Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BUENOSAIRES723
2006-03-28 17:34:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Buenos Aires
Cable title:  

Embassy Buenos Aires Avian Influenza Tabletop

Tags:  AMGT ASEC CASC AMED KFLO AEMR AR 
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VZCZCXRO4614
PP RUEHRG
DE RUEHBU #0723/01 0871734
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 281734Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3983
INFO RUCNBEH/BRASILIA ENVIROMENTAL
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BUENOS AIRES 000723 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR S/ES - O/CMS - Office of Crisis Management Support

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AMGT ASEC CASC AMED KFLO AEMR AR
SUBJECT: Embassy Buenos Aires Avian Influenza Tabletop
Exercise and Updated Tripwires

Reference: (A) State 219189
(B) State 220047
(C) Buenos Aires 2914
(D) Buenos Aires 3110

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BUENOS AIRES 000723

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR S/ES - O/CMS - Office of Crisis Management Support

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AMGT ASEC CASC AMED KFLO AEMR AR
SUBJECT: Embassy Buenos Aires Avian Influenza Tabletop
Exercise and Updated Tripwires

Reference: (A) State 219189
(B) State 220047
(C) Buenos Aires 2914
(D) Buenos Aires 3110


1. (U) Sensitive But Unclassified - Not For Internet
Distribution.


2. (SBU) Summary: Embassy Buenos Aires' Avian Influenza
(AI) Mission Task Force (MTF) conducted an AI mission
specific tabletop exercise which was led by the PMO and
included CLO, IRM, PAS and the MSG representatives on March
2nd. Based on the results of this exercise, the MTF
modified existing tripwires and included a specific tripwire
for human-to-human transmission of AI as outlined in
paragraph six. The revised tripwires represent a more
plausible scenario in the event of a pandemic. End Summary.


3. (SBU) Based on the results of a March 2nd mission-
specific tabletop exercise, Embassy Buenos Aires modified
its existing avian influenza (AI) tripwires (see paragraph
six). The changes include a specific tripwire for human-to-
human transmission of AI. Participants in the tabletop
included the Avian Influenza (AI) Mission Task Force (MTF),
which is chaired by the DCM and composed of ESTH, MED, CONS,
RSO, MGMT, MILGRP and FAS, along with representatives of
CLO, IRM, PAS and the MSG.

--------------
Tabletop Scenario
--------------


4. (SBU) During the tabletop exercise, led by the PMO,
participants were asked to consider scenarios in which AI
had been discovered in both Argentina and neighboring
countries through animal-to-human transmission. The
exercise also included situations in which an eligible
family member (EFM) contracted AI, the disease becomes
widespread in birds in Argentina, and human-to-human
transmission is discovered in China. The participants
determined that the appearance of human AI in Argentina
through contact with animals could result in widespread
panic, looting of drugstores, and a possible reduction in
FSN staff reporting to work. If AI reaches pandemic
proportions and appears in the U.S. before appearing in

Argentina, airports and other modes of transportation will
likely cease functioning. Since Buenos Aires serves as an
air transportation hub for USG missions in several
neighboring countries, Post may become the "safe-haven" for
USG employees from those missions who are stranded in
Argentina due to the shut-down of transportation services.

--------------
Modified Tripwires
--------------


5. (SBU) In modifying the tripwires, the MTF factored in
the fast transmission rate that would occur if the virus
develops the ability to spread directly from human-to-human
and the historically rapid geographical dispersion of
pandemics, which would be magnified by the pace of modern
air travel. As before, all tripwire responses have been
made under the assumption that an effective human vaccine
will not be available. Any of the tripwires discussed below
could occur independently of each other. It is also
possible that two or more tripwires could occur sequentially
or simultaneously.


6. (SBU) Following are the Revised Tripwires and Responses:

Tripwire One: A substantial and sustained spike in the
number and/or broadening geographic spread of animal-to-
human cases anywhere in the world.

- EAC meets to confirm tripwire has been crossed.
- Provide Mission briefings for American and LES
employees and dependents.
- Ensure that any public announcements or travel warnings
issued are disseminated to American citizens in
Argentina.
- Begin preparations for actions in Tripwire Two.

Tripwire Two: A spike in the number and/or broadening
geographic spread of animal-to-human cases in Latin America
(including Argentina).

- EAC meets to confirm tripwire has been crossed.
- Provide Mission briefings for American and LES employees
and dependents.

BUENOS AIR 00000723 002 OF 003


- Conduct a town hall meeting for US citizens in Argentina.
- Restrict official and unofficial travel to suspected
areas.
- Consider authorized departure should cases of animal-to-
human transmission of AI be confirmed in Argentina.
- Restrict incoming official travel to Argentina giving
priority to personnel involved in investigative/containment
efforts, or as otherwise deemed necessary by COM.
- Increase coordination with appropriate GOA ministries and
schools.
- Begin plans to operate Embassy with reduced personnel in
the event LES absences increase.
- Ensure that staff purchases sufficient supplies of food,
water and other necessary domestic items for a shelter-in-
place scenario and inform U.S. citizen community in
Argentina of the need to do the same.
- Begin preparations for actions in Tripwire Three.

Tripwire Three: Confirmed human-to-human transmission of AI
anywhere in the world.

- EAC meets to confirm tripwire has been crossed.
- Provide mission briefings (perhaps by phone or email) for
American and LES employees and dependents.
- Ambassador to decide whether to request authorized or
ordered departure of non-essential staff and family members.
If this is not possible due to shutdown of airports or if
the disease has already reached the U.S., non-essential
staff and families should shelter in place. (It is probable
that staff and family members will only have a limited time
to depart Argentina. This will depend on the rate of
dispersion of the disease and the pandemic-associated
shutdown of national and regional airports.)
- IF AD/OD is not feasible, instruct all non-emergency
American and LES staff to remain home on administrative
leave. Children should remain home from school. Provide
similar information to U.S. citizen community in Argentina.
- Cancel incoming official travel to Argentina except for
personnel involved in investigative/containment efforts, or
as otherwise deemed necessary by COM.
- Coordinate with CA/OCS on issuance of guidance (public
announcement or travel warning, as appropriate) urging
American citizens to defer all non-emergency travel to
Argentina and particularly the affected regions.
- In coordination with the Department, prepare press
guidance.
- Provide situation updates to Department as needed.
- Recommend social restrictions to staff and U.S. citizen
community in Argentina (restrict movements of all personnel
in the city; restrict dinner parties, participation in
sporting events, etc.)
- Implement home quarantine of any staff or dependents that
have been in contact with a person confirmed to have an AI
infection and implement at-home monitoring procedure.
- Implement social distancing (limit movement of all
personnel and dependents in the city) and inform U.S.
citizen community in Argentina of the need to do the same.
- Plan for home visits to sick individuals who receive care
under the Embassy health unit.
- Plan delivery service of food and other essential items to
residences, as needed.
- Depending on level of public inquiries, Embassy staffs and
equips a situation room. Consular officers should establish
a database tracking American citizens who have been
quarantined, hospitalized or ill at home. Also, prepare
guidance for American citizen community on treatment
options.
- Reduce consular operations to emergency consular services
only.
- Consider segregating the Marine Security Guard detachment
from the rest of the mission to decrease the risk of spread
of the disease.
- Severely restrict visitor access to Mission.
- Consider prophylactic Tamiflu treatment only for staff
required to be in direct contact with potentially infected
persons and those at high risk if they develop the disease.
- Provide personal protective gear to staff required to have
continuing contact with the general public.
- In the event of civil unrest, attempt to increase the size
of the local guard force and the frequency of patrols to
personal residences. If necessary, consider relocating
personnel sheltering in place to a safer location.
- Prepare to provide safe haven in case members of other USG
missions, who must transit Buenos Aires to return to the
U.S., become stranded in Argentina due to airport closures.

Alternate Tripwire: Mission emloyee or eligible family
member develops AI infection.


BUENOS AIR 00000723 003 OF 003


Alternate Tripwire Response:

- Employee or eligible family member begins Tamiflu
treatment.

- Medevac if possible; otherwise use local medical
facilities and/or home quarantine patient and anyone who has
had direct contact with patient.

GUTIERREZ