SCENESETTER FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY SILVERBERG'S

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 000172

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/12/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER KUNR PHUM IS IZ LE SY SU EG UN
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY SILVERBERG'S
VISIT TO CAIRO

Classified by DCM Stuart Jones for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Embassy Cairo warmly welcomes your visit.
It has been difficult to gain Egyptian cooperation on UN
reform. During his meeting with Ambassador Tahir-Kheli in
December Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit signaled a willingness
to compromise, but this has not yet materialized. The FM
will likely remind you that Egypt takes seriously its role as
a leader of developing nations in multilateral fora. But in
reality, Egypt has used alleged "non-aligned", OIC or Arab
block "consensus" to actively thwart U.S. objectives. Your
visit presents an opportunity to remind the GOE that a more
efficient, transparent, and effective UN would benefit all
nations. The concept of reform has become an element on
Egypt's internal agenda as well, and despite setbacks in the
2005 elections, Mubarak continues to pledge his commitment to
democratic reform. As a regional leader, Egypt exerts a
positive influence, particularly in the Palestine/Israel and
Syria/Lebanon situations. End summary.


2. (C) UN Reform: Egypt's stance on the range of UN reform
initiatives has been unhelpful. Both the FM and your
counterpart, Assistant Minister for Multilateral Affairs
Naela Gabr, told Ambassador Tahir-Kheli during her early
December visit to Cairo that Egypt would like to find ground
for greater cooperation with the U.S., but we see no tangible
results yet. Your meetings present an opportunity to
continue a high-level dialogue and press for progress across
the Board.


3. (C) The FM will likely leave substantive discussions to
his Assistant Minister. You can expect Ambassador Gabr to
engage you on the details of Egypt's position on each of the
pending proposals. In short, Egypt's positions on key issues
are as follows:

-- Management reform: supports slowing process of reform;
believes reform not urgent;

-- Mandate review: opposes review of all mandates over five
years old; suspicious of review of mandates that impact
Palestinians;

-- Human Rights Council: wants same size; limited use of
country specific resolutions; opposes adopting criteria for
membership;

-- Ethics Office: believes office not necessary; Ambassador
Gabr has requested a description of the proposed mandate and
estimated cost;

-- Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism:
supports including language that would exempt acts by
national liberation movements and include acts by national
militaries.


4. (C) Egypt and the UNHCR: Relations between the GOE and
UNHCR are badly strained as a result of a December 30
incident in which at least 27 Sudanese refugees were killed
when Egyptian police broke up a three-month-long sit in at a
small park near Cairo's UNHCR offices. The GOE is defensive
about the incident, and blames UNHCR for creating the
situation and then criticizing the Egyptian response. The
GOE detained about 2000 protesters but released all but
approximately 460, who are now under review by UNHCR, pending
deportation. While working hard to promote greater
communication/cooperation between the GOE and UNHCR, we have
refrained from publicly criticizing the GOE's inept handling
of the incident.


5. (C) Egypt and the IAEA: In the IAEA, Egypt has
emphasized NPT universality (Israel) over compliance (Iran),
but Iran's decision on January 10 to remove the seals at the
Natanz enrichment facility has disturbed the GOE. Cairo may
take note that the Egyptian Director General of the IAEA,
Mohammed el Baradei, has acknowledged the seriousness of this
latest breach. There may be cause to hope that Egypt will
realize that it should join the international community in
calling for an emergency meeting of the IAEA Board of
Governors to consider referring Iran to the UNSC.


6. (C) Domestic Political Overview: Although Mubarak has
reaffirmed his commitment to democratic reform and political
pluralism, there have been setbacks in recent months. In
particular, the GOE intervened in the later rounds of recent
parliamentary elections to staunch impressive gains by the
Muslim Brotherhood. Reported election irregularities
included the use of bribery, violence and threats of violence
to influence voters, barring voters from entering polling
stations, and rigging vote counting. The GOE also convicted
on forgery charges and jailed political opposition leader
Ayman Nour on December 24. Observers agree that Nour's real
offense was challenging Mubarak, and implicitly his son Gamal
as a potential future President. Nour's conviction, which
came at significant expense in terms of international
criticism, only further marginalizes a secular opposition
that was wiped out in the parliamentary elections.
Nonetheless, Mubarak has vowed to continue democratic and
economic reform, albeit at a pace set by the GOE, not
dictated by international friends or critics.


7. (C) Economic Overview: Because the Egyptian leadership
recognizes that free market policies are essential to create
growth and jobs and, in the long term, preserve social peace,
the GOE's economic reform agenda will likely continue. When
Mubarak announced a new cabinet on December 31, he retained
all previously-appointed economic reformers and placed some
additional ministries under the leadership of new reformers.
Egypt's reformers are pushing for a Free Trade Agreement and
are disappointed that the U.S. has postponed an announcement
of FTA negotiations.


8. (C) External Relations: Senior GOE officials have
consistently urged Bashar al Assad to cooperate fully with
the Mehlis commission's investigation of the Hariri
assassination. At the same time, officials press us to
refrain from taking strong action against Syria and warn that
a post-Asad regime could prove worse than the status quo. On
Israel/Palestine, Egypt's influence is also positive. The
Egyptians had developed a close working relationship with
Sharon and have been key to brokering agreements on Gaza
withdrawal, the movement of Palestinians in and out of Gaza,
and training Palestinian security forces. On Iraq, the GOE
has supported the political process by hosting Iraqi leaders
and publicly backing the presence, for now, of U.S. forces in
Iraq. Nonetheless, the GOE differs with us fundamentally on
democracy in Iraq and believes that Iraq needs a "tough but
fair" leader to keep the peace.

RICCIARDONE