summoned to Saprang's headquarters in Phitsanulok for briefings
or, in the case of Chiang Mai Mayor Boonlert Buranupakorn,
weekly attendance checks. With CDRM leaders pre-occupied in
Bangkok, Saprang has the local authority to neutralize Thaksin's
closest allies in his former home base and pursue government
agencies viewed as dominated by Thaskin cronies.


11. (C) Even allowing for some self-promotion, Saprang's
comments support his contention that he was indeed one of the
key instigators of Thaksin's overthrow. Now slated for a new
assignment in Bangkok, Saprang is likely to end up with a more
visible role in the CDRM leadership. In such a position, his
oft-stated patriotism and passion for protecting the monarchy
combined with his deep distrust of the former prime minister and
tendency to say what he thinks could mean headaches for those in
power. End Comment.
CAMP