Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06CAIRO6365
2006-10-15 10:27:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Cairo
Cable title:  

EGYPTIAN LIAISON CHIEF DISCUSSES BORDER GUARD

Tags:  PREL PTER KPAL KTIP IS EG 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0001
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHEG #6365/01 2881027
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 151027Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1995
INFO RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1266
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 0657
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L CAIRO 006365 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2011
TAGS: PREL PTER KPAL KTIP IS EG
SUBJECT: EGYPTIAN LIAISON CHIEF DISCUSSES BORDER GUARD
FORCES AND SMUGGLING INTERDICTION

Classified By: DCM Stuart Jones for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

------
Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L CAIRO 006365

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2011
TAGS: PREL PTER KPAL KTIP IS EG
SUBJECT: EGYPTIAN LIAISON CHIEF DISCUSSES BORDER GUARD
FORCES AND SMUGGLING INTERDICTION

Classified By: DCM Stuart Jones for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (C) Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) Liaison
Chief MG Nagy reported that Egypt has sought assistance from
a petroleum company (NFI) to bolster its tunnel detection
tactics on the border with Gaza. Although Egypt and Israel
began a tunnel detection discussion between engineers in
early 2006, cooperation stalled. Nagy said he has not yet
received an indication that Israel would support Egypt's use
of sensors for tunnel detection. Smuggling and infiltration
interdiction efforts south of Karem Shalom are less than
satisfactory because Egypt relies on poorly trained and
unprofessional Central Security Police to patrol that area.
Egyptian-Israeli liaison exchanges are on track, Nagy said,
but there has not been a high level Joint Military Committee
meeting in some time. Post is following up with petroleum
sector contacts to try to confirm cooperation on border
security, but Nagy's assertion that that Egypt would benefit
from more professionally trained forces on the border also
makes good sense. As GOE officials note, like Israel,
Egypt's own internal security is at risk when smuggling
persists as it increases the likelihood of additional
terrorist incidents in the Sinai. End summary.

--------------
Bolstering Tunnel detection
--------------


2. (C) DMI's Liaison Chief MG Nagy told poloff and DATT on
October 11 that in early 2006, Egypt asked Israel for advice
on tunnel detection techniques. Nagy explained that he
requested coordination meetings among Egyptian and Israeli
engineers aimed at improving the Border Guard Forces' (BGF)
ability to detect tunnels and thwart smuggling. Israel
Defense officials hosted Egyptian engineers on the Israeli
side of the Karem Shalom crossing, but only showed the
Egyptians trench digging equipment instead of sensors. When
the Egyptians asked to discuss the use of sensors, the
Israelis declined and the exchange did not continue. Nagy
said he has not yet received an indication that Israel would

support BGF use of sensors (or other technology). In the
meantime, Nagy said DMI is working with a petroleum company
(NFI) to enhance Egypt's tunnel detection capability.

--------------
Police role in counter-smuggling
--------------


3. (C) Nagy said Egypt also hopes to deploy more BGF to the
Gaza border to reduce the reliance on the interior ministry's
Central Security Police (CSP) for counter-smuggling. Nagy
alleged that the police are poorly trained and not focused on
the counter smuggling mission. Nagy also faulted the lack of
professionalism among Central Security Police for
infiltration and smuggling problems in the area south of
Karem Shalom. The poorly paid police are not committed to
the mission, sleep on the job, and even steal MoD-donated
equipment such as binoculars, night vision goggles, and
vehicles, Nagy said. When poloff asked about the October 1
Reuters report that some CSP assigned in the North Sinai town
of Al Arish were arrested for involvement in a network to
sell weapons and explosives to Palestinians and Bedouin, Nagy
said the problem is "everywhere." (Note: Following the
October 1 report, Post's Ministry of Interior contacts
downplayed the arrest, asserting that the Al Arish network
and arrests were an aberration involving very few
individuals. End note).

--------------
The Bedouin Element
--------------


4. (C) According to Nagy, some Bedouin are involved in both
stealing and smuggling signal cables and ammunition shells
because the copper is valuable. He said the Bedouin also
sell fuses from mortars to Palestinians for use in their
homemade Kassem rockets. While the Kassems are ineffective,
they remain an irritant to Israel, Nagy noted.

--------------
Egyptian-Israeli Liaison

--------------


5. (C) Nagy, who heads the GOE's Liaison Agency with
International Organizations (LAWIO),described liaison with
Israeli counterparts as good, but said that his Israeli
counterpart, General Dickel, is stretched thin because he
also oversees strategic planning and the military attach
section. Nagy said that Dickel's claims to be available
immediately "24/7," have not proven true. Although Dickel
has good intentions, he is occasionally slow to respond, Nagy
said. Nonetheless, working level liaison officers speak on
the phone daily and meet weekly. Egypt would like to
schedule a Joint Military Committee meeting some time after
Ramadan, Nagy observed, but lower level exchanges need to
take place first in order to agree on an agenda and resolve
minor points of contention.


6. (C) In his role as Chief of LAWIO for the past several
years, MG Nagy also led the GOE team that negotiated the
agreement to deploy the Border Guard Forces on the Gaza
border. He also advises the Minister of Defense Field
Marshal Tantawi and the Director of Military Intelligence on
issues pertaining to liaison with Israel and the Border Guard
Forces and coordinates with the Ministry of Interior to
secure police support for the BGF in the North Sinai and, as
needed, on the Gaza border.

--------------
Comment
--------------


7. (C) Post is following up with petroleum industry
contacts to verify GOE efforts to acquire enhanced tunnel
detection equipment. Ultimately, however, Nagy's claim that
Egypt needs more professionally trained bodies on the job
makes good sense. Allegations in the Israeli press about the
deficiencies in GOE counter-smuggling efforts anger GOE
officials, who explain that smuggling interdiction has
increased dramatically since the BGF deployed. As DMI and
Ministry of Defense contacts note, Egypt, like Israel, stands
to lose when smuggling persists because it of the increased
likelihood that additional terrorist incidents may occur in
the Sinai -- a scenario that could also pose a threat to
Egypt's vital tourism industry.
JONES