Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06CAIRO3282
2006-05-31 09:59:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Cairo
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER FOR GENERAL GRIFFIN'S JUNE VISIT TO

Tags:  PHUM PREL MASS MOPS EG KPAL IS IZ SU 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHEG #3282/01 1510959
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C O N F I D E N T I A L CAIRO 003282 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/29/2016
TAGS: PHUM PREL MASS MOPS EG KPAL IS IZ SU
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR GENERAL GRIFFIN'S JUNE VISIT TO
CAIRO

Classified by ECPO Counselor John Desrocher for reasons
1.4(b) and (d).

-------
Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L CAIRO 003282

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/29/2016
TAGS: PHUM PREL MASS MOPS EG KPAL IS IZ SU
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR GENERAL GRIFFIN'S JUNE VISIT TO
CAIRO

Classified by ECPO Counselor John Desrocher for reasons
1.4(b) and (d).

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (C) Embassy Cairo warmly welcomes your visit and the
opportunity to discuss with you ways in which we might
bolster our military cooperation with Egypt. The
U.S.-Egyptian military partnership is the cornerstone of our
strategic relationship. While both nations benefit from the
relationship, we occasionally differ in the strategies we
adopt to achieve our shared goals. Congressional scrutiny of
USG security assistance to Egypt has been frustrating to our
GOE interlocutors, including the Minister of Defense and his
Chief of Staff. You can reassure them of the
Administration's steadfast support for the status quo on
security assistance. Egypt continues to play a pivotal role
on regional issues such as Israel-Palestine and Sudan. On
the internal front, President Mubarak has reconfirmed his
commitment to political and economic reform, but there have
been setbacks in this area in recent months. End summary.


-------------- --------------
Your Introduction to Chief of Staff LTG Samy Enan
-------------- --------------



2. (C) In contrast to his predecessor, Chief of Staff LTG
Samy Enan does not speak English. But during an intensive
round of discussions with him during the annual military
coordination meetings in late 2005 and in subsequent
meetings, LTG Samy has been eager to engage on both political
and military issues. He is particularly interested in
discussing how to make the BRIGHT STAR exercises more useful
to all participants and may raise this with you. We suggest
that you urge him to accept the USG proposal to include
disaster management exercises in the program for 2007.


3. (C) Although your meeting is meant to be a courtesy
call, LTG Enan will likely also ask you about the ongoing
Congressional scrutiny of U.S. security assistance to Egypt.

A recent proposed amendment, sponsored by Congressman Obey,
to reduce military assistance for FY 2007 by USD 200 million
(current funding is USD 1.3 billion) failed with a voice vote
but sparked vigorous debate over the whether the U.S. should
continue the funding pending greater progress on democratic
reform. The GOE has used the assistance, which has been in
place since the Camp David accords, to modernize and replace
Eastern European systems with U.S. equipment. The pace of
modernization has slowed because 75 percent of the assistance
now goes to maintenance and upgrades of existing systems.
The Egyptians assert that the assistance does not allow them
to purchase the systems their modernization plans call for
and that efforts in Congress to redirect the aid disrupt
their strategic planning. Defense Minister Tantawi told a
senior USG visitor recently that he was personally offended
by the ongoing Congressional threats to reduce military aid
and that the threats would not increase the pace of political
reform. Your interlocutors will tell you that maintaining a
strong military (with the help of USG funding) is a national
security issue on which they will not compromise and that the
GOE will make up for any reduction in military assistance by
taking money currently allocated to social programs such as
health and education. They will also tell you that a loss of
military assistance will compel Egypt to source military
systems from less expensive non-U.S. (Chinese) suppliers.
You can reassure your interlocutors that the Administration
supports the full funding of military assistance for 2007.

--------------
Regional Issues
--------------


4. (C) Iraq: Despite Mubarak's concerns over the U.S.
invasion, senior GOE officials have stated publicly that U.S.
forces should remain in Iraq for the time being. Egypt has
supported the political process in Iraq, but Mubarak
distrusts Iraq's Shi'a and fears Iranian influence in the
region and in Iraq in particular. He believes that a "tough
but fair" leader is what Iraq needs. While we value our
military and intelligence cooperation with Egypt on Iraq, we
continue to look for additional opportunities for
collaboration. Your interlocutors may remind you of Egypt's
standing offer to train Iraqi security forces at GOE expense.
We have thanked Egypt for the offer and suggested that the
Iraqis would welcome the assistance if the training could be
done in Iraq. The Egyptians are not willing to expose their
troops to the security risks there.


5. (C) Palestine/Israel: The Egyptians want to see Hamas
fail but, in the meantime, want to avoid heightened extremism
in Gaza and the West Bank. GOE officials have pressed Hamas
to abide by existing agreements, renounce violence and
recognize Israel. Egypt would like to see Fatah's civil
servants paid and are contributing directly to efforts to
provide humanitarian assistance as well as offering to serve
as the conduit for all assistance. To strengthen security on
Egypt's border with Gaza, Defense Minister Tantawi has asked
to begin negotiations with Israel to place additional troops
(Egypt deployed 750 border guards in 2005) in the Sinai.
Tantawi has told us that Israel is not yet ready to begin
these negotiations.


6. (C) Darfur: In addition to sending large amounts of
humanitarian aid to Darfur, the GOE has deployed three mobile
medical teams, 34 military advisors, and 50 police to the
area. President Mubarak issued a positive statement on the
recent agreement on Darfur and hinted at Egypt's support for
its full implementation and for a transition to UN forces in
Darfur. Although the Ministry of Defense does not currently
plan to increase the number of advisors in Darfur, it may be
receptive to a request for peacekeepers in real numbers,
after the UN assessment process is complete. You may want to
raise this possibility with LTG Samy.

--------------
Domestic politics
--------------


7. (C) The late 2005 parliamentary elections ended in
violence, over a dozen deaths, and widespread allegations of
fraud and ballot box manipulation. Although NDP candidates
won 360 of 444 seats, Muslim Brotherhood candidates won 88
seats and thereby established a platform from which to attack
the Mubarak regime. Mubarak's term is due to end in 2011,
but many observers expect the transition sooner. The public
fears that Mubarak is aiming to establish his son Gamal as
his successor. No real contenders stand in Gamal's way, but
it is not clear that the Egyptian military will tolerate the
pharaonic succession of decidedly un-military Gamal. A
series of incidents, including harassment of opposition
activists and crackdowns against political demonstrations
have called into question the GOE's commitment to political
reform. But the GOE is working on a package of
constitutional amendments, said to redistribute powers among
the branches of the government and also to facilitate the
enactment of anti-terror legislation based on western models.
It is too soon to tell if these measures will solidify a
genuine reform process or be tailored to preserve the ruling
NDP's political monopoly.
RICCIARDONE