NAGA INSURGENCY OFFERS NO EASY SOLUTION

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 CALCUTTA 000561

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

PACOM FOR POL/AD

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PTER ASEC PREL PGOV PHUM IN BM
SUBJECT: NAGA INSURGENCY OFFERS NO EASY SOLUTION


1. (SBU) Summary: December 4-7, ConGen met with government
officials and contacts in the Northeast Indian state of Nagaland
to discuss ongoing ethnic Naga insurgencies. During this
period, representatives of the separatist National Socialist
Council of Nagaland (Isak-Muivah) (NSCN-IM) faction were meeting
in Amsterdam with a GOI negotiating team led by Union Labor
Minister George Fernandes to negotiate a formal peace treaty. A
cease fire has been in place between the NSCN-IM and the GOI
since August 1997. Contacts in Nagaland, from Chief Minister to
social leaders, were uniform in hoping a resolution could be
achieved through some form of autonomy or "federal relationship"
under the Indian constitution. However, complicating this
aspiration is the expectation that Naga dominated parts of
neighboring states Manipur, Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, and even
parts of Burma would have to be included in a final autonomous
greater Nagaland or "Nagalim." End Summary.


2. (SBU) On Dec 4-7, ConGen met with Chief Minister Neiphiu
Rio Governor Shyamal Datta, State Home Minister Thenucho,
Chief Secretary Lalhuma, Indian Army 3rd Corps Commander
Lieutenant General M.S. Dadwal and Leader of the Opposition,
Congress Party Member I. Imkong. Discussions focused on
prospects of meeting the demands by insurgent NSCN-IM and the
NSCN-Khaplang factions for Naga autonomy. The GOI has
ceasefires with both groups but is only conducting negotiations
with NSCN-IM. None of the contacts could offer much detail on
the negotiations that were occurring at that time in Amsterdam
between the GOI team led by Union Labor Minister George
Fernandes and NSCN-IM leaders Isak Chishi Swu and Thuingaleng
Muviah. The CM indicated that the Central GOI did not consult
regularly with the state leadership on terms or aspects of its
negotiations with the separatists. The lack of discussion
between the state and federal officials was a common complaint
of the state officials and contributed to a sense of alienation
at the state-level from the national government.


3. (SBU) While specifics were lacking, the state officials
believed that a growing understanding was developing between the
GOI and the insurgents that would lead to resolving what is
considered to be one of the longest running insurgencies in
South Asia. The GOI will not accept the insurgents' initial
demands for an independent "Nagalim," incorporating the 1.2
million Nagas resident in Nagaland and the surrounding states of
Assam, Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh. However, some form of
autonomy under the terms of India's existing constitution, "a
sub-national constitution," might be possible, but the area of
the autonomous district might not include the Naga areas of the
surrounding states. What autonomy would mean is not clear but
would likely allow for more Naga control over budget, natural
and mineral resources, education and curriculum. The GOI would
still control security, external relations and monetary
policies.


4. (SBU) CM Rio believed that the incorporation of all Naga
territories would be necessary for a successful peace agreement.
Other officials, including Opposition Leader Imkong agreed,
saying that a greater Nagaland was critical point for the
NSCN-IM leadership as other insurgent groups such as the NSCN-K
and Naga National Council (NNC) would accuse the NSCN-IM of
`selling-out' to the GOI. A possible middle solution was for
the GOI to provide a degree of autonomy for the state of
Nagaland, leaving the door open for later incorporation of other
areas. Although, this may not be politically tenable for the
present Congress-led Indian government coalition as the
neighboring states of Manipur, Assam and Arunachal Pradesh all
have Congress-led governments that would likely collapse if
state land were ceded to a greater Nagaland. CM Rio's refusal
to recognize the practical and political limitations of ceding
land from neighboring states for Nagaland was not unique as many
of the local officials argued a final agreement would not be
possible unless all Nagas were incorporated into an autonomous
Nagaland. Rio's blindness to political realities also extended
to his belief that the GOI should pressure the Government of
Burma to cede Naga dominated territory in Burma. Approximately
500,000 Nagas live in Burma and constitute much of the base for
the NSCN-K faction.


5. (SBU) Comment: A striking aspect of the various
interactions with leading government officials, both elected
leaders and civil servants, was the almost uniform support for a

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greater Nagalim. Surprisingly, state officials sworn to uphold
a unified India were very open in advocating for an autonomous
Nagaland. The two GOI appointed officials met by ConGen, Indian
Army3rd Corps Commander Dadwal and Governor Datta, offered a
contrary view and, unlike the state leadership, saw the
separatists as a security problem for India. The pro-autonomy
position of state officials and the sense that the GOI seldom
consulted on the peace negotiations conveyed an impression of
significant disconnect between the GOI and Nagaland. With no
clear results from the last round of negotiations in Amsterdam,
immediate resolution of the Naga problem is unlikely and the
sense of separation and isolation of Nagaland from India will
likely continue as local officials advocate more vocally for
autonomy.
JARDINE