VENEZUELA/CUBA: MORE TORCH-PASSING VIEWS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CARACAS 002655

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/31/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV VE CU
SUBJECT: VENEZUELA/CUBA: MORE TORCH-PASSING VIEWS

REF: CARACAS 2527

Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT DOWNES,
REASON 1.4 (D)


1. (C) Summary. Charge met August 25 with several Venezuelan
Cuba experts to solicit informed views on the likely impact
Fidel Castro's absence from the scene would have on Venezuela
and President Chavez. The Venezuelan Cuba-watchers predicted
that the death of Fidel Castro would be a severe
psychological blow to Chavez and undermine his Bolivarian
revolution ideology. At the same time, the experts opined
that Chavez aspires to be the leader of the international
socialist movement and would try to fill Castro's
"anti-imperialist" shoes. While noting that Chavez does not
have as good a relationship with Raul Castro, they
nevertheless predicted that Chavez would try to sustain a
hard-line succession in Cuba. These same interlocutors
praised the USG's "prudent" policy to date on the Cuba
transition process. End Summary.


2. (SBU) Charge, accompanied by PAO and A/PolCouns, met
August 25 with a group of influential Venezuelan
"Cuba-watchers" to disseminate further the USG's post-Castro
transition policy message and to solicit additional views on
the potential impact Castro's death would have on President
Chavez. Former Venezuelan UN Ambassador Milos Alcalay
organized the August 25 roundtable as a follow-up to the
Charge's August 16 lunch to discuss the same subject
(reftel). Former COPEI presidential candidate Eduardo
Fernandez, ex-Ambassador Eduardo Figueroa, Castro biographer
(and once a Cuban-trained "guerrillero") Americo Martin, and
former Secretary General of the Venezuelan Communist (also
Cuban-trained) Party Pompeyo Marquez participated.

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Chavez Without Castro
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3. (C) All participants in the August 25 roundtable
underscored the depth of President Chavez's personal devotion
to Fidel Castro and predicted that Castro's death will be a
significant blow to Chavez psychologically. They said the
Venezuelan President has relied heavily on Castro's advice,
particularly during domestic crises. Fernandez opined that
Chavez appears psychologically dependent on Castro and
predicted that Chavismo without Castro would "lose its soul."
Others predicted that Chavez would try to radicalize his
domestic program in the wake of Castro's death. Alcalay, for
example, highlighted Chavez's continued political dependence
on the Cuban-staffed health and educational "mission"
programs.


4. (C) The same group argued that Chavez truly sees himself
as the Castro's heir to the international socialist movement.
They believed that the passing-of-the-torch media images of
Chavez's August 13 bedside visit with Castro revealed the
true extent of the Venezuelan president's international
ambition and "megalomania." Alcalay predicted that after
Castro's death, Chavez would "expropriate Castro's words" for
his own purposes, much in the same way Chavez already
exploits the writings of Simon Bolivar. Retired ambassador
Figueroa argued that without Castro behind him, Chavez's
influence would diminish in Latin America.

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Chavez and the Cuban Transition
--------------


5. (C) Drawing on their Cuban experience and contacts, our
interlocutors predicted that the post-Castro Cuban transition
will evolve spontaneously, and not according to a
well-defined plan. They all assumed Raul Castro would
continue to lead Cuba, but would rely heavily on domestic
alliances, particularly his well-developed ties within the
military. None of the Cuba-watchers believed the Chavez's

CARACAS 00002655 002 OF 002


relationship between Raul Castro could ever be as strong as
his relationship with Fidel, although Alcalay argued Raul
would still welcome the BRV's continued, critical economic
support. Pompeyano stressed that Chavez is not very popular
among the Cuban people.


6. (C) Our interlocutors did not discount the possibility
that the BRV would potentially engage in military adventurism
in Cuba, potentially choosing the hard-line side in a civil
conflict. They did stress, however, that Venezuela has no
tradition of expeditionary military action and that even the
BRV would have to weigh the diplomatic downside of
international isolation. Several suggested that in such a
circumstance, quasi-military groups tied to the MVR,
especially the Francisco Miranda Front, could serve as a
vanguard intervention force. At the same time, former
guerrillero Martin suggested that the BRV is engaging in
"excessive arms purchases" to stockpile weapons for potential
export.

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Praise for U.S. Policy
--------------


7. (C) Drawing on the Secretary's and A/S Shannon's recent
statements, Charge underscored our support for a future of
freedom for Cuba that will be defined by the Cuban people, as
well as our willingness to provide humanitarian assistance to
a democratic transition government. He stressed that the
Cuban people deserve the freedoms that we in this hemisphere
have determined are their rights: the freedom of expression,
the freedom to form political parties, the freedom to choose
their own leaders, and the freedom not to be jailed for their
political beliefs. Cautioning that they are more accustomed
to criticizing U.S. foreign policy, the participants
nevertheless universally praised U.S. policy to date with
respect to the transition taking place in Cuba. They
stressed that U.S. "prudence" would be decisive in
facilitating a democratic transition.

WHITAKER