OAS EOM FINAL REPORT ON VENEZUELA ELECTIONS --

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CARACAS 001231

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/03/2016
TAGS: PGOV KDEM OAS VE
SUBJECT: OAS EOM FINAL REPORT ON VENEZUELA ELECTIONS --
WEAKER STILL

REF: A. 05 CARACAS 3681


B. CARACAS 00719

C. CARACAS 00903

D. CARACAS 01152

Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT R. DOWNES FOR 1.4 (D)

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Summary
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1. (C) On April 25, the OAS electoral observation mission
(EOM) quietly released its final report on the December 2005
legislative elections. The report, like the preliminary
version, was less critical of the electoral process than the
EU EOM (refs a and b). In general, most criticism of the
government is buried in the body of the report, and some of
the OAS EOM's recommendations for resolving problems do not
effectively address the issues. There has been little
reaction to the report, but the government did run full page
ads in opposition papers May 7 highlighting the parts of the
report that praised the automated voting system. If this
does become a hot topic, it might be in the context of its
formal presentation at the OAS ministerial meeting in Santo
Domingo in June. End Summary.

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OAS EOM Views Similar, but Sometimes Weaker than EU
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2. (C) The OAS electoral observation mission's (EOM) final
report on the December 2005 legislative elections, like the
preliminary version, is similar but less critical of the
electoral process than the EU EOM (refs a and b). For
example, the OAS EOM acknowledges that the opposition's
distrust of the National Electoral Council (CNE) was rooted
in its "origin, composition, and provisional status."
Instead of recommending a new, more politically balanced CNE,
however, the OAS simply recommends that the National Assembly
name a permanent CNE by either ratifying in place or changing
the current members, seemingly dismissing the opposition's
concerns about the board's extremely biased composition. The
EOM later notes that the government is responsible for
including the opposition in formal and informal
decisionmaking. However, the wording does not necessarily
imply including people of diverse political views in the CNE
or any government body. In addition, the OAS supports the
opposition's demand that the CNE release the electoral
registry with addresses, essential to verifying the accuracy
of the rolls, but it does not use the existence of the Tascon
or Maisanta lists as part of its argument. The lists, which
essentially single out opposition supporters, are briefly
mentioned as an opposition concern. The OAS EOM claimed it
could not confirm their use as a tool of political
discrimination, but were disturbed by the "possibility" that
the lists could be used for political means. The lists are
key to voter confidence in the even-handedness of the CNE,
however, another point the EOM dodged.


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3. (C) The OAS report is closer to that of the EU on other
issues and occasionally goes further in its critique and/or
recommendations. For example, the OAS EOM agreed that legal
loopholes, and inconsistent and, at times, contradictory
applications of the Constitution and electoral laws led to
decisions that violated the spirit and letter of the law,
generating further suspicion of the electoral process. The
OAS EOM specifically singles out the CNE for not protecting
the principle of proportional representation as the
Constitution calls on it to do. On the technical front, the
OAS, like the EU, noted that the technological development of
the voting system had surpassed what was envisioned and
regulated in the electoral law. The OAS EOM also called for
the opposition to be given a more active role in auditing the
voting system, as the EU did. In its technical discussion
the OAS went one step further calling on the CNE to develop a
long-term strategic plan for future automation of the voting
system.

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Some Recommendations Appear Inadequate
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4. (C) Occasionally, the OAS EOM's recommendations for
resolving problems do not appear to satisfactorily address
them. Although it suggests rethinking the prohibition on
public financing for political parties, the OAS EOM also
recommends the CNE limit the time and extent of campaigning,
as it is constitutionally authorized to do, as an alternative
solution to balancing out the funding for campaigns and
making it more transparent. Another recommendation states
the CNE should regulate the internal elections of political
parties to ensure that the constitutional requirements for
such elections are met. This seems like an odd
recommendation, since the CNE has been unable to fulfill its
constitutional obligation to oversee the labor unions'
internal elections and is widely accused of interfering for
political reasons. As a result, these elections have been
delayed by more than a year, triggering frustration of these
unions and a citation by the International Labor
Organization. Moreover, President Chavez used this legal
provision in 2000 to try to get his supporters elected as
leaders of the pro-opposition Venezuelan Workers
Confederation (CTV),the country's largest union at the time.

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Reaction
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5. (U) There has been little reaction to the report and all
of it has been predictable. The CNE website has an article
taken from the Communication Ministry's website that focuses
on the OAS' approval of the automated voting system and
strong condemnation of the opposition for pulling out despite
the CNE's concession to withdraw the fingerprint machines.
In addition, the government took out full page ads in the May
7 editions of pro-opposition newspapers El Universal and El
Nacional highlighting excerpts that praised the automated
voting system and the CNE's work. The opposition papers have

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emphasized the OAS' usual call for dialogue and its
recommendation to release the electoral registry with
addresses to opposition and civil society organizations to
ensure independent auditing and review.

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Comment
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6. (C) The quiet unveiling of the OAS report and the absence
of any telling criticism of the CNE, compared to the EU's
formal release via press conference in Caracas and up front,
direct critiques, suggests the OAS is more concerned about
sparking President Chavez' ire than providing a fully
accurate and useful report. The OAS' feeble performance in
this instance must be factored into a decision on whether to
support future OAS observation missions in Venezuela. Having
said that, as noted in ref c, leadership is key. Perina
simply did not have the stature or the spine to stand up to
the BRV. The report, like the appointment of the new CNE
(ref d) appears to be a missed opportunity to suggest
necessary improvements to the electoral process in Venezuela.
While the murder of a prominent priest (septel) and the
appointment of the CNE have overshadowed news of the report,
if this does become a hot topic, it might be in the context
of its formal presentation at the OAS ministerial meeting in
Santo Domingo in June.
BROWNFIELD