Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06CARACAS852
2006-03-28 19:45:00
SECRET
Embassy Caracas
how-toVZCZCXRO4814 PP RUEHAO DE RUEHCV #0852/01 0871945 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 281945Z MAR 06 FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3857 INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEM COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA PRIORITY 6221 RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 5327 RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ PRIORITY 1832 RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY 0038 RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO PRIORITY 1906 RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO PRIORITY 3656 RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 0639 RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PRIORITY 1101 RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO PRIORITY 3389 RUEHMU/AMEMBASSY MANAGUA PRIORITY 1099 RUEHDG/AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO PRIORITY 0081 RUEHAO/AMCONSUL CURACAO PRIORITY 0700 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0046 RUEHMI/USOFFICE FRC FT LAUDERDALE PRIORITY 2944 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA PRIORITY 0599
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 CARACAS 000852
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
FOR FRC LAMBERT
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2026
TAGS: SNAR PREL PINR VZ
SUBJECT: BRV COUNTERDRUG AMBIVALENCE
Classified By: AMBASSADOR WILLIAM F. BROWNFIELD FOR 1.5 (D)
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 CARACAS 000852
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
FOR FRC LAMBERT
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2026
TAGS: SNAR PREL PINR VZ
SUBJECT: BRV COUNTERDRUG AMBIVALENCE
Classified By: AMBASSADOR WILLIAM F. BROWNFIELD FOR 1.5 (D)
1. (C) SUMMARY: The BRV's CN relationship with us continues
to be ambivalent. On one hand, the Antidrogas command of the
National Guard (GN) is increasingly willing to work with us
within our Port Security Project, while BRV Drug Czar Luis
Correa appears to be penalizing NGO Alianza for having too
close of a relationship with us. Correa insists that there
is no persecution and that CN cooperation will rapidly take
off once the Addendum to the 1978 CN MOU is signed. END
SUMMARY
2. (U) Our only active project with the BRV is the Port
Security Project. This week small steps forward were
achieved with the assistance of the National Guard (GN)
Antidrogas command. First, Antidrogas agreed to be formally
named the end-user of a NAS funded container inspection
machine, a requirement for importing the gamma source. The
machine is a loaner until we get our own and will be used in
conjunction with our Puerto Cabello Container Inspection
Facility (CIF). Though agreeing to be the formal end-user
may not seem like much, our BRV contacts have been wary of
putting their names to any document which links them with the
USG.
3. (U) Also, after months of delay, Antidrogas finally
authorized our CBP inspectors stationed in Puerto Cabello to
conduct two days of training in Tachira, March 22-23. The
rudimentary course included analysis of travel and cargo
documents, observational techniques, interviewing techniques,
and inspection techniques. The course was well attended and
the students enthusiastic. Demand for the class was such
that not all could be accommodated, and we plan to return the
week of April 9.
4. (C) On March 14 the Ambassador hosted a fundraiser for
Alianza para una Venezuela sin Drogas, a sister organization
of Partnership for a Drug Free America. Three hundred
well-heeled members of the business and media were invited,
more than 200 confirmed, but only about 75 showed up.
Previous iterations of this same event have always been very
well attended. Several of the no-shows told Alianza they
were apprehensive that attending an event at the U.S.
Ambassador's residence could open them up to political
persecution. BRV Drug Czar Luis Correa was invited to the
fundraiser but refused to attend, giving us the excuse that a
member of Alianza's board of directors, Marcel Granier, was a
coup-plotter. (Note: Granier is prominent opposition figure
who has fearlessly attacked the Chavez government. He owns
and directs the private television station RCTV.)
5. (C) Apparently, snubbing the event was not sufficient for
Correa. On March 20 he called television stations
Globovision and Venevision to advise them that Alianza had
been decertified as a BRV-approved demand reduction NGO and
that any time donated to Alianza would be taxed. This
information was initially passed to us by Alianza but was
later confirmed by Granier, the media NGO Bloque de Prensa,
and our contacts in Globovision and Venevision. Both
immediately pulled the Alianza commercials. In a March 23
meeting, Globovision added that Correa had specifically
referred to the March 14 fundraiser when explaining the
reasons for decertifying Alianza.
6. (C) After an in-house meeting, we determined to confront
Correa. On March 24, NAS and DEA met with Correa and bluntly
accused him of persecuting Alianza solely for having held
their fundraiser at the Ambassador's residence. Correa took
umbrage, but not too much, insisting that the fundraiser and
the decision to take away their tax-free status were not
related. He went on to explain that the transformation of
CARACAS 00000852 002 OF 002
the Commission Against Drug Abuse (CONACUID) into the
National Anti-drug Office (ONA) required that each of the 305
CN-related NGO's previously approved by CONACUID be
reevaluated and approved by ONA. Alianza, he insisted, had
yet to do so. He promised to work with Alianza to expedite
their petition for tax-free status.
7. (C) We took advantage of the meeting to give Correa an
advance copy of the Addendum to the 1978 CN MOU. A formal
copy was transmitted by dip note to the MFA. Correa was
visibly pleased to get it and was optimistic that it would be
signed soon, insisting that our complaints about lack of
cooperation were about to end.
8. (C) COMMENT: Correa is anxious to move this Addendum
forward as its signing will represent a rare achievement for
him. Drug seizures are well behind last year's and Correa's
controlling and manipulative behavior continues to alienate
his colleagues within the BRV police, military and
intelligence apparatus. Correa is a professional
intelligence officer. Before taking over CONACUID/ONA,
Correa headed the technical unit within the Intelligence
Services Directorate (DISIP) that targeted the U.S. Mission.
Notches on his belt include turning a USG informant and
penetrating an unclassified email system. While undoubtedly
clever, his DISIP-inspired management style has not been
successful. He treats his contacts like informants,
compartmentalizes information, and believes surreptitiously
exchanging information epitomizes bilateral cooperation. He
is sadly unable to fill the coordinating and policy
generation role that his position demands.
--------------
DEA COMMENT
--------------
9. (S) Luis Correa, while a member of the civilian
intelligence agency DISIP, was responsible for monitoring
U.S. Embassy communications with teltap and cellular
intercept equipment. He also managed a computer hacker who,
by targeting opposition figures, managed to obtain an Embassy
officer's unclassified emails. Additionally, since mid-2004,
Correa has led a team of intelligence officers to conduct
surveillance of DEA agents and the DEA vetted unit. During
this time, Correa was able to infiltrate the DEA vetted unit
headquarters and sabotage equipment purchased by NAS.
10. (S) In March 2006, Correa directed a professional
contact of the DEA to provide him information regarding
current DEA investigations in an effort to expose DEA for
conducting unilateral operations within Venezuela. Correa
stated that he wanted to find the next John Correa, the U.S.
Naval Attache expelled for espionage. When the contact
refused, Correa asked the contact's supervisor to pressure
the contact to cooperate.
BROWNFIELD
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
FOR FRC LAMBERT
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2026
TAGS: SNAR PREL PINR VZ
SUBJECT: BRV COUNTERDRUG AMBIVALENCE
Classified By: AMBASSADOR WILLIAM F. BROWNFIELD FOR 1.5 (D)
1. (C) SUMMARY: The BRV's CN relationship with us continues
to be ambivalent. On one hand, the Antidrogas command of the
National Guard (GN) is increasingly willing to work with us
within our Port Security Project, while BRV Drug Czar Luis
Correa appears to be penalizing NGO Alianza for having too
close of a relationship with us. Correa insists that there
is no persecution and that CN cooperation will rapidly take
off once the Addendum to the 1978 CN MOU is signed. END
SUMMARY
2. (U) Our only active project with the BRV is the Port
Security Project. This week small steps forward were
achieved with the assistance of the National Guard (GN)
Antidrogas command. First, Antidrogas agreed to be formally
named the end-user of a NAS funded container inspection
machine, a requirement for importing the gamma source. The
machine is a loaner until we get our own and will be used in
conjunction with our Puerto Cabello Container Inspection
Facility (CIF). Though agreeing to be the formal end-user
may not seem like much, our BRV contacts have been wary of
putting their names to any document which links them with the
USG.
3. (U) Also, after months of delay, Antidrogas finally
authorized our CBP inspectors stationed in Puerto Cabello to
conduct two days of training in Tachira, March 22-23. The
rudimentary course included analysis of travel and cargo
documents, observational techniques, interviewing techniques,
and inspection techniques. The course was well attended and
the students enthusiastic. Demand for the class was such
that not all could be accommodated, and we plan to return the
week of April 9.
4. (C) On March 14 the Ambassador hosted a fundraiser for
Alianza para una Venezuela sin Drogas, a sister organization
of Partnership for a Drug Free America. Three hundred
well-heeled members of the business and media were invited,
more than 200 confirmed, but only about 75 showed up.
Previous iterations of this same event have always been very
well attended. Several of the no-shows told Alianza they
were apprehensive that attending an event at the U.S.
Ambassador's residence could open them up to political
persecution. BRV Drug Czar Luis Correa was invited to the
fundraiser but refused to attend, giving us the excuse that a
member of Alianza's board of directors, Marcel Granier, was a
coup-plotter. (Note: Granier is prominent opposition figure
who has fearlessly attacked the Chavez government. He owns
and directs the private television station RCTV.)
5. (C) Apparently, snubbing the event was not sufficient for
Correa. On March 20 he called television stations
Globovision and Venevision to advise them that Alianza had
been decertified as a BRV-approved demand reduction NGO and
that any time donated to Alianza would be taxed. This
information was initially passed to us by Alianza but was
later confirmed by Granier, the media NGO Bloque de Prensa,
and our contacts in Globovision and Venevision. Both
immediately pulled the Alianza commercials. In a March 23
meeting, Globovision added that Correa had specifically
referred to the March 14 fundraiser when explaining the
reasons for decertifying Alianza.
6. (C) After an in-house meeting, we determined to confront
Correa. On March 24, NAS and DEA met with Correa and bluntly
accused him of persecuting Alianza solely for having held
their fundraiser at the Ambassador's residence. Correa took
umbrage, but not too much, insisting that the fundraiser and
the decision to take away their tax-free status were not
related. He went on to explain that the transformation of
CARACAS 00000852 002 OF 002
the Commission Against Drug Abuse (CONACUID) into the
National Anti-drug Office (ONA) required that each of the 305
CN-related NGO's previously approved by CONACUID be
reevaluated and approved by ONA. Alianza, he insisted, had
yet to do so. He promised to work with Alianza to expedite
their petition for tax-free status.
7. (C) We took advantage of the meeting to give Correa an
advance copy of the Addendum to the 1978 CN MOU. A formal
copy was transmitted by dip note to the MFA. Correa was
visibly pleased to get it and was optimistic that it would be
signed soon, insisting that our complaints about lack of
cooperation were about to end.
8. (C) COMMENT: Correa is anxious to move this Addendum
forward as its signing will represent a rare achievement for
him. Drug seizures are well behind last year's and Correa's
controlling and manipulative behavior continues to alienate
his colleagues within the BRV police, military and
intelligence apparatus. Correa is a professional
intelligence officer. Before taking over CONACUID/ONA,
Correa headed the technical unit within the Intelligence
Services Directorate (DISIP) that targeted the U.S. Mission.
Notches on his belt include turning a USG informant and
penetrating an unclassified email system. While undoubtedly
clever, his DISIP-inspired management style has not been
successful. He treats his contacts like informants,
compartmentalizes information, and believes surreptitiously
exchanging information epitomizes bilateral cooperation. He
is sadly unable to fill the coordinating and policy
generation role that his position demands.
--------------
DEA COMMENT
--------------
9. (S) Luis Correa, while a member of the civilian
intelligence agency DISIP, was responsible for monitoring
U.S. Embassy communications with teltap and cellular
intercept equipment. He also managed a computer hacker who,
by targeting opposition figures, managed to obtain an Embassy
officer's unclassified emails. Additionally, since mid-2004,
Correa has led a team of intelligence officers to conduct
surveillance of DEA agents and the DEA vetted unit. During
this time, Correa was able to infiltrate the DEA vetted unit
headquarters and sabotage equipment purchased by NAS.
10. (S) In March 2006, Correa directed a professional
contact of the DEA to provide him information regarding
current DEA investigations in an effort to expose DEA for
conducting unilateral operations within Venezuela. Correa
stated that he wanted to find the next John Correa, the U.S.
Naval Attache expelled for espionage. When the contact
refused, Correa asked the contact's supervisor to pressure
the contact to cooperate.
BROWNFIELD