A/S RADEMAKER'S BILATERAL NONPROLIFERATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 CAIRO 001232

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2016
TAGS: PREL PARM PGOV IS IR EG KNNP IAEA UNSC
SUBJECT: A/S RADEMAKER'S BILATERAL NONPROLIFERATION
DISCUSSIONS IN EGYPT

Classified by DCM Stuart Jones for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

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Summary
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1. (C) Acting Assistant Secretary for International
Security and Nonproliferation Stephen Rademaker discussed
Iran's nuclear weapons program with Foreign Minister Ahmed
Aboul Gheit and held bilateral nonproliferation discussions
with the Assistant Minister for Multilateral Affairs
Ambassador Naela Gabr on February 15-16. During the
Iran-focused discussions, senior GOE officials confirmed
Egypt's opposition to Iran's efforts to acquire nuclear
weapons (efforts Egypt did not dispute are underway in Iran),
but pressed the U.S. to continue to keep Israel's nuclear
program and a Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (MENWFZ)
on the international agenda. Aboul Gheit said Iranian
possession of nuclear weapons would likely prompt one or more
Arab states to seek such weapons. The discussions also
addressed the IAEA (safeguards and the Additional Protocol),
the Conference on Disarmament, export controls, the
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI),conventional weapons
trafficking, landmines, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT),the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC),and
the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The delegations
agreed to continue close coordination on Iran, and to meet
again in 2007, in part to consult ahead of the first
preparatory meeting (Prepcom) for the next NPT Review
Conference. End summary.


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Iran Discussions with Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit
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2. (C) Acting A/S Stephen Rademaker, joined by the
Ambassador, Kurt Kessler and Eythan Sontag of the ISN Bureau,
and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Jack David, began
bilateral nonproliferation meetings in Cairo by discussing
Iran's nuclear weapons program with Foreign Minister Ahmed
Aboul Gheit on February 15. Aboul Gheit confirmed that GOE
policy opposes proliferation of nuclear weapons and agreed
that Iran is seeking to build nuclear weapons. But Aboul
Gheit also accused the U.S. of "shielding" Israel in
nonproliferation discussions and said that the U.S. focus on
Iran alone would encourage others in the region to pursue
similar programs. A/S Rademaker said that the U.S. does
consistently urge Israel, along with India and Pakistan, to
accede to the NPT, but accession by Israel is unlikely until
there is a peace settlement in the region. A/S Rademaker
emphasized that a nuclear weapons-capable Iran, particularly
given the rhetoric of the current Iranian regime, would only
further destabilize the region and push us farther from the
objective of encouraging Israel's signature of the NPT. He
stressed the danger of justifying inaction on the Iranian
nuclear issue until Israel moves forward on the NPT, as this
would likely give Iran sufficient time to realize its nuclear
weapons ambitions.


3. (C) A/S Rademaker also noted that some of Egypt's Gulf
neighbors view the Iranian threat with grave concern. He
shared that some in the Persian Gulf region predict that
Egypt and Turkey would also deploy nuclear weapons if Iran
succeeds. Aboul Gheit agreed that a nuclear Iran would
prompt others to pursue a nuclear weapons program, but
rejected the suggestion that Egypt would be among such
countries. Proclaiming himself "convinced" of the need to
stop Iran and the low probability of making progress on
Israel in the short term, Aboul Gheit said "the only thing we
ask is for is repetition of references" to a nuclear weapons
free zone in the Middle East. "I don't expect you to press
them (Israel) to drop their program now, but we need to have
hope for 5, 10 15, 20 years away." Noting the pressure of
public opinion, Aboul Gheit asked the U.S. to find a way
Egypt can support the U.S. on this without appearing to be
ignoring Israel. Reiterating this point, Aboul Gheit noted
that he was looking for "references to Israel (and its
nuclear program),not action." A/S Rademaker pointed to the
language of the February 4 IAEA resolution on Iran as
evidence that we can work with Egypt if it limits its
objective to keeping Israel on the international agenda.
Aboul Gheit then warned against military strikes in Iran,
saying it would make Iraq look like "child's play." He also
asked the U.S. to ensure that Russia and China are on board
with any proposed actions because without their endorsement,
Egypt's support would be precarious. Throughout the
conversation, Aboul Gheit made repeated references to the
"Arab street's" perception of Western double standards,
which, for many Muslims, served as justification for Iran's
nuclear weapons ambitions. Arab governments, he said, would
have to be sensitive to this perception.


4. (C) Turning to the 2005 NPT Review Conference, Aboul
Gheit attributed the failure, in part, to the lack of
coordination between the U.S. and Egypt. By contrast, he
noted, dialogue before the 2000 Review Conference had been
excellent, and the result was an agreed statement at the
conference. A/S Rademaker expressed U.S. displeasure with
Egypt's conduct at the Review Conference but agreed that
close cooperation would be key to avoiding a repeat of the
2005 experience.

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Iran
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5. (C) Following the introductory meeting with Aboul Gheit,
A/S Rademaker and Assistant Minister (A/M) Gabr opened the
nonproliferation dialogue. Egypt's delegation included:
Deputy Assistant Minister for Multilateral Affairs Ihab
Fouzy, Disarmament Office Director Dr. Hossam Aly, Obaida
Dandardawy (Disarmament),Omar Amer Youssef (the Minister's
Advisor on Disarmament),General Sherif Bedir (Directorate of
Military Intelligence),and General Younis al Masry
(Directorate of Military Intelligence). The delegations
resumed discussions of Iran with a U.S. briefing on Iran's
nuclear weapons program, highlighting evidence upon which the
U.S. bases its assessment that Iran is most likely to produce
its first nuclear weapons early-to-mid next decade.


6. (C) GOE Perspective: A/M Gabr thanked the delegation
for the briefing and said it confirmed Egypt's decision to
support the IAEA resolution. She asked the U.S. to continue
to provide such briefings so that the FM can make informed
decisions on Iran and stressed that Egypt opposes nuclear
weapons proliferation (by Iran or any other nation). A/M
Gabr also reaffirmed Egypt's support for the legitimate
rights of countries under the NPT to develop nuclear power
and pressed that the Iran matter must not be addressed in
isolation. Rather, the international community through
multilateralism should deal with all similar files --
including Israel -- in a comprehensive way. Dr. Aly added
that universality of the NPT is the only solution to
preventing another Iran and said Israel's nuclear program
"provoked" Iran's program. Dr. Aly and A/M Gabr also noted
that in Arab public opinion, Israel's program gives
legitimacy to Iran's program. Reiterating Aboul Gheit's
earlier statement, A/M Gabr said that to maintain support in
the Arab street, we must find a way to discuss Israel, to
keep it on the agenda, and to show that there is no double
standard. Dr. Aly asked whether a decision by Iran to
withdraw from the NPT would put it on the same footing as
Israel.


7. (C) U.S. Response: On implications of an Iranian
decision to withdraw from the NPT, A/S Rademaker said that
withdrawal would not cure Iran's violation; the situation
would be anomalous to North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT
after it had been caught in violation of the treaty. As a
base-line, the U.S. urges all states, including Israel,
Pakistan, and India, to accede to the NPT, A/S Rademaker
assured. But he also cautioned against creating a perception
of a linkage between progress on the Iran matter and progress
with Israel and its nuclear policy. Disagreeing with the
assertion that Israel "provoked" Iran's nuclear program, A/S
Rademaker said the U.S. and some of Egypt's regional
neighbors believe that Iran's program may have other regional
targets and that Iran may simply want nuclear weapons because
it believes that this is commensurate with its place in the
world. He also suggested that the Arab League and GCC could
play a more proactive role in pressuring Iran. The reality,
A/S Rademaker said, is that without compliance with the NPT,
there will never be NPT universality or a MENWFZ. He
emphasized that given Iran's current noncompliance, Israel
would never agree to accede to the NPT. Israeli accession is
only likely to occur when Iran's program has been stopped and
there is peace in the region.

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Multilateralism and Iran
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8. (C) A/M Gabr noted (more than once) Egypt's preference
that the IAEA continue to handle the Iran matter and
expressed concern that turning the Iran file over to the UNSC
would damage the IAEA's credibility. She also suggested that
a group of regional states might consider meeting to discuss
the Iranian threat. Obaida Dandardawy asked if the U.S. is
concerned over threats that Iran will deny the IAEA access to
sites following referral to the Security Council. DMI's
General Bedir alleged the U.S. had "rushed" the issue to the
UNSC. Dr. Aly suggested that a more lucrative economic
package and security guarantees would entice Iran to
cooperate.


9. (C) A/S Rademaker confirmed U.S. support for
multilateralism (including continued IAEA involvement in
solving the Iran matter),noting that the purpose of UNSC
involvement was to reinforce, not replace, the IAEA. Citing
Iran's history of non-cooperation, A/S Rademaker explained
that the U.S. had not "rushed" for a referral to the UNSC,
and had patiently pursued a diplomatic solution for three
years. As an indication of U.S. commitment to finding such a
solution, A/S Rademaker said the U.S. would support the
current Russian proposal so long as it continued to exclude
the possibility of Iran developing uranium enrichment on its
own soil and did not provide Iran with technical know-how.
A/S Rademaker outlined the U.S. view on next steps in the UN,
starting with a call on Iran to meet all requests made by the
IAEA Board. If Iran continues to spurn such cooperation, the
UNSC should consider mandating full cooperation. As for
sanctions, A/S Rademaker said that although discussion of
this is premature, possibilities include limiting Iran's
technical access to nuclear assistance and imposing a travel
ban on Iran's leaders. On Iran's threats to reduce
cooperation, Kessler said Iran had already stopped its
provisional implementation of the Additional Protocol, but
Iran still has an obligation to allow the IAEA to do what is
necessary to meet its obligations under its NPT-required
safeguards agreement. In response to Rademaker's suggestion
that lessons from the "Libya model" may apply to Iran, Dr.
Aly protested that this would send the wrong message -- if
you get caught trying to build a nuclear program, there are
no ramifications, only rewards.


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Egypt's Priorities; The Additional Protocol
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10. (C) In reviewing Egypt's nonproliferation priorities,
Dr. Aly stressed the need for progress towards a MENWFZ and
said Egypt is not prepared to adopt the Additional Protocol
(AP) absent Israel's accession to the NPT. Dr. Aly said
Egypt believes that signing the AP will detract from the
discussion of universality. He also pressed for support for
an IAEA General Conference Resolution urging all states to
adopt a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA). Dr. Aly
criticized alleged U.S. opposition to any reference in the UN
that could be construed as pressuring Israel to join the NPT.
Dr. Aly complained that plans for an IAEA-sponsored forum to
discuss other regions' experiences in creating WMD-free zones
had stalled because of Israeli opposition to the original
agenda. The U.S. delegation urged the Egyptians to re-engage
with Israel and the IAEA regarding the forum.

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Conference on Disarmament
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11. (C) A/S Rademaker told Assistant Minister Gabr that
Egypt's linkage of progress on the Fissile Material Cut-off
Treaty to other issues is "holding hostage" progress in the
Conference on Disarmament (CD). A/M Gabr noted that the FMCT
is not a priority, but said Egypt does support it.
Ultimately, Gabr said, Egypt wants a balanced approach to the
agenda items, inclusion of verification in the FMCT, and a
commitment to addressing the issues within the CD by
consensus. A/S Rademaker pressed the U.S. position that the
FMCT should not include verification because it is not
realistically achievable. Discussing verification allows
countries such as Pakistan and India that produce fissile
material to buy more time to produce, he said. A/M Gabr
responded favorably to the A/S's suggestion that the U.S.
would table a proposal to negotiate an FMCT, but declined the
suggestion that Egypt (a member of the G-21) co-sponsor the
proposal.

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Proliferation Security Initiative; EXBS Program
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12. (C) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense David briefed
the group on PSI and urged Egypt to endorse the Statement of
Interdiction Principles. DMI's General Bedir expressed
concern that interdiction would conflict with international
law and asked about the extent of pressure from the U.S. for
nations to comply with interdiction requests. A/S Rademaker
emphasized the decision to participate in a PSI interdiction
is a voluntary and sovereign one. The U.S. delegation
further elaborated that endorsement of the SOP constitutes a
political rather than a legal commitment, and U.S. PSI
experts would be willing to further discuss the matter with
Egyptian officials, including possibly via digital video
conference. A/M Gabr said an interagency group would
"seriously study" the PSI and be in touch should they like to
discuss it further.



13. (C) The U.S. delegation described the Export Control
and Border Security (EXBS) program broadly, focusing on
technical assistance that may be available to bolster Egypt's
capabilities. The U.S. delegation noted that funds had
already been allocated for FY06 and FY07 for potential EXBS
projects in Egypt. A/M Gabr said she would be happy to
receive detailed information on the program. (Note: The
U.S. delegation later provided Post with programmatic details
regarding EXBS. Post passed this information to MFA
officials for their consideration. End note.)

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Landmines; Conventional Weapons
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14. (C) A/M Gabr confirmed that Egypt does not trade in or
produce any anti-personnel mines and flagged Egypt's own
problem with mines in the Western Desert. Expressing
frustration with the recent Croatia meeting on the Ottawa
Convention, Dr. Aly noted: countries do not have the
capacity or money to comply with Article 7, 90 percent of the
Croatia attendees were there to request money, and even
Croatia was cited at the meeting for trying to sell mines on
the internet. A/S Rademaker expressed surprise that the
Ottawa Convention members are not more proactive in helping
Egypt address its problem.


15. (C) UN Register: Dr. Aly said Egypt is reconsidering
its position on inserting WMD in the UN Register of
Conventional Arms. A/S Rademaker welcomed this news, noting
that given the likely clandestine nature of any such
transfers, the WMD reference is not useful.


16. (C) Conventional Weapons Trade with DPRK: A/S
Rademaker described U.S. efforts to curtail DPRK conventional
arms sales, which provide hard currency for its ballistic
missile and WMD programs. He asked Egypt to refrain from
engaging in any military trade with the DPRK adn to shut down
any Korea Mining Development Trading Organization (KOMID)
offices that might exist in Egypt. Assistant Minister Gabr
declined to give this assurance and suggested that the U.S.
would better achieve its objectives with the DPRK by offering
humanitarian and economic assistance.

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CTBT, CWC, BWC
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17. (C) A/M Gabr said that until Israel accedes to the CWC
and BWC, Egypt is not willing to become a full party to
either convention. (Note: Egypt has signed but not ratified
the BWC. It has not signed the CWC. End note) Egypt will,
however, continue to adhere to the spirit of the conventions
and has no intention to employ either BW or CW. She pressed
the A/S for information on Israel's reluctance to sign the
conventions and stressed the need for "balance." Gabr
contended that Egypt has consistently made concessions while
Israel provides little in return. She said this has hardened
public opinion against accepting yet another nonproliferation
convention until Israel shows a similar willingness. On the
CTBT, Dr. Aly said Egypt believes the Senate rejected the
treaty because the U.S. wanted to conduct safety and
reliability tests. He added that experts believe that the
CTBT is verifiable and also expressed concern over rumors the
U.S. would not contribute to on-site inspections. He also
complained that the U.S. and Israel blocked Egypt's move to
mention the NPT in the final paragraph of the CTBT.


18. (C) On testing, A/S Rademaker said the reluctance to
accept the CTBT arises from the view that while the U.S.
would abide by its treaty obligations, others may sign but
then try to test anyway in secret. Rademaker confirmed that
the U.S. is the largest contributor to monitoring and has no
plans to end its moratorium on nuclear testing. On the CWC
and BWC, Rademaker said that Egypt could apply greater
pressure to Israel to ratify by becoming a full party itself.
He also offered the possibility of U.S. assistance to Egypt
to permit it to come into compliance with the CWC, should
Egypt accede to the treaty. A/S Rademaker added that Israel
is concerned about the Syrian chemical weapons program and is
not signing for tactical reasons. Dr. Aly pushed back on
this point, asserting that the more committed Egypt gets on
paper, the bigger the regional power imbalance becomes
because of Israel's nuclear arsenal.

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Next Steps
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19. (C) The bilateral discussions concluded with a review
of outstanding action items and next steps. A/S Rademaker
proposed that:
-- the U.S. and Egypt continue close consultation on Iran;
-- Egypt consider trying to revisit the idea of the
IAEA-sponsored Forum on the creation of a Middle East WMD
Free Zone;
-- the U.S. could arrange a DVC with GOE officials on the PSI;
-- the U.S. will deliver a paper on the EXBS program;
-- the parties meet again before the 2007 NPT Preparatory
Conference;
-- the U.S. and Egypt should continue to hold such
wide-ranging nonproliferation dialogues on a regular basis,
perhaps annually.

A/M Gabr agreed with all proposals except the DVC on PSI
(noting the GOE would study this internally) and asked for
more vocal U.S. support for the MENWFZ and for appreciation
of Egypt's support in multilateral fora.

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Comment
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20. (C) The U.S.-Egypt dialogue offered a useful venue for
both delegations to convey their positions on a wide range of
nonproliferation issues. In discussions on the margins, GOE
officials frequently noted that the opportunity to address
such matters in a bilateral context would be an important
step in avoiding confrontation in multilateral fora. While
senior GOE officials appeared convinced of Iran's nuclear
weapons pursuit, they were also forthright in noting that a
tougher Arab stance against Iran's program can only occur in
the context of at least references to the objective of a
MENWFZ. The USG should follow up expeditiously on agreed
areas of possible cooperation, such as EXBS, to consolidate
the momentum gained in these talks.


21. (U) A/S Rademaker cleared this cable.
RICCIARDONE