NORTHERN THAILAND COMMENTS ON KARENNI NATIONAL PROGRESSIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L CHIANG MAI 000139

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
STATE FOR EAP/MLS, PRM/A: TRUSCH AND S/CT: TKUSCHNER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/22/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF PTER TH BM
SUBJECT: NORTHERN THAILAND COMMENTS ON KARENNI NATIONAL PROGRESSIVE
PARTY

REF: A. RANGOON 1184 B. STATE 130770

CLASSIFIED BY: John Spykerman, Political Officer, Consulate
Chiang Mai, State.
REASON: 1.4 (c)


1. (U) This cable provides supplemental information to Embassy
Rangoon's more comprehensive response (ref. A) to Department's
request for information on the Karenni National Progressive
Party (KNPP) in ref B.


2. (C) SUMMARY. Local RTG intelligence officials strongly
dismissed links between the KNPP and any terrorist activities.
Instead, these officials suspect that Burma's State Peace and
Development Council (SPDC) engages in active misinformation
campaigns against those ethnic organizations that have not
agreed to cease-fire agreements with the Burmese regime.
According to one source, these SPDC propaganda attacks are
designed to link ethnic organizations to terrorism and erode
international support for their cause. Northern Thailand-based
refugee assistance organization sources also doubt the KNPP's
ability to execute terrorist attacks, although they allege the
organization has used intimidation and violence both within the
camps and outside. End Summary.


3. (C) Wiroon Iampraphat, chief of the RTG's National
Intelligence Agency (NIA) Mae Hong Son office, flatly dismissed
alleged links between the KNPP and terrorist activities. Wiroon
(PROTECT) told post he has worked in northwestern Thailand's Mae
Hong Son province with his Burmese ethnic minority counterparts
(including Karenni, Shan, Pa-O, and Palaung) for more than 10
years and has a deep familiarity with the KNPP's military and
political strategies and those of the SPDC. According to his
analysis, the SPDC has tried to capitalize on international
sentiment against terrorist movements to discredit non-ceasefire
rebel groups, thus weakening international support and
pressuring these rebels to seek "a return to legal fold" within
the Burmese regime. Wiroon also speculated that such propaganda
could be meant to save face for SPDC leaders' failure to charge
suspects in a spate of bombings in Rangoon earlier this year.


4. (C) Wiroon said the NIA believes the KNPP and other ethnic
rebel groups have usually attacked only SPDC military targets
and have eschewed civilian locations. Moreover, Wiroon said KNPP
military action is defensive in nature, limited to small areas
of Kayah State, and designed to protect bases, villages, and
cross-border trade routes. Wiroon said the KNPP, like other
ethnic rebel groups, relies to some degree on assistance from
the RTG and Thailand-based organizations and it was in their
best interests to "keep themselves clean" from suspicions of
drug trafficking or terrorist activities.


5. (C) Officials with the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) office in Mae Hong Son who are familiar with
the KNPP also doubt that the group has any capacity to engage in
the activities listed in ref B. Gradual loss of territory and
defections to the SPDC over the years have weakened the KNPP's
reach, and the group is especially sensitive to bad press and
eager to maintain its dialogue with the UNHCR and other NGOs,
those officials said. However, UHNCR Mae Hong Son field office
chief Hanne Mathisen said that the KNPP has used intimidation
and violence both within the camps and outside. She added that
although the KNPP now says it does not employ child soldiers, it
continues to compel porters and medics to cross into Burma to
treat injured soldiers during its operations in Kayah State.


6. (U) This cable was coordinated with Embassies Bangkok and
Rangoon.

CAMP