Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06CAIRO601
2006-02-01 18:02:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Embassy Cairo
Cable title:  

IRAN: CENTRIFUGE BRIEFING TO EGYPTIAN MFA

Tags:  PREL IS IR EG KNNP IAEA UNSC 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

011802Z Feb 06
UNCLAS CAIRO 000601 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL IS IR EG KNNP IAEA UNSC
SUBJECT: IRAN: CENTRIFUGE BRIEFING TO EGYPTIAN MFA


UNCLAS CAIRO 000601

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL IS IR EG KNNP IAEA UNSC
SUBJECT: IRAN: CENTRIFUGE BRIEFING TO EGYPTIAN MFA



1. Lawrence Livermore representative Roger Miller and
Department of Energy representative Richard Nephew briefed
the MFA's Assistant Minister for American Affairs Ali al
Hefny and MFA disarmament specialists on Iran's Gas
Centrifuge Program on January 29. Al Hefny said Egypt
appreciated the opportunity to continue engaging with the
U.S. on the Iran issue and noted that Egypt shared the USG's
concerns. He also flagged Egypt's concern about Israel and
said the GOE's goal is to create a zone in the Middle East
free of WMD. Al Hefny urged the U.S. to consider regional
perspectives on the WMD threat and to take an "even-handed"
approach.


2. MFA's disarmament experts asked the DOE team:

-- if the U.S. knows exactly what Iran has achieved.
-- if the U.S. knows how long it would take for Iran to
complete its pilot program.
-- if the U.S. knows of any clandestine facilities in Iran
where enrichment technology is being developed.
-- if the U.S. endorses the Russian proposal
-- if the U.S. is worried that Iran will make good on its
threats to end diplomacy (and possibly pull out of the NPT)
if the IAEA refers it to the UNSC.


3. Miller replied that we don't know exactly what Iran has
achieved, but it may not need a significant amount of time to
complete the pilot program. Miller also noted that it is
easier for Iran to conceal a clandestine facility behind a
declared facility. On the Russian proposal, Miller said U.S.
support depends on the ability to ensure that Iran does not
have access to enrichment technology. On the risk of
referral, Miller acknowledged Iran's threats, but cited
Iran's interest in remaining within the NPT regime. Iran's
threats are not, he noted, a reason to ignore the
requirements of the NPT regime. Nephew added that unlike the
case of North Korea before it withdrew from the NPT, Iran has
more political and economic interests to remain in the
regime.
RICCIARDONE