IS CHAVEZ LOSING IT?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 CARACAS 001169

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
FOR FRC LAMBERT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/28/2026
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR VE
SUBJECT: IS CHAVEZ LOSING IT?

REF: A. CARACAS 00374

B. IIR 6 902 9500 06

C. IIR 6 902 9493 06

D. IIR 6 902 9498 06

E. 05 CARACAS 02934

CARACAS 00001169 001.2 OF 005


Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT R. DOWNES FOR 1.4 (D)

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (C) Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez' rhetoric has
always been radical. Yet, up until the last six to 12
months, he reserved his most extreme statements for domestic
audiences. Lately, he has flown off the handle in front of
international microphones. He has criticized regional
counterparts who in the past he attempted to court. He has
even lashed out at his own domestic supporters. Meanwhile,
his claims that the United States is trying to assassinate
him or to invade Venezuela have continued. Although there is
some evidence that elements of the Venezuelan Government
question his reactionary harangues, his most senior advisers
mimic his radical rhetoric. Whether his attempts to circle
the wagons around a smaller, more radical group of countries
is a calculated strategy or a frustrated reaction to the
region's refusal to embrace him as its leader is unclear. We
do not know whether Chavez' job is getting to him, but his
public antics are making him appear increasingly on edge.
Whatever the cause, we can take advantage of his volatile
behavior. Creative U.S. outreach to Chavez' regional
partners will drive a wedge between him and them. Through
his relationship with Iran, Chavez' appears to have begun to
alarm countries untroubled by his anti-U.S. rhetoric on his
own. As international attention--especially from us--feeds
Chavez' ego, we need to be circumspect in choosing which of
his outbursts to respond to.

-------------- --------------
International Audiences Get Dose of the Real Chavez
-------------- --------------


2. (U) Chavez used to moderate his rhetoric when he spoke
before international audiences. Over the past six to twelve
months, however, he has spouted in foreign venues the
invective he once reserved for speeches to his hardline
domestic supporters. Chavez began a "Nightline" interview in
September 2005 by trying to appear kindhearted toward the
American people. He claimed close ties to former President
Clinton and said he wanted to kneel in prayer with Americans.
In response to Ted Koppel's pointed questions, however, he
eventually accused the United States of having plans to
invade Venezuela and said "Mr. Bush's administration" was the
only government "on the face of the earth" with which he
lacked good relations. At a speech at the U.N. General
Assembly the same month, Chavez accused market-oriented
economic policies espoused by President Bush of sowing
"misery, inequality, and infinite tragedy for all the peoples
on the continent." He accused Washington of attempting to
overthrow him in 2002, of organizing Venezuela's 2002-03
national strike, and of tolerating international terrorism.
Perhaps Chavez' most well publicized example of radical and
undiplomatic behavior occurred in November 2005 on the
margins of the Summit of the Americas in Mar del Plata,
Argentina. Chavez and a stadium full of adulating supporters
jumped up and down in a rally against President Bush and the
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). Chavez began
chanting, "to hell with FTAA." He recommended that his
colleagues "stay away from President Bush" because meeting

CARACAS 00001169 002.2 OF 005


with him was "bad luck." He reiterated the claims he made on
"Nightline" that he had proof of U.S. plans to invade
Venezuela. At an April 19 meeting in Asuncion with his
Bolivian, Uruguayan, and Paraguayan counterparts, Chavez
threatened to blow up Venezuelan oil wells if the United
States attacked him. During an April 23, 2006 BBC interview,
Chavez repeated most of the accusations he made at the
multilateral events, although he again distinguished between
his love for the American people and his condemnation of
President Bush. He claimed that "combatants" throughout the
region would defend him if the United States attacked
Venezuela. He extended his criticism to British Prime
Minister Tony Blair, calling Blair a "frustration" to the
British left who kneeled to the demands of Washington.

--------------
Isolating Friends
--------------


3. (U) After Chavez dubbed Prime Minister Blair
"Bush-Hitler's main ally" and lambasted him publicly in
February 2006, we reported that Chavez had been increasingly
isolating world leaders other than President Bush (REF A).
This trend has continued. Not only has he continued to
disparage Blair, but he is also still criticizing Latin
American presidents. Chavez withdrew Venezuela from the
Andean Community of Nations (CAN) in late April, blaming his
counterparts in the process. Chavez said Peruvian President
Alejandro Toledo and Colombian President Alvaro Uribe "killed
the CAN" by signing free trade agreements with Washington.
"Let's not waste time reviving (the CAN). Let's bury it...,"
he said. After his remarks touched off a war of words with
left-wing Peruvian presidential candidate Alan Garcia, he
managed to incite another diplomatic incident by insulting
outgoing Peruvian President Toledo (SEPTEL).

--------------
They're Trying to Kill Me
--------------


4. (C) Chavez warns the public on a regular basis that the
United States plans to either attack Venezuela or to
assassinate him. Most recently, he alerted his weekly "Alo
Presidente" program listeners on April 23 that Washington
could use an unspecified "grave event" that could occur
during one of the U.S. Ambassador's future trips as an excuse
for invading Venezuela. Chavez appears to believe his own
rhetoric. Former Science and Technology Minister Carlos
Genatios told poloff that Chavez once summoned him in the
middle of the night because the President had received a
report about an imminent earthquake and was concerned the
United States would drop a bomb to stimulate such a disaster.
DAO reporting indicates that Chavez' personal security
measures are extensive. In particular, DAO observed greatly
increased presidential security and an exhausted and
withdrawn Chavez during two events at Venezuela's military
headquarters (Fuerte Tiuna) in July 2005. The Venezuelan
representative for an armored clothing firm told reporters
Chavez has a large supply of bullet-proof jackets, raincoats,
and his signature red sport shirts, which cost USD 2,500
apiece.

--------------
The Leader is Talking to You!
--------------


5. (U) Even in the domestic context, where Chavez is
typically masterful and totally in charge, the BRV President
has appeared brittle. Chavez appeared to snap when a group

CARACAS 00001169 003.2 OF 005


of poor Venezuelans, who tend to support Chavez, interrupted
a February 9 ceremony commemorating a new "endogenous
development nucleus," that is, a group of state-sponsored
cooperatives. Chavez responded to picketers demanding a
meeting with the President to demand housing by insisting,
"the leader is talking to you!" Continuing to refer to
himself in the third person, he asked, "don't you think the
leader deserves respect?" Chavez also accused the group of
sabotaging the event on behalf of an opposition party. He
said their problems would be addressed afterwards, but he
couldn't "divide himself in three."

--------------
Don't Mention the Emperor's Clothes
--------------


6. (C) DAO reporting indicates Chavez' advisers have a
mixed assessment of his reactionary diatribes (REFS B, C, and
D). According to one report, some administration officials
praise Chavez' rants. Additional DAO reporting indicates
concern among other Chavista officials that the President is
losing the confidence of the public with his alarmist
discourse.


7. (C) If Chavez' most senior officials are aware of the
concern, they choose to ignore it. No one is willing to give
Chavez bad news, much less criticism. Instead, senior
officials often parrot Chavez' radical line. Pro-Chavez
tabloid Diario Vea's "Martian" column, widely thought to be
written by Vice President Jose Vicente Rangel, repeated on
April 25 Chavez' mantra that President Bush's government is
the "most immoral" in the world. The Martian added that
President Bush "surrounded himself with scum." Chavez' chief
exponent of military doctrine, Maj. Gen. Alberto Mueller
Rojas, told reporters the BRV did not make up the idea of a
U.S. invasion. Rather, it was preparing to defend the
homeland. Defense Minister Orlando Maniglia criticized the
press for reporting that he was "not worried" about the visit
of the U.S.S. George Washington carrier group to the
Caribbean. Maniglia said his office remained alert to
"protect territorial waters" from external forces interested
in Venezuelan territory.


8. (SBU) The extremism of some senior BRV officials may
even help fuel Chavez' radical behavior. Chavez has
surrounded himself with officials with violent, radical
backgrounds. Vice President Jose Vicente Rangel is rumored
to have smuggled arms to Venezuelan communist guerrillas
movements active during the 1960s and 1970s. The heads of
the BRV "Moral Power"--Attorney General Isaias Rodriguez,
Comptroller General Clodosbaldo Russian, and Public Defender
German Mundarain--are all ex-guerrillas. Supreme Court
President Omar Mora Diaz is a former urban guerrilla.
Foreign Minister Ali Rodriguez was also involved with
Venezuelan insurgents, and Anzoategui Governor Tarek William
Saab has links to Islamic terrorist activities. Many other
senior Venezuelan military and government officials were
involved in Chavez' coup attempt in 1992.


9. (C) Another partial explanation for Chavez' increasing
radical rhetoric is that Chavez no longer appears to consult
with technocrats and experts outside his inner circle. As a
presidential candidate in 1998, Chavez consulted on a fairly
regular basis with Jose Toro Hardy, a noted commentator and
PDVSA board member, on oil policy. At one point during the
campaign, when Chavez advocated the sale of Citgo, Toro Hardy
had a lengthy conversation with him about the merits of
keeping the company. Chavez promptly backed away from his
earlier comments. Although Toro Hardy is now clearly

CARACAS 00001169 004.2 OF 005


identified with the opposition, Chavez has also backed away
from technocrats and experts who are basically non-political.
For example, oil expert Hugo Hernandez, an external PDVSA
director until January 2005, has maintained excellent ties
with the BRV and opposition but no longer appears to have
access to Chavez (REF E). Chavez' isolation from technocrats
and experts extends beyond the petroleum sector. Jose Rojas,
an adviser to the President of Banco de Venezuela with
impeccable credentials, served as a senior Finance Ministry
official in the early days of the Chavez administration but
no longer has access to senior BRV policymakers.

-------------- --------------
Could His Radicalism be Calculated? An Alternative View
-------------- --------------


10. (SBU) Chavez' radicalism may be calculated rather than
reactionary. That his discourse itself has become more
extreme as his audience has expanded suggests either a change
in Chavez' ideology or, more likely, a radicalization he had
planned all along. For example, Chavez hinted in November
2004 that his revolution would become more radical. In a
speech outlining his "New Strategic Map" at Fuerte Tiuna,
Chavez said, "It's not that those proposing (communism and
eliminating private property) are crazy, no. It is not the
right time." Chavez did not begin using the term "socialist"
to describe his "revolution" until early 2005. Now, "21st
century socialism" is his movement's ubiquitous slogan.


11. (C) Chavez may view turning international as the
natural progression of his revolution. Hiram Gaviria,
Chavez' former Ambassador to France, sketched out for us five
phases of Chavez' movement, noting that we were now in the
"internationalization" period. Indeed, since Chavez has
neutralized his opposition, he may now be turning to others
daring to cross him. (Such an outlook would help explain why
he turned on his own supporters during the "endogenous
nucleus" ceremony.) He may also wager that his tough
behavior plays well domestically, even though it may appall
the diplomatic community.


12. (C) If Chavez truly does fear a U.S. attack, his
provocation of Washington by supporting Iran's nuclear agenda
seems counterintuitive. Yet, Chavez may be hedging his bets
by prioritizing ties to countries he regards as most likely
to help him in the event of an invasion. The most reliable
allies, he may wager, would be other likely targets of U.S.
military action, such as Cuba and Iran. According to DAO
reporting, a senior Venezuelan government official reported
that Chavez believed the United States would attack Iran,
North Korea, and Venezuela. With Cuba, at least, Chavez may
already have some sort of mutual defense agreement. He
announced April 21 that if the United States attacked Cuba,
"Venezuelan blood would run" in Cuba's defense. Although
Chavez said he expected soldiers throughout the region to
defend Venezuela, he may suspect the loyalty of his Latin
American counterparts. A presentation on military doctrine
obtained by poloff that was apparently prepared by the
Venezuelan armed forces in around 2003 (SEPTEL) mentions as a
possible conflict scenario a NATO invasion of Venezuela
justified under the mandate of the OAS.

--------------
Comment
--------------


13. (C) Are Chavez' actions political maneuvers or
knee-jerk responses? The truth is probably somewhere in
between. If Chavez is not losing his mind, he may be at

CARACAS 00001169 005.2 OF 005


least losing his touch. Even if Chavez' radicalism is
calculated, his outbursts are likely to continue. His
government, unable to meet his increasingly ambitious
demands--such as 10 million votes, 1.5 million hectares of
redistributed land, and two million military reservists--is
likely to frustrate him even more. The protesters' demands
for Chavez' attention show that Chavez is beginning to reap
what he has sown by centralizing decisionmaking and trying to
show he can answer all of Venezuela's problems personally.
Meanwhile, we can exploit Chavez' gaffes, which appear
increasingly juvenile--or in the case of Iran, dangerous--to
the international community. Chavez's actions suggest that
he views other countries' involvement with Washington as a
type of betrayal. Consequently, U.S. involvement in Latin
American military exercises and meetings help drive a wedge
between Chavez and the region. Successfully inked U.S. trade
agreements are already causing him to lash out against his
regional counterparts.


14. (C) Chavez' narcissism can not be overestimated. Part
of his self-worth derives from the amount of international
attention he receives. That Time magazine named Chavez one
of the 100 most influential people probably set his world on
fire. With this in mind, we should not respond to every one
of his nutty remarks. By refusing to take each of Chavez'
outbursts seriously, we frustrate him even more, paving the
way for additional Bolivarian miscalculations. We also allow
room for other international actors to respond.

BROWNFIELD