Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06CARACAS913
2006-04-04 12:12:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Caracas
Cable title:
BETTER LATE THAN NEVER: RUSSIAN CHOPPERS ARRIVE
how-toVZCZCXRO1622 PP RUEHAG DE RUEHCV #0913 0941212 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 041212Z APR 06 FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3931 INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEM COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA PRIORITY 6257 RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 5353 RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ PRIORITY 1863 RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY 0069 RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO PRIORITY 1938 RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO PRIORITY 3667 RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 0648 RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PRIORITY 1117 RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO PRIORITY 3414 RUEHMU/AMEMBASSY MANAGUA PRIORITY 1117 RUEHDG/AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO PRIORITY 0105 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0301 RUEHAO/AMCONSUL CURACAO PRIORITY 0714 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0075 RUEHMI/USOFFICE FRC FT LAUDERDALE PRIORITY 2967 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA PRIORITY 0615
C O N F I D E N T I A L CARACAS 000913
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
FOR FRC LAMBERT
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2026
TAGS: PGOV MASS VE
SUBJECT: BETTER LATE THAN NEVER: RUSSIAN CHOPPERS ARRIVE
IN VENEZUELA
REF: A. 05 BOGOTA 00894
B. 05 BOGOTA 03863
Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT R. DOWNES FOR 1.4 (D)
C O N F I D E N T I A L CARACAS 000913
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
FOR FRC LAMBERT
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2026
TAGS: PGOV MASS VE
SUBJECT: BETTER LATE THAN NEVER: RUSSIAN CHOPPERS ARRIVE
IN VENEZUELA
REF: A. 05 BOGOTA 00894
B. 05 BOGOTA 03863
Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT R. DOWNES FOR 1.4 (D)
1. (U) Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez presided over the
formal handover of three Russian MI-17 helicopters to the
Venezuelan Army's helicopter battalion in Yaracuy State on
April 3. The three aircraft, which arrived in Venezuela
unassembled on February 21, are part of a contract Chavez
announced he signed with Russia for 10 MI-17s in September
2004. Officials from Russian arms export firm
Rosoboronexport had announced the helicopters would arrive in
late 2005, but the press reported that Venezuelan pilots did
not complete their training in Russia until December.
According to commander of the army Raul Baduel, Russia will
also help the BRV establish a plant to help maintain the
helicopters.
2. (U) During the ceremony, Chavez blustered that the
Pentagon would be on "ORANGE alert" because of the purchase
of the three helicopters. Chavez also claimed he would seek
Russian fighter planes because of the difficulty Venezuela
has had obtaining F-16 parts from the United States.
Finally, he announced a total of 15 helicopters--including
MI-26 and MI-35 models--would be delivered by the end of
2006. According to the most recent announcements from
Venezuelan officials, the BRV hopes to sign two more
contracts with Russia to obtain a total of 33 or 35
helicopters. (Embassy Note: Reports of what the two
countries are signing have varied widely, probably because
the BRV often inks letters of agreement that do not carry
legal weight.)
3. (U) Defense Minister Orlando Maniglia told reporters the
MI-17s would be used for patrols, rescue operations, and
forest fires along the Venezuelan border. During the
televised handover ceremony, Venezuelan troops showed off
their search and rescue training. Notwithstanding Maniglia's
stated intention, the military apparently envisions a combat
role for the helicopters, as well. Although the MI-17 was
designed primarily as a transport helicopter, the three
Venezuelan models have been outfitted as gunships. The
military also demonstrated how the helicopters could deliver
a howitzer.
--------------
Comment
--------------
4. (C) Chavez' timeline may be overambitious, given
Venezuela's track record at procuring arms on schedule. For
now, it appears at least that the original MI-17 deal is
settled, even if the delivery of the seven remaining units
does not transpire right away. The MI-17s probably do not
upset the regional balance of power. Venezuela's poorly run
armed forces seem incapable thus far of integrating
sophisticated equipment into combat. The reality of the
threat may not matter, though, as the impact of arms
purchases will depend in part on the perception of the
Colombian military (REFTELS).
BROWNFIELD
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
FOR FRC LAMBERT
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2026
TAGS: PGOV MASS VE
SUBJECT: BETTER LATE THAN NEVER: RUSSIAN CHOPPERS ARRIVE
IN VENEZUELA
REF: A. 05 BOGOTA 00894
B. 05 BOGOTA 03863
Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT R. DOWNES FOR 1.4 (D)
1. (U) Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez presided over the
formal handover of three Russian MI-17 helicopters to the
Venezuelan Army's helicopter battalion in Yaracuy State on
April 3. The three aircraft, which arrived in Venezuela
unassembled on February 21, are part of a contract Chavez
announced he signed with Russia for 10 MI-17s in September
2004. Officials from Russian arms export firm
Rosoboronexport had announced the helicopters would arrive in
late 2005, but the press reported that Venezuelan pilots did
not complete their training in Russia until December.
According to commander of the army Raul Baduel, Russia will
also help the BRV establish a plant to help maintain the
helicopters.
2. (U) During the ceremony, Chavez blustered that the
Pentagon would be on "ORANGE alert" because of the purchase
of the three helicopters. Chavez also claimed he would seek
Russian fighter planes because of the difficulty Venezuela
has had obtaining F-16 parts from the United States.
Finally, he announced a total of 15 helicopters--including
MI-26 and MI-35 models--would be delivered by the end of
2006. According to the most recent announcements from
Venezuelan officials, the BRV hopes to sign two more
contracts with Russia to obtain a total of 33 or 35
helicopters. (Embassy Note: Reports of what the two
countries are signing have varied widely, probably because
the BRV often inks letters of agreement that do not carry
legal weight.)
3. (U) Defense Minister Orlando Maniglia told reporters the
MI-17s would be used for patrols, rescue operations, and
forest fires along the Venezuelan border. During the
televised handover ceremony, Venezuelan troops showed off
their search and rescue training. Notwithstanding Maniglia's
stated intention, the military apparently envisions a combat
role for the helicopters, as well. Although the MI-17 was
designed primarily as a transport helicopter, the three
Venezuelan models have been outfitted as gunships. The
military also demonstrated how the helicopters could deliver
a howitzer.
--------------
Comment
--------------
4. (C) Chavez' timeline may be overambitious, given
Venezuela's track record at procuring arms on schedule. For
now, it appears at least that the original MI-17 deal is
settled, even if the delivery of the seven remaining units
does not transpire right away. The MI-17s probably do not
upset the regional balance of power. Venezuela's poorly run
armed forces seem incapable thus far of integrating
sophisticated equipment into combat. The reality of the
threat may not matter, though, as the impact of arms
purchases will depend in part on the perception of the
Colombian military (REFTELS).
BROWNFIELD