DIPLOMATIC CARGO IMPOUNDED

C O N F I D E N T I A L CARACAS 002852

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR WHA/AND, OFM, AND L/DL
HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
DEPT PASS TO AID/OTI RPORTER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2031
TAGS: ADPM MARR MASS PGOV PREL VE
SUBJECT: DIPLOMATIC CARGO IMPOUNDED

REF: IIR-6-902-9077-06 DTG 051519Z SEP 06

Classified By: Robert Downes, Political Counselor,
for Reason 1.4(b).

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) The Venezuelan National Guard (GN) seized and opened
part of an inbound U.S. Military Group (MILGP) shipment on
August 23. The seized cargo consists of household effects
(HHE) and commissary rations. A shipment of FMS materials
ordered and purchased by the BRV and consisting of ejection
seat components was also part of the shipment, but was
cleared and removed from the area before the seizure and
remain in MILGP possession. The BRV handling of this
incident quickly spiraled out of control, with senior
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (BRV) officials accusing the
United States of wrongdoing. While numerous theories as to
BRV motivation exist, it is unclear and will likely remain
unclear what confluence of events or strategies led to the
seizure. What is clear is that, due to a conscious,
high-level decision by the BRV, an historically smooth
diplomatic protocol has been compromised, and could have
lasting ramifications. END SUMMARY

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HOW IT NORMALLY WORKS
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2. (C) The Military Group (MILGP) receives a support C-17
flight every two months, normally carrying household effects
(HHE) for military staff assigned to the Embassy, as well as
commissary rations. Dangerous military cargo can be carried
on these flights. MILGP has received this support for
decades and has routinely enjoyed the administrative and
logistical support of the BRV. On August 23, MILGP followed
standard procedures, requesting and receiving clearance for
the incoming aircraft, as well as for all vehicles and
personnel picking up the cargo. On this occasion, as in the
past, airport and National Guard (GN) personnel allowed the
convoy to pass through customs and agriculture checks without
incident.

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HOW IT DIDN'T WORK THIS TIME
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3. (C) Upon exiting the airport, the convoy consisting of
four trucks split into two convoys, one each of two
tractor-trailers and two smaller trucks. While the two
smaller trucks, carrying a few HHE items and the FMS
material, reached Caracas without incident, the two larger
trucks proceeded to a holding area as the route between the
airport and Caracas is only open to heavy traffic during
certain hours. It was during this wait that the GN
approached the heavy trucks, initially saying there was a
paperwork issue and directed the trucks to return to the
airport to clear up some customs problems. Threats to open
the crates came from various angles, and, at one point during
the night, a GN Captain even distributed tools to his
soldiers with orders to open the crates.


4. (C) Caracas MILGP Commander spoke with the GN Core 5
Commander, Major General Luis Matto, who was at the airport,
in the early morning hours of August 24. MILGP Commander
underlined that the containers had been properly cleared and
in any case were protected under the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations (VCDR). Matto indicated that Minister
of Defense Baduel had specifically sent him to open the
containers and that they had "clearance" from the MFA that
the cargo was to be opened. Once two Venezuelan prosecutors
validated customs agents' previous, erroneous declarations
that the cargo was not diplomatic, and over the repeated
objections of the MILGP transportation NCO present at the
scene, the cargo was opened and the containers emptied. The
MILGP NCO departed the scene at this time, to avoid any
perception that his presence could be misconstrued as
acceptance of the BRV actions, including under Article 36 of
the VCDR.

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HIGH-LEVEL INVOLVEMENT
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5. (C) The fact that Minister of Defense Baduel ordered a
two-star general out to the airport in the middle of the

night conclusively demonstrates this whole matter was a
conscious decision by senior BRV leadership. Minister of
Interior and Justice Jesse Chacon held a press conference on
August 25, during which he called out individual Embassy
employees (both officers and FSNs) and accused the USG of
bringing dangerous, even subversive contraband into the BRV
under the guise of "diplomatic cargo."


6. (C) Then-Vice Foreign Minister (VFM) for North American
and Multilateral Affairs MariPili Hernandez received Charge
and visiting Special Coordinator for Venezuela on August 28.
Hernandez's reaction to our broaching of the subject
suggested she was not fully in the loop and did not have all
the facts. Even as she emphasized the need to maintain these
interactions in diplomatic channels and out of the press,
Hernandez had just issued a press release regarding her note
of protest to the Embassy on this very incident.


7. (C) Charge spoke September 13 with Rene Arreaza, Chief
of Staff to Vice President Rangel, regarding the release of
the impounded HHE. Arreaza indicated he had talked with
Rangel, who had, in turn, talked with Chavez on the subject.
According to Arreaza, new VFM Jorge Valero Briceno
(MariPili's successor) has been directed to meet with us
following his return from the NAM conference on or about
September 15 to resolve the issue. Arreaza reported that
Rangel had spoken directly with Customs chief Jose Vielma
Mora, who reiterated that there was no basis on which to hold
the seized cargo. (NOTE: While the impounded material
physically resides with SENIAT (BRV Customs),they have told
MILGP personnel that prosecutor Damaso Garcia in the Public
Ministry is responsible for approving the release of the
material. END NOTE)

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POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS
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8. (C) There are a number of possible explanations for BRV
behavior in this case. We do not have all the answers, but a
couple of basic points bear noting.

-- This was not a matter of a junior GN officer exceeding his
authority. The fact that a GN major general was at the
airport in the middle of the night, stating that he was
acting on orders of the MOD, establishes rather that this was
a planned activity by the BRV. Moreover, the rapid, detailed
engagement by three different BRV ministries, all suggesting
nefarious USG motives, supports this conclusion.
(Interestingly, the MOD has had little to say on this issue,
letting the MFA, MOJ, and even the AG carry the load.)

-- This harassment is consistent with two reliable behaviors
by the BRV in this pre-electoral period: first, its dedicated
effort to posit a purported conflict between the United
States and Venezuela; and second, its continuing effort to
stage events to distract attention from intractable issues of
governance (crime, housing, etc.),where the BRV's record is
poor.


9. (C) Among the explanations we have heard for why the BRV
undertook such action are:

-- an effort to embarrass the United States by "discovering"
munitions (i.e., the ejector seat materiel) in the shipment;

-- a related effort to suggest a fear of military coup
plotting; (Minister of Interior Jesse Chacon harped on this
theme in length in his intervention.)

-- an effort to embarrass the Venezuelan Air Force,
traditionally viewed as the most pro-American armed service;
and

-- a distraction from the BRV's current problems of
governance.

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COMMENT
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10. (C) Even in the embattled environment surrounding
USG-BRV relations, we have enjoyed relative ease with regard
to diplomatic shipments prior to this incident. Post will
continue to operate through available diplomatic channels to
retrieve all of the seized cargo.

BROWNFIELD