Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06CARACAS1052
2006-04-18 18:19:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Caracas
Cable title:  

COPEI: LAST DITCH SCRAMBLE FOR REJUVENATION

Tags:  PGOV KDEM VE 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CARACAS 001052 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
FOR FRC LAMBERT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2026
TAGS: PGOV KDEM VE
SUBJECT: COPEI: LAST DITCH SCRAMBLE FOR REJUVENATION

REF: CARACAS 01026

CARACAS 00001052 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT R. DOWNES FOR 1.4 (D)

-------
Summary
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CARACAS 001052

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
FOR FRC LAMBERT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2026
TAGS: PGOV KDEM VE
SUBJECT: COPEI: LAST DITCH SCRAMBLE FOR REJUVENATION

REF: CARACAS 01026

CARACAS 00001052 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT R. DOWNES FOR 1.4 (D)

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (C) Venezuelan Christian Democratic party COPEI shuffled
its executive after young party members revolted against the
leadership of former secretary general Cesar Perez Vivas in
March. Former international relations secretary Sadio
Garavini told poloff the new leaders were good but criticized
his party for cleaning house at a time when the opposition
needed to appear most united. Although Garavini described
the purge as a clash in personalities rather than policies,
the new leadership did appear to have some real differences
with Perez Vivas over political strategy. Like his
counterpart in Accion Democratica (REFTEL),Perez Vivas was
an overconfident leader focused on seeking help from the
international community rather than on appealing to
Venezuelan voters. Conversely, new secretary general Luis
Ignacio Planas and his allies have been seriously examining
the party's internal weaknesses. Whether the plodding
self-reflection will help resurrect COPEI will depend on the
still untested new leadership and its ability to adopt
fundamental changes more quickly than it has in the past.

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Public Explanation for Party Purge Spurious
--------------


2. (U) The president, the secretary general, and other
senior officials of Venezuelan Christian Democratic party
COPEI resigned March 10, according to press reports.
President Eduardo Fernandez, the party's figurehead, said he
wanted to cede the way for new faces. Secretary general
Cesar Perez Vivas, COPEI's top political official, claimed he
was resigning to show his profound differences with President
Eduardo Fernandez. He also denounced the penetration of the
party leadership by Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez'
movement. Perez Vivas' explanation begged the question why,
if Fernandez were resigning, he needed to step down in
protest. His decision to remain in the party despite its
infiltration by Chavistas was also curious.

--------------
A COPEI Coup?

--------------


3. (C) Daniel Thiman, personal aide to COPEI's former
Miranda State Governor Enrique Mendoza, offered poloff in
mid-March a more convincing explanation of the party purge.
According to Thiman, young party officials in league with
Fernandez maneuvered to kick out Perez Vivas. COPEI's
executive committee rejected Perez Vivas' annual report of
the party by a 46-4 vote, according to press reports.
Fernandez' resignation was arranged as part of the deal for
Perez Vivas to step down. Former international affairs
secretary general Sadio Garavini, who stepped down as well,

SIPDIS
confirmed Thiman's version of events. In a March 27 meeting
with poloff, Garavini added that the divisions in the party
also fell along urban and rural lines, with Tachira-born
Perez Vivas' contingent hailing from the Venezuelan interior.



4. (C) Garavini said that although he was closer to
Fernandez than to Perez Vivas, he had reservations about the
party machinations. Garavini said the new leadership under
secretary general Luis Ignacio Planas was good. Nonetheless,

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he did not expect the purge would change COPEI policies

CARACAS 00001052 002.2 OF 003


because it was above all a struggle of personalities. COPEI
needed to change its structure and to shed its image of the
past, he said. He granted that the shakeup was needed, but
he questioned the timing. One of the few opposition figures
who has steadfastly promoted alliances, Garavini said Chavez'
opponents were showing their divisions when they needed to
look most united. His resignation letter suggested that his
opposition to the timing of the purge prompted him to step
down, although he may have fallen victim to the same deal
that required the resignation of his ally, Fernandez.

--------------
The Two Former Wings of the Party
--------------


5. (C) CESAR PEREZ VIVAS. COPEI remained anchored to the
discredited Fourth Republic during the tenure of former
secretary general Cesar Perez Vivas. Perez Vivas exhibited

SIPDIS
an overconfidence and obliviousness to the fate of his party
similar to that of Accion Democratica (AD) secretary general
Henry Ramos Allup (REFTEL). In a late 2004 meeting with
poloff, Perez Vivas said COPEI needed to distance itself from
other parties in order to keep its own identity. He also
shunned working with NGOs and unions. (Embassy note: Most
other parties, NGOs, and unions enjoy greater credibility
with the Venezuelan public than does COPEI. COPEI's share of
the Venezuelan vote has dwindled to less than 4 percent in
part because it retains the stigma of its pre-Chavez
presidential administrations.) According to press reports,
members of various parties complained that Perez Vivas
hindered the formation of electoral alliances.


6. (C) Perez Vivas shared AD's strategy of looking for help
from the international community rather than courting
Venezuelan voters. After telling poloff COPEI needed U.S.
financing, he met with the Ambassador in August 2005 to make
the same appeal. When Ambassador told him the U.S. strategy
was to support grassroots organizations rather than weakened
political parties, Perez Vivas pressed for indirect support
through NDI or IRI. The Ambassador countered by offering to
triangulate support with COPEI for social projects in poor
areas, a strategy, he noted, the opposition especially needed
to adopt. Perez Vivas agreed, but never returned with any
concrete proposals.


7. (C) EDUARDO FERNANDEZ. Former President Fernandez
displayed a sophistication and cleverness in his public
discourse that has been lacking among many opposition
leaders. For example, in a speech honoring COPEI's 60th
anniversary in January, Fernandez said that Venezuelans were
paying dearly for the divisions and useless arguments of the
opposition. Unlike most opposition spokesmen, who tend to
hone in on electoral and other Chavez abuses that resonate
little with the Venezuelan public, Fernandez attacked key
Chavez weaknesses. He criticized the poor state of
Venezuelan schools and hospitals. In a strategic approach
few other opposition figures have adopted, he contrasted the
money the BRV has awarded ("regalar") abroad with the
"Dante-esque spectacle" in which Venezuelans lived.
Fernandez was not always in line with COPEI policy, and as a
primarily symbolic figure, was unable to change it. Along
with Garavini, Fernandez opposed the decision to not
participate in the December elections, reasoning that COPEI
could not build a majority by abstention but only by
"presenting an alternative program."

--------------
New Leadership Still an Unknown
--------------


8. (C) The new COPEI leadership has since adopted the

CARACAS 00001052 003.2 OF 003


cautious, participatory approach espoused by Fernandez during
the legislative elections. COPEI originally did not endorse
the "decalogue" of 10 electoral reforms that AD and other
parties demanded from the National Electoral Council (CNE).
It has since reversed itself, pitching its endorsement of the
10 demands as an act of unity with the opposition. Unlike
AD, however, COPEI is still participating in efforts to
select a unity candidate and has signaled its satisfaction
with some of the candidates for the CNE, according to press
reports. COPEI's new secretary general, Luis Ignacio Planas,
is a young official who has stuck to the party line in
meetings with poloff. Although his promise as party leader
is unclear, Planas appears to have no illusions about the
difficulty of the task he faces. Before taking the reins of
the party, Planas served as COPEI's national coordinator for
organization and electoral control. As such, he was involved
in a project called "Open Doors" aimed at signing up 250,000
party members. Planas presided over a conference attended by
poloff in January on the future of Christian Democratic
parties that soberly examined COPEI's weaknesses. Planas
faulted the party's lost connection with the people and its
unclear message. At the conference, party leadership and
vision coordinator Roberto Casanova summarized party
problems, some of which recalled the strategies of the
notably absent Perez Vivas. According to the presentation,
centralism, limited internal democracy, an inability to
finance itself, a poor relationship with civil society, and
an absence of ideology dogged COPEI. Since becoming
secretary general, Planas has begun accusing Perez Vivas'

SIPDIS
remaining allies in COPEI of involvement in financial
irregularities, according to Mendoza aide Thiman.


9. (C) The new party president, Orlando Contreras Pulido,
is a relative unknown. The opposition's short-lived
electoral alliance had placed him second on its list of
National Assembly candidates for Nueva Esparta State before
its pullout in December. COPEI's new vice president,
Virginia Rivero Lozada, formerly served as the party's
national coordinator for human rights. She has been a
helpful Embassy contact on both human rights and political
issues, but has a reactionary demeanor typical of anti-Chavez
politicians.

--------------
Comment
--------------


10. (C) COPEI will be better off without Cesar Perez Vivas.
Just how much the party improves will depend largely on its
untested leadership. COPEI's future will be more promising
if the new party leaders share some attributes of their
allies in the former party executive. The new blood will
need to shed the party's image as the discredited remains of
the Fourth Republic in part by seeking the kinds of alliances
with other groups that Perez Vivas opposed. They will also
have to act faster. Upon COPEI's announcement of its plans
to restructure in December 2004, we reported that the party
could not afford a lengthy period of self-reflection. Still,
COPEI took over a year to begin carrying out its plans.
These changes appear to be a good start, but they are only a
start. COPEI's clock is ticking.

BROWNFIELD