SCENESETTER FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY RADEMAKER'S

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 000855

SIPDIS

DOHA FOR ROB PYOTT (PLEASE PASS TO A/S RADEMAKER DELEGATION)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV IS IR EG KPAL KNNP IAEA
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY RADEMAKER'S
FEBRUARY 14-17 VISIT TO CAIRO

Classified by DCM Stuart Jones for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

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Summary
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1. (C) Embassy Cairo warmly welcomes your visit for
nonproliferation discussions. Nonproliferation has been a
key agenda item in the U.S.- Egyptian bilateral relationship
in recent months, and expanding our dialogue will facilitate
greater cooperation. Because Egypt takes seriously its role
as a regional leader on nonproliferation and its influence in
multilateral fora in general, Foreign Ministry officials want
to know that the U.S. values their expertise and respects
their ability to influence decision-making on regional
nonproliferation matters. Egypt's priorities for the talks
are the Middle East WMD Free Zone and pressing Israel to
accede to the NPT. Although our dialogue on these issues
intensified during the lead up to the recent IAEA Board of
Governors meeting on referring Iran to the UNSC, the outcome
of that meeting left MFA colleagues pessimistic about the
prospect for progress. Despite the GOE's focus on Israel,
these discussions serve as a launching point for engagement
with GOE disarmament experts to pursue greater cooperation on
a wide range of nonproliferation issues. End summary.

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Egypt's NP Team
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2. (C) Your counterpart, Assistant Minister for
Multilateral Affairs Ambassador Naela Gabr, will lead Egypt's
delegation for the discussions. An expert in multilateral
issues and fora, Ambassador Gabr served at both the UN and at
Egypt's mission in Geneva. Ambassador Gabr is not a
nonproliferation specialist, and has focused largely on UN
reform in recent months, with a particular interest in the
Human Rights Council. Egypt's positions on UN reform issues
are often at odds with our own. We expect that in the
bilateral discussions, Ambassador Gabr will rely heavily on
the head of MFA's Disarmament Office, Dr. Hossam Aly. Dr.
Aly, who assumed his post in the fall of 2005 after returning
from a 12-year assignment in Vienna, is a nonproliferation
expert. At the conclusion of the first day's discussions,
you will meet Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit. The FM has
taken a greater interest in NP matters in recent months and
was personally involved in pressing for the inclusion of
language on a Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in the
IAEA resolution on Iran. He takes seriously Egypt's role
in all multilateral fora, uses such fora to press Egypt's
national agenda, and is proud of his ability to influence
decision making. He will likely remind you of his influence
in your meeting.

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NPT Regime and the IAEA
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3. (C) MFA's disarmament experts have expressed frustration
that the U.S. does not press Israel to accede to the NPT.
Despite reassurances that the U.S. supports the universality
of the treaty, Egypt will argue that the U.S. ignores
regional concerns about Israel while focusing exclusively on
Iran. They regularly note that, without universality, there
will always be an "Iran" working to counter the perceived
threat from Israel. You can expect the Egyptians to express
disappointment at what they saw as lukewarm U.S. support for
language on a Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in the
IAEA resolution referring Iran to the UNSC. After the
special meeting of the Board of Governors, a MFA disarmament
contact complained that that the U.S. watered down the
language proposed by the Egyptians to the point that it
became meaningless. He also said the U.S. only agreed to the
language because of strong pressure from the EU-3. The
Foreign Minister may tell you that since Egypt voted with the
U.S. to refer Iran to the UNSC, several members of Parliament
have asked him why Egypt does not insist on more pressure on
Israel.


4. (C) On the May 2005 Review Conference, MFA contacts
complained that the difficulties arose because of poor
coordination between the U.S. and Egypt before the
conference. They complained that their team tried repeatedly
to engage with U.S. counterparts before the conference, and
that their gesture was ignored. The underlying message is
that Egypt takes seriously its role on nonproliferation and
will remind us that it insists on being consulted and treated
as a player.

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Other Bilateral Agenda Items
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5. (C) We have briefed the MFA on both PSI and the EXBS
program. The Egyptians were reluctant to accept the offer of
assistance under EXBS because they did not want to undergo
the initial "analysis" of their border control systems. On
PSI, the Egyptians have asked for a more detailed briefing.
They were initially unreceptive to what they perceived to be
a request to cede sovereignty and do not read the Law of the
Sea to support the initiative. They also resent the fact
that they have not been invited to shape the Initiative. On
the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC),the MFA team will
reiterate that Egypt is not prepared to sign until the
Israeli nuclear issue is addressed. Egypt's position on the
Biological Weapons Convention also remains unchanged (signed
but not ratified),and we have received no sign that they are
prepared to reconsider. On demining, the Egyptians will
update you on the status of their recently created Demining
Secretariat, which prioritizes and coordinates all demining

SIPDIS
activities in the country. They may also request financial
support. We believe the GOE needs to do more to coordinate
among ministries on this issue and to raise money through
private international demining channels.

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Gaza
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6. (C) Egypt continues to play a vital role in Palestinian
security. GOE officials from several ministries have said
that Egypt was genuinely surprised by the Hamas victory.
They believe that Gazans voted against Fatah, but not
necessarily for Hamas. The GOE has urged the U.S. to
maintain its support for Abu Mazen, continue financial
assistance to the Palestinian people, and find a way to deal
with Hamas under appropriate terms. Senior Egyptian
officials met Hamas representatives on February 7 and pressed
the group to abide by existing agreements, forswear violence,
and recognize Israel.


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Danish Cartoon Controversy
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7. (C) Since the public reaction elsewhere in the Arab
world turned violent, Egypt's leaders have leavened their
condemnation of the cartoons with appeals that protests be
peaceful. Egyptian diplomats have been urging the Danes to
address this problem for several months and were among the
first to protest the intolerance of these images at the OIC
and in other diplomatic fora.
RICCIARDONE