BRV IRRITATED BY AMBASSADORIAL OUTREACH ACTIVITIES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CARACAS 001032

SIPDIS

AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
AMEMBASSY LIMA
AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
AMEMBASSY MEXICO
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY QUITO
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO
AMCONSUL CURACAO
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USOFFICE FRC FT LAUDERDALE
NSC WASHDC
HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
USINT HAVANA

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV ASEC VE
SUBJECT: BRV IRRITATED BY AMBASSADORIAL OUTREACH ACTIVITIES

REF: CARACAS 01018

Classified By: AMBASSADOR BROWNFIELD FOR REASON 1.4(b)

Summary
--------------


1. (C) VFM Maripili Hernandez convoked the Ambassador on
April 12 to complain that his public diplomacy visits to poor
communities were inadequately coordinated, and to suggest
that we were collaborating with the independent media to
provoke incidents during such visits. The Ambassador
rejected both assertions, but requested written suggestions
on how to improve coordination with the BRV and avoid future
incidents. The fundamental problem for the BRV is that
despite incessant anti-American propaganda, the Ambassador
continues to be warmly received in some of the most chavista
parts of the country. The BRV has chosen to view this as an
unacceptable irritation, which explains the increasingly
violent demonstrations mounted by MVR officials. We'll
increase our information flow to the MFA, and continue our
visits. End summary.

BRV Annoyance
--------------


2. (C) Ambassador and DCM visited the MFA on April 12 at
VFM Maripili Hernandez' request to discuss the attack on the
Ambassador during his April 7 visit to the Caracas
neighborhood of El Coche (reftel). Hernandez asserted that
the BRV was finding out about the Ambassador's travel from
the media, something she characterized as "irregular and
highly inconvenient." She made clear that she had been
instructed to "reject" the Embassy's handling of the visit,
and repeatedly underlined the BRV view that independent media
presence at Ambassadorial events "distorts reality" and
incites violence. Hernandez was particularly miffed, she
said, because she had discussed this matter in detail during
her April 4 meeting with A/S Shannon. She thought the two of
them reached an agreement on notifying visits, but the
Embassy had not modified its practices. The resulting
incident, she concluded -- making clear that she was echoing
the opinion of President Chavez -- could only be interpreted
as an "intentional provocation" by the USG.


3. (C) Hernandez said that our visits to poor communities
failed to take into account the "political realities" of
Venezuela, suggesting that traveling to such areas in "luxury
vehicles wearing fine clothing" was an offensively
ostentatious display sure to provoke humble Venezuelans.
Moreover, the fact that the Coche visit took place so close
to the anniversary of the April 2002 coup grated
additionally; the strongly chavista population continues to
blame the USG and a former Ambassador for their
"participation" in the coup. (The Ambassador immediately
challenged Hernandez on this point, denying any USG
participation in the coup.) Hernandez suggested that the
live broadcast of Ambassadorial visits exacerbated the
problem, saying that chavistas had a visceral reaction to the
presence of U.S. representatives in their communities, and if
aware, real-time, of a visit, would mount protests. She
called on the Ambassador to ask Globovision not to broadcast
his appearance live, in order to avoid this difficulty. The
Ambassador said that we respected freedom of expression and
would therefore not make any such pitch. (Note: The whole
time we sat in Hernandez' office, the TV remained on in the
corner -- tuned to Globovision. End note.)


4. (C) Hernandez underlined that additional coordination
with the BRV could have helped avoid these problems, but
clearly in her view "the Embassy informs Globovision before
the MFA on purpose, in order to create an incident." She
clearly stated the BRV's "total commitment to respecting the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR)," and in
particular noted that the MFA was not/not requesting the

CARACAS 00001032 002 OF 003


Ambassador's daily schedule nor limiting his travels.

USG Amazement
--------------


5. (C) The Ambassador expressed amazement that the BRV
would suggest that an attack on his person could be construed
as a provocation by him or the USG, and categorically denied
our purpose was to provoke. He emphasized that he was under
explicit instructions to present the best possible image of
the United States to the broadest segment of Venezuelan
society, and he would not vary from that goal. He pointed
out that we advise multiple institutions of the BRV in
advance of his travels outside Caracas: the Caracas
Metropolitan Police (PM),DISIP, the Office of the Vice
President, the minister of defense, and three different
offices at the MFA (the minister, the vice minister, and
protocol). Inside Caracas, the PM and DISIP are informed
before the fact and participate in advance site visits with
RSO staff. Because we will continue our outreach, and taking
into account that our multilayered notification of the BRV
had clearly failed to register with the BRV, the Ambassador
asked for a written explanation of how the BRV would have us
notify his travels in order to avoid difficulties.

"You tell us what's sensitive"
--------------


6. (C) Hernandez responded that we should not expect the PM
or DISIP to have the same level of political awareness as the
MFA or the Embassy. She suggested that the Embassy should
assess all Ambassadorial appearances, and notify the MFA if
any have the potential to "cause problems." Pressed again by
the Ambassador for an exact, written procedure, Hernandez
equivocated, repeating that the Embassy should "figure out
where problems may arise" and then inform the MFA. Hernandez
took pains to point out that the BRV was not intending to
restrict the Ambassador's freedom of movement -- which, she
asserted, would violate Article 26 of the VCDR - despite
repeated threats by the Department to limit Venezuelan
Ambassador Alvarez' travels in the United States.


7. (C) The Ambassador repeated that we regularly inform
high-ranking officials of our travels, and follow all
instructions provided thus far by the BRV. He again asked
for precise, written instructions on how the BRV wanted to be
notified. This is an important matter, he said. Directly
challenging Hernandez' earlier suggestion that these attacks
were spontaneous popular reactions, he asserted that there
have been three violent protests in three weeks, all
organized by elected officials of President Chavez' Fifth
Republic Movement (MVR). During the Coche protests, some of
the motorcyclists who harassed his motorcade, kamikaze-style,
had pistols in their waistbands. If the MFA is suggesting
that DISIP -- an intelligence agency -- cannot detect threats
nor provide security, what procedures would the MFA have us
follow? Hernandez repeated the canard first voiced by
Ambassador Alvarez that DISIP is not informed of the
Ambassador's travels; the Ambassador refuted that.


8. (C) The Ambassador returned for a third time to his
request for a precise and written notification procedure,
noting that he planned to travel to La Guaira on April 20 for
another donation ceremony. Tell us how and with whom to
coordinate, and we'll do it. Hernandez conceded that, taking
into account our belief that the MVR was organizing violent
anti-American protests, she could "understand (our) concerns"
about giving precise data about Ambassadorial travel to the
BRV. She gave her word that the MFA would not organize any
protests. The Ambassador said he never believed the MFA was
behind such actions, but remained convinced that certain MVR
officials in state and local governments were behind recent
attacks.

Comment

CARACAS 00001032 003 OF 003


--------------


9. (C) Hernandez was in an untenable position, having to
explain how an attack on the U.S. Ambassador constituted a
U.S. provocation. The fundamental problem for the BRV is
that, despite its frenzied anti-American propaganda,
including two dozen specific allegations of nefarious U.S.
activities, the Ambassador continues to be warmly received in
some of the most chavista parts of the country. One
alternative would be for the chavistas simply to dismiss this
as a "paradox". But the BRV has instead chosen to view the
Ambassador's activities unacceptable irritations. That
explains the new and increasingly violent demonstrations
mounted by MVR officials.


10. (C) At the end of the day, there are only two ways that
the BRV can end the pain: first, get us to back down. That
won't happen in the current context, and it helps us to be
able to say that the Ambassador's barrio visits are at
express Washington direction. We will increase the number,
level and depth of our notifications to the BRV about the
Ambassador's travels, including providing fairly specific
information on outreach activities to the MFA a day in
advance. Second, they can hope to intimidate our
counterparts, those who receive our assistance. To date, we
have found counterparts willing to accept our help, and an
Ambassadorial visit.

BROWNFIELD