Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06CALCUTTA413
2006-09-13 12:11:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Kolkata
Cable title:  

SHADOW LINES - INDIA STRUGGLES WITH SECURITY ON ITS EASTERN

Tags:  PINR PGOV PREL BG IN NP PK 
pdf how-to read a cable
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PP RUEHBI RUEHCI
DE RUEHCI #0413/01 2561211
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 131211Z SEP 06
FM AMCONSUL CALCUTTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1154
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 1038
RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI PRIORITY 0405
RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI PRIORITY 0405
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 0245
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU PRIORITY 0245
RUEHGO/AMEMBASSY RANGOON PRIORITY 0170
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 0188
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0069
RHMFISS/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEILB/NCTC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHCI/AMCONSUL CALCUTTA 1412
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CALCUTTA 000413 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/INS AND INR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/13/2016
TAGS: PINR PGOV PREL BG IN NP PK
SUBJECT: SHADOW LINES - INDIA STRUGGLES WITH SECURITY ON ITS EASTERN
BORDERS

CLASSIFIED BY: Henry Jardine, Consul General, AmConsulate
Calcutta, State.
REASON: 1.4 (d)

CLASSIFIED BY: Henry Jardine, Consul General, AmConsulate
Calcutta, State.
REASON: 1.4 (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CALCUTTA 000413

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/INS AND INR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/13/2016
TAGS: PINR PGOV PREL BG IN NP PK
SUBJECT: SHADOW LINES - INDIA STRUGGLES WITH SECURITY ON ITS EASTERN
BORDERS

CLASSIFIED BY: Henry Jardine, Consul General, AmConsulate
Calcutta, State.
REASON: 1.4 (d)

CLASSIFIED BY: Henry Jardine, Consul General, AmConsulate
Calcutta, State.
REASON: 1.4 (d)


1. (C) Summary. Porous borders with Bangladesh and Burma
present a serious threat to India's security that India so far
has been unable to manage effectively. In West Bengal,
politicians, intelligence, law enforcement, and academics all
agree on the growing problem of Islamist infiltration into India
via Bangladesh, though they differ in their assessment of the
seriousness of the threat. Intelligence experts sound a much
more alarmist note about Bangladesh, and to a lesser extent
about the growing Maoist problem, than do the politicians.
Though there is growing awareness of these security problems in
New Delhi, it is very likely that security on the Eastern
borders will continue to challenge both the national government
and the states. End Summary.

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Bangladeshi Influx Provides Potential Terrorists Nexus

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--------------


2. (C) India shares a 4,100 kilometer land border with
Bangladesh. A little more than half of that border is with the
state of West Bengal, with some of it riverine but most of it
flat and featureless and hard to defend. Delhi Political
Counselor and Consulate Poloff met with W. Bengal Home Secretary
Prasad Ray on September 5. Ray identified international
terrorism from Islamists using this border as the real threat on
the eastern front. The reasons he cited include the Indian
Army's focus on the western areas of the country - the border
with Pakistan - and inadequate resources to cover the Bangladesh
border with the Border Security Force (BSF) and the internal
intelligence Special Service Bureau. Ray noted the recent
arrests of two Bangladeshis in connection with the Mumbai
bombings, and said interrogations revealed that those

responsible for the bombings had entered through the Eastern
frontier. Media have highlighted repeatedly that border guards
on both sides routinely take small bribes to look the other way,
resulting in thriving cross-border smuggling of goods and
people.


3. (C) Contributing to illegal migration, political parties in

W. Bengal have used the back and forth flow of people across
porous borders to court voters by readily providing ration cards
and identity documents in return for votes. Aside from settled
migrants, a large number of people cross the border during
daylight hours for work in India and return to Bangladesh at
night. (Note: Ray cited the example of rickshaws in the
northern Bengal city of Shilliguri, which do not operate at
night because the rickshaw-wallahs have gone home to Bangladesh.
End note.) Ray mentioned that, at the August 2006
Indo-Bangladesh Home Secretaries meeting, both nations agreed to
a broad resolution for cooperation in tackling the terrorist
problem. The Indians proposed institutionalized mechanisms, but
have yet to gain agreement on these from Bangladesh.


4. (C) During meetings with security sector officials and
academics, however, we heard a more alarmist tone. According to
Deputy Director General (DG) of the Police Intelligence Branch
(Borders) Dilip Mitra, the Bangladesh government is providing
cover for the growing jihadist movements within Bangladesh that
are increasingly tied into the political mainstream. Many law
enforcement sources also connected Pakistani intelligence
services with the infiltrations from Bangladesh. Mitra believes
that apart from attacks in Kashmir, participants in every recent
attack in India have been channeled through the East. Press
reporting following the Mumbai, Nagpur, Varanasi, and Ahmedabad
incidents echoed this assertion. Border Security Force Dep.
Inspector Gen. S.K. Mitra (no relation) lamented the lack of
adequate personnel and resources to monitor and stop entry from

CALCUTTA 00000413 002 OF 002


Bangladesh.


5. (C) Both Home Secretary Ray and Dilip Mitra noted that
there is a de jure border and a de facto border between India
and Bangladesh. In Mitra's terms, "There is a 10-12 kilometer
stretch of land in India that is occupied by Bangladeshi
migrants who have settled down." Moreover, there is a huge and
growing population of Bangladeshis in Calcutta whom security
forces think may provide operational support to terrorists
infiltrating across the porous border on their way to operations
elsewhere in India. (Comment. Ray's less-alarmist tone
probably stems from his concern for maintaining peaceful
relations between Muslims and non-Muslims in W. Bengal. During
times of communal tensions, the GOWB has favored dialogue as a
means of resolving issues. The GOWB has taken a similar
approach to the growing number of madrassas in the state,
co-opting and monitoring the teaching curriculum in the schools.
Interestingly, Ray believed that insurgents and Islamists of
any type had not (and presumably would not) act in their W.
Bengal safehaven in order to continue their operations in other
parts of the country without problem. End Comment).

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Maoists - the less severe home grown problem?

-------------- --------------


6. (C) Ray spoke in much more detail about Maoist activity in

W. Bengal. He did not consider the Maoists a threat comparable
to international terrorists. Ray analyzed Maoist presence in W.
Bengal as less severe than that in other states. In his view,
new Maoist recruits in the state were not true believers in the
cause, but mostly desperately poor tribals looking for food and
work. (Comment: This may be due to the tendency in India to
equate Maoists with the Naxalite Movement, which originated in

W. Bengal, or the fact that the CPI-Maoist was originally a part
of the CPM. It also reflects a belief that the CPM is a party
that represents the poor, and therefore, can turn the poor away
from extremism through political action. End Comment.) Ray
acknowledged that the border with Nepal was virtually open, and
stated that the CPM was hoping that the Nepali Maoists would
enter Nepal's mainstream political process.


7. (C) Journalists and academics that we met linked the
Maoists in Nepal more closely to the Maoists operating in
India's "red corridor" which stretches from Nepal to Andhra
Pradesh and includes western areas of W. Bengal, as well as
Jharkand, Chattisgarh, and Madhya Pradesh. A number of
journalists spoke in detail about the ease by which small arms -
mostly Chinese made - crossed into northeastern states from
Myanmar. They highlighted for us on maps routes used by Maoists
to smuggle arms from Nepal to the south.


8. (C) COMMENT: Perceptions of the terrorist threat from
Bangladesh spanned a broad spectrum among contacts. Views
ranged from seeing an extreme danger of "Pakistanization" of
Bangladesh to a more circumscribed characterization of
individual infiltration and small scale activities. However,
all contacts agreed that there is growing evidence of terrorist
links to Bangladesh. With much of India's military and security
forces focused on the Pakistan border, the Bangladesh border is
seen as a soft underbelly for terrorist infiltration.


9. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: In turn, the limited concern expressed
by officials regarding the Maoist threat in W. Bengal is
surprising given the continued targeting and brutal killing of
CPM officials in the state. The downplaying of the Maoists may
be to attributable to the group being an ideological challenge
to the governing CPM and therefore, too sensitive an issue to
fully highlight. POL and CG Calcutta will continue to follow the
issues of border instability and internal insurgencies. END
COMMENT.


JARDINE
HJARDINE