Ramadan in Casablanca: Why is This Year Different?

C O N F I D E N T I A L CASABLANCA 001268

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG, INR/NESA/NAP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2015
TAGS: MO PGOV PINR PREL
SUBJECT: Ramadan in Casablanca: Why is This Year Different?

REF: A) Rabat 00990

B) Rabat 01050
C) Casablanca 0947

Classified By: Principal Officer Douglas C. Greene for Reasons 1.4
(b),(d).


1. (C) Summary: According to press reports and personal
observations, attendance at mosques throughout Casablanca during the
month of Ramadan this year hit an all-time high and the number of
youth present was unprecedented. Anti-Western rhetoric was not
prominent in "official" mosques although it did find its way into
some sermons and prayers. Middle-class Moroccans contacts do not see
the dramatic increase of worshipers, at official mosques, as a great
concern. They explain the phenomenon as Moroccans' way of showing
solidarity with fellow Muslims in the region as well as a way to
counter what they perceive as recent attacks against their faith.
They do, however, indicate their concern that the numbers of
underground mosques throughout Casablanca are growing and encouraging
extremist, anti-Western ideology. An ideology, even some pro-Western
contacts assert, that is being fueled by a U.S. policy in the region.
End Summary.

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Record Numbers at Hassan II
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2. (U) The Hassan II Mosque in Casablanca is the largest Islamic
religious monument outside Mecca. It is designed to hold 25,000
worshipers inside and 80,000 in an outdoor courtyard. On October 17,
the last day of Ramadan prayers, approximately 200,000 Casablancans,
more than 20 times the average number, crowded into the Mosque and
the surrounding area, blocking traffic for hours.


3. (C) The Mosque is the showpiece of the Moroccan government and as
such is known to adhere strictly to official sermons issued by the
Ministry of Habous and Islamic Affairs. Because of the negative
reaction of many Moroccans to the exorbitant costs incurred for the
homage to King Hassan II, it has not been well-attended. But last
year, during Ramadan, the Ministry hand picked a very popular Imam
for the Mosque known, according to the Moroccan weekly news magazine
TelQuel, as Casablanca's own "Pop Star" of Islam. The choice was
made specifically in order to draw crowds to the Mosque after initial
boycotts.


4. (C) It is widely known that the authorized sermons and prayers at
Hassan II are normally non-political in nature. On October 17,
however, according to LES who attended the prayers, there was a
deviation from official policy. LES reported that, as usual, after
prayers the Imam asked for blessings for all Muslims, which was
greeted with a boisterous and positive response. He followed by
appealing for blessings on the King, and received a lackluster
reaction, with very few worshipers chanting the traditional "Amin,
Amin" in reply. The very popular Imam finished his requests to Allah
with a call for "bad wishes to all those causing harm to our brothers
in Iraq and Palestine" to which the 200,000 worshipers inside and
outside the Mosque responded with a great and prolonged cheer,
according to LES.

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Why the Increase?
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5. (SBU) Some Moroccans speculate that Casablancans attended
services in greater number this Ramadan as a reaction to a perceived
escalation of Western criticism of Islam. According to these
Casablancans, Moroccans feel that by being more devout Muslims they
show support for their brothers in Iraq and Palestine while
"defending" Islam, in a peaceful manner, from what they believe to be
attacks from the West. As examples of the perceived anti-Islamic
bent, Casablancans cited an escalation of armed conflicts in the
Middle East, the controversial Danish cartoons depicting Mohammad,
and the efforts to prohibit Muslim women from wearing headscarves
throughout Europe.


6. (C) At an iftar, towards the end of Ramadan, Poloff posed the
question of mosque attendance to some Moroccan guests. Two local
teachers responded that not only was the protection of Islam and
Muslim solidarity the reason for higher attendance at mosques
services, but they also believed it was the reason more women are
veiling in Casablanca.

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Underground Mosques a Concern
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7. (SBU) According to Moroccan law, the Ministry of the Habous and
Islamic Affairs has authority over all mosques in Morocco and sermons
delivered in them. In reality there are numerous "underground"
mosques throughout the country and in Casablanca in particular.
Longtime residents of Casablanca agree that as many as 80 percent of
the city's places of worship are working outside Ministry guidelines.
That number is comprised of a combination of official mosques acting
outside the ministry's supervision and "underground" mosques with
fundamentalist or extremist tendencies located in basements, private
homes and apartments, and festival halls. We have heard
unsubstantiated claims that Moroccans living and working abroad may
be funding some of these mosques. More recently, however, we are
hearing that more middle-class Moroccans here are funding the
mosques, drawing groups of educated, unemployed, and disillusioned
youth to the unapproved sermons.


8. (SBU) After the May 2003 Casablanca bombings, the GOM reinforced
its fight against terrorism, in part, by more strictly controlling
fundamentalists preaching in Casablanca's poorest neighborhoods,
where they were recruiting young men to join their movements. The
Ministry of Habous and Islamic Affairs closed some of Casablanca's
unofficial mosques and restricted access between prayers in official
mosques known to the Ministry to have had more radical Imams. In
recent months, official mosques have begun to reopen throughout the
day with a host of structured programs offered by the Ministry.
Among these programs are those headed by the newly graduated
Morchidat (Ref A) who conduct basic education and religious
information courses for both men and women. However, despite the
GOM's efforts, underground mosques still thrive in Casablanca and
find ways to hide from the Ministry's oversight.

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Pointing the Finger at the U.S.
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9. (C) At two Ramadan iftars, some prominent, pro-Western
businessmen discussed their view of factors which have contributed to
the developments outlined above. They focused on the impact of U.S.
policy in the region on local developments. The U.S. has failed to
address longstanding regional grievances, and its counterterrorism
policy is creating new ones, they assert. One result, in Morocco, is
the empowerment of funadmentalists. The absence of a strong peace
process, U.S. policy toward the Lebanon conflict, and developments in
Iraq, are all fodder for these groups in Morocco, and have a
significant impact on broader public opinion too, they believe. If
the U.S. adjusted it policy to focus on underlying regional disputes,
then Morocco would be able to deal more effectively with extremism at
home.


10. (C) The King's human development initiative, they said, is aimed
directly at these threats to stability. The explicit goal is to link
Morocco's economic take-off with the poorest elements in society,
where extremism finds fertile ground. With the government and
fundamentalists vying for influence in the poorest neighborhoods,
there is a tough battle for control of the ground going on in
Casablanca's urban slums. The government's weapons - training and
development programs, housing, job creation, etc. - are up against
those of the Islamists. These contacts assert that adjustments in
U.S. policy in the region could help to undercut the emotional appeal
that Islamists generate in Morocco, and help the Moroccan government
create the linkage that the human development program aims to
achieve.

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Comment
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11. (SBU) Anti-American and anti-Western sentiments in Casablanca
ebb and flow following the tide of events in the distant Middle East.
During the month of Ramadan, however, the city is more sensitized to
issues relevant to the Islamic world, and emotional expressions of
solidarity and anger are more prevalent. It is hard to know
precisely how much of this is transient, and how much reflects
longer-term trends in Moroccan society. We see some evidence that
emotions on sensitive regional and religious issues flare more
quickly than in the past. On the other hand, tempers cool as quickly
as they flare in the city. During the recent war in Lebanon, many
regular contacts distanced themselves from the Consulate (Ref C).
Since then, many of those who were reluctant to meet with us have
once again begun to reach out, albeit a bit more cautiously.

GREENE