Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BUENOSAIRES2637
2006-11-28 21:40:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Buenos Aires
Cable title:  

AMIA SPECIAL PROSECUTORS CALL ON AMBASSADOR

Tags:  PTER KJUS PREL PGOV AR FBI 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBU #2637/01 3322140
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 282140Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6609
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/FBI WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L BUENOS AIRES 002637 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

WHA FOR A/S SHANNON, DAS DUDDY, DMCCARTHY
WHA/BSC FOR BARNES, FRIEDMAN, MOSS
NEA/IR FOR HWOOSTER
S/CT FOR ARNOLD SIERRA
NSC FOR JOSE CARDENAS
FBI FOR CTD IRAN-HIZBALLAH UNIT AND OIO AMERICAS UNIT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2016
TAGS: PTER KJUS PREL PGOV AR FBI
SUBJECT: AMIA SPECIAL PROSECUTORS CALL ON AMBASSADOR


Classified By: Ambassador Wayne for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L BUENOS AIRES 002637

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

WHA FOR A/S SHANNON, DAS DUDDY, DMCCARTHY
WHA/BSC FOR BARNES, FRIEDMAN, MOSS
NEA/IR FOR HWOOSTER
S/CT FOR ARNOLD SIERRA
NSC FOR JOSE CARDENAS
FBI FOR CTD IRAN-HIZBALLAH UNIT AND OIO AMERICAS UNIT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2016
TAGS: PTER KJUS PREL PGOV AR FBI
SUBJECT: AMIA SPECIAL PROSECUTORS CALL ON AMBASSADOR


Classified By: Ambassador Wayne for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: On November 27, AMIA prosecutors Alberto
Nisman and Marcelo Martinez Burgos called on the Ambassador
to express their deep appreciation for the USG's support for
their investigation and publicly for our public support
following the release of their report. They noted that their
investigation continues, looking particularly into the Tri
Border Area (TBA) and Buenos Aires networks that facilitated
the 1994 attack. They stated that the Interpol delay in
emitting the "Red Notices" was an inconvenience but not
unexpected, given the case's history. Nisman said he wished
his own government was more forthcoming in voicing support
but did see as positive the fact that the Foreign Ministry
was pulling together an interagency group (including the
Prosecutors) to discuss next steps. Ambassador assured the
Prosecutors of continued U.S. support, briefly describing our
diplomatic efforts, and encouraged them to work with the
Judge and Argentina's Interpol representative to respond
aggressively to Iran's efforts to derail the capture notices.
We also noted the upcoming 3 1 talks in Buenos Aires, stating
that this would be an excellent opportunity for Argentina to
brief on the AMIA issue and solicit support. End Summary.


2. (C) Drs. Alberto Nisman and Marcelo Martinez Burgos, lead
prosecutors in the AMIA case, called on the Ambassador
November 27 to discuss the status of the case. DCM, A/LegAtt
and PolOff sat in on the meeting. Nisman thanked the
Ambassador for the USG's valuable support to their
investigation and for the public statements of support
following the release of their investigative report October

25. Nisman stated that he wished he could get a similar show
of support from his own government. He noted that his team

continues to work on the investigation and is focused
particularly on trying to uncover more information about the
Islamic networks operating in the TBA and in Buenos Aires at
the time.


3. (C) Ambassador asked if Nisman had seen some of the
negative press that has come out that basically described
Nisman's report as a recirculation of the previous
investigation and based on intelligence files and the
testimony of unreliable witnesses. Nisman said that he had
quietly responded to the authors of the press articles. To
the Ambassador he very strongly defended the investigation,
the report and the strength of evidence and witnesses. He
noted that several of the witnesses were former senior Iraqi
government officials, e.g. Bani Sadr, with direct knowledge
of events surrounding the conception of the attack. He
explained that not a single intelligence file was cited as
evidence in his report; rather that the intelligence served
to support the evidence gathered through other sources, or to
generate new leads that were later corroborated via
independent evidence.


4. (C) Turning to Interpol and the capture notices, the
Ambassador asked if Nisman and Martinez Burgos knew if anyone
had responded to the Interpol Secretary General's
notification that he would not be issuing Red Notices until
both Iranian and Argentine authorities had an opportunity to
express their views. Nisman said he did not think anyone
had. The Ambassador noted how important it was for Argentina
to reach out for support and start building an international
coalition. He said that it often takes significant urging,
even of our best friends, to build this kind of support. The
Ambassador explained that he had raised the AMIA case, and
made the same points, to the Foreign Minister, and to the
Interior and Justice Ministers as well. A/LegAtt stressed
the importance of engaging quickly with Interpol and not
leave the field open to the Iranians to have the last word.


5. (C) The Ambassador explained that the U.S. would be
working quietly here, in Washington and in capitals to build
support for Argentina's legitimate right to disseminate the
capture notices and to seek to bring terrorists to justice.
The Ambassador stressed the importance of reaching out to the
countries represented on the Interpol Executive Committee to
make sure they were aware of Argentina's position. Nisman
said that he would talk to Judge Canicoba Corral and to
Argentina's Federal Police Interpol Chief to discuss
responding to the Secretary General.

6. (C) Nisman also noted that the Foreign Ministry had been
talking to them and other agencies and has put together an
interagency process to look at the issues. Nisman offered
that he was going over to the MFA that afternoon for a
meeting. He said that he and Martinez Burgos had offered
their services to help inform other governments and were at
the MFA's disposition. Ambassador noted that he had made the
same suggestion to senior officials in several of his
meetings as a way to explain to governments, first hand, the
strength and complexity of the case against the indicted
individuals. PolOff noted the upcoming 3 1 meeting in Buenos
Aires and that it would be an excellent opportunity to raise
the AMIA issue and solicit support. Nisman said he believed
that 3 1 would be one of the issues of the MFA meeting.


7. (C) Comment: Nisman was very appreciative of the public
expressions of support he had received from the U.S., and
others and said that this was very important, particularly
for the GoA, to feel it had international support. He asked
the Ambassador and USG to do all it could to solicit more
such support from other countries. It is discouraging that
apparently no one in Buenos Aires had thought to respond
officially to the Interpol Secretary General, but we believe
we have energized Nisman to work with the Judge and the
Argentine Interpol representative to at least consider it.
A/LegAtt will follow up with the Interpol representative to
see where things stand. It is encouraging, however, that the
GoA is starting to discuss in a coordinated fashion how to
initiate a diplomatic effort. Embassy will continue to
engage here to support those efforts, including contact in
the next days with the MFA.
WAYNE