Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06CAIRO1811
2006-03-23 17:29:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Cairo
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER FOR GEN ABIZAID'S VISIT TO CAIRO

Tags:  PREL PGOV MASS IS IZ IR EG SU KPAL KNNP 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 001811 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/22/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV MASS IS IZ IR EG SU KPAL KNNP
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR GEN ABIZAID'S VISIT TO CAIRO

Classified by DCM Stuart Jones for reasons 1.4(b) and (c).

-------
Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 001811

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/22/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV MASS IS IZ IR EG SU KPAL KNNP
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR GEN ABIZAID'S VISIT TO CAIRO

Classified by DCM Stuart Jones for reasons 1.4(b) and (c).

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (C) GEN Abizaid, Embassy Cairo warmly welcomes your
visit as an opportunity to review our agenda on regional
security and the future of our FMF assistance to Egypt.
President Mubarak believes, and the MoD's senior leadership
will reiterate, that our mil-mil relationship is the
cornerstone of the broader bilateral relationship. The
military views the USD 1.3 billion in annual foreign military
assistance as an entitlement, granted at the time of the Camp
David Accords. Consequently, Field Marshal Tantawi and his
advisors resent increasing Congressional challenges to
Egypt's FMF budget. MoD officials know they will face
another challenge in Congress during the upcoming budget
cycle, but Field Marshal Tantawi received assurances from the
range of senior USG officials he recently met in Washington
of the Administration's support for the current level of FMF
funding. While we continue to offer suggestions on how to
strengthen our cooperation with the MoD through military
transformation planning and increased public outreach on our
military cooperation, our influence remains somewhat limited.
The MoD's general adversity to change, will hamper our
efforts to help Egypt explain the value of their military
assistance package to Congress. End summary.

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FMF: Congressional challenges and the IMC
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2. (C) Protecting Egypt's earmarked military assistance is
the MoD's number one priority. The absence of an earmark for
Egypt's FMF in the original FY06 appropriations bill upset
the GOE. Congress later restored the earmark in conference,
but the episode still rankles. MoD leadership regards the
FMF-funded military modernization as a national security
issue and warn that any reduction in USG funding will be made
up with money currently allocated to health, education, and
other social programs. They also warn that any loss of

military assistance from Washington will force Egypt to
source from non-U.S. suppliers, including the Chinese.
Tantawi will probably tell you he wants more proactive
Administration support with Congress this year. You can
remind him that the GOE shares responsibility to persuade
Congress through support for U.S. global priorities.


3. (C) The International Medical Center (IMC): Egypt's
treatment of unauthorized patients at the FMF-funded IMC
violates the Arms Export Control Act (AECA). We do not yet
know what the Congressional reaction will be. The Field
Marshal has, thus far, opted to continue to allow the IMC to
treat unauthorized patients at IMC despite State and Defense
Department warnings. Tantawi has a personal interest in the
IMC and often takes visiting Defense Ministers and other
diplomatic groups to tour the facility. He also
fundamentally cannot believe that the USG would create a
showdown over medical care. State's Political Military
Bureau will soon notify Congress of the violation. If
Tantawi raises this with you, you should reiterate the USG
position that continued unauthorized treatment at IMC is a
serious issue. We recommend that the Field Marshal instruct
the IMC to stop unauthorized treatment immediately.


--------------
Key Mil-Mil Themes
--------------


4. (C) Interoperability: Egypt is unlikely to sign either a
Communications Interoperability Security Memorandum of
Agreement (CISMOA) or an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing
Agreement (ACSA) in the near term. After some delay, the MoD
has agreed to hold bilateral talks on ACSA in late April.
Although our joint exercise schedule has been hampered by the
absence of a CISMOA or ACSA, the GOE supports the Bright Star
exercises. We have recently started frank bilateral
discussions with the MoD on the need to control costs and
prevent overbilling for the next Bright Star.


5. (C) Transformation: At the MCC in November, we asked MoD
officials to outline its transformation strategy, but they
declined. Likewise, Tantawi's senior advisors declined
repeated offers to brief Field Marshall Tantawi on
transformation planning during his counterpart visit to the
U.S. in March. Because Egyptian focus on this issue could
enhance support for FMF, we will continue to seek ways to
encourage the MoD to discuss this with us.


6. (C) Modernization: After considerable U.S. urging, Egypt
has prepared a draft 20-year military modernization plan,
which they presented at the 2005 MCC. Getting Egypt to
ensure that its requests for acquisitions are consistent with
its plan will be key, and we should continue to press that
point. Although we will also encourage the MoD to think more
critically about possible alternate uses for facilities such
as the Tank Plant (post production) and whether Egypt still
needs to retain its stock of aging and difficult-to-maintain
Soviet equipment, the MoD has thus far not shared its
planning with us.


--------------
Regional Security
--------------


7. (C) Israeli-Palestinian Situation: We stress at every
opportunity the need for Egypt to urge Hamas to recognize
Israel, disavow violence, and accept the agreements already
made between the Palestinian Authority and Israel. GOE
support for President Abbas remains strong, but they view him
as weak. Egypt is currently focused on relieving
humanitarian suffering in Gaza and has donated food through
the Karem Shalom crossing. You might ask Tantawi for an
update on the GOE view of the situation.


8. (C) Sudan: On rehatting AMIS, the GOE does not believe
the African Union's March 10 Peace and Security Commission
statement on Darfur means that there must be a peace
agreement in Darfur before UN forces establish their mission.
But the GOE does believe that a peace agreement should be
reached as soon as possible. Although we stress the urgency
of the humanitarian situation and our view that rapid UN
involvement is key, GOE officials have said they believe the
violence is diminishing.


9. (C) Iraq: Although Tantawi heard in Washington that the
U.S. is committed to ensuring a stable Iraq, he will
nonetheless remind you that the GOE supports the presence of
U.S. troops and would oppose a withdrawal at this time. He
will also express concerns about Iran's interference in Iraq.
If appropriate, you may want to draw Tantawi out on Iran and
the direction of its nuclear program. (Note: The GOE voted
at the IAEA in favor of reporting Iran to the UNSC. End
note).

--------------
Political Reform
--------------


10. (C) President Mubarak recently told Egyptian newspaper
editors that his January meeting with Vice President Cheney
and his February meeting with Secretary Rice indicated that
the USG was satisfied with Egypt's reform process. This is
not the case. The GOE is nominally proceeding with its
reform agenda, centered on an ambitious plan to create 4.5
million jobs over the next six years, but no concrete results
have been observed thus far. The postponement of local
council elections until 2008 suggests that the GOE leadership
is moving cautiously. The February 3 Red Sea ferry accident
and the avian influenza crisis (four human cases thus far)
have also put the GOE in a defensive stance. The opposition
bloc in the new Parliament, which includes 88 independent
deputies affiliated with the banned but tolerated Muslim
Brotherhood, has kept up a steady stream of criticism of the
GOE. Secular opposition activist Ayman Nour, who placed a
distant second to Mubarak in the September 2005 presidential
elections, remains in prison after his December 24, 2005
conviction on politically-motivated forgery charges. Nour's
appeal before Egypt's highest court will be heard on May 18.
Tantawi will tell you that internal reform is underway and
will continue to proceed at a pace appropriate for Egypt.

RICCIARDONE