Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BUENOSAIRES1901
2006-08-24 18:06:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Buenos Aires
Cable title:  

ARGENTINA: KIRCHNER POWER GRAB PUSHING OPPOSITION

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PREL AR 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BUENOS AIRES 001901 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA TOM SHANNON, JOHN MAISTO, AND CHARLES SHAPIRO
NSC FOR DAN FISK
TREASURY FOR DAS NANCY LEE
USCINCSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/24/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL AR
SUBJECT: ARGENTINA: KIRCHNER POWER GRAB PUSHING OPPOSITION
UCR TO BREAKING POINT

REF: 05 BUENOS AIRES 01324

Classified By: CDA, a.i., Michael Matera, Reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BUENOS AIRES 001901

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA TOM SHANNON, JOHN MAISTO, AND CHARLES SHAPIRO
NSC FOR DAN FISK
TREASURY FOR DAS NANCY LEE
USCINCSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/24/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL AR
SUBJECT: ARGENTINA: KIRCHNER POWER GRAB PUSHING OPPOSITION
UCR TO BREAKING POINT

REF: 05 BUENOS AIRES 01324

Classified By: CDA, a.i., Michael Matera, Reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (SBU) SUMMARY: The century-old Radical Civic Union (UCR)
party is facing serious divisions in the run-up to its
national convention to be held in Rosario August 25-26
between those who want to accept President Kirchner's call to
join his "concertacion" and those who want to remain an
opposition party. Kirchner's "concertacion" in practice does
not involve a policy debate or differences of opinion and is
instead an alliance of Peronists and non-Peronists who have
signed onto Kirchner's political program. Despite the
prominence of the pro-Kirchner faction members, the vast
majority of convention delegates reportedly favor maintaining
the UCR as an opposition party, making it unlikely the
pro-Kirchner bloc will succeed in their objective of pulling
the entire UCR into Kirchner's orbit. It is unclear if the
pro-Kirchner faction will even attend the convention. Both
sides claim they are not seeking a formal rupture of the
party, but it is likely that de facto two parties will
emerge, one that will back President Kirchner for re-election
and one that will support an opposition candidate in 2007,
most likely Roberto Lavagna. END SUMMARY.


2. (SBU) The century-old Radical Civic Union (UCR) party is
facing serious divisions in the run-up to its national
convention to be held in the city of Rosario August 25-26
between those who want to accept President Kirchner's call to
join his "concertacion" and those who want to remain an
opposition party. (For more on the UCR, see reftel.) The
pro-Kirchner bloc -- known as the Radicales K or by their
favored term, Radicales G (for "government" or the Spanish
word for "management") -- includes the majority of the UCR
Governors and the most prominent UCR Mayors. The
pro-Kirchner bloc met in San Vicente on August 12 and again
in Bariloche on August 21 in a show of force in the lead up
to the party convention. The national party leadership favor

maintaining an opposition stance and have recently advocated
supporting former Minister of the Economy Roberto Lavagna's
as-yet-unannounced candidacy for President in 2007.
(Comment: Kirchner's use of the word "concertacion" is a
reference to Chile's governing coalition of parties. Unlike
Chile's example, however, Kirchner's concertacion in practice
does not allow for differences of opinion or a policy debate
and is instead an alliance of Peronists and non-Peronists who
have signed onto Kirchner's political program. End Comment.)


3. (SBU) Despite the prominence of the Radicales K members,
the vast majority of the party convention delegates
reportedly favor maintaining the UCR as an opposition party,
making it unlikely the pro-Kirchner bloc will succeed in
their objective of pulling the entire UCR into Kirchner's
orbit. It is unclear if the Radicales K will even attend the
convention. After first threatening to boycott the event,
then announcing last week they would attend, on August 23
several leading Radicales K said that the faction would not
in fact attend. Kirchner reportedly told the group, "No one
goes where they will lose." Press reporting indicated that
the UCR Governors of Mendoza, Corrientes and Catamarca were
still considering attending the convention. (Comment: Both
sides claim they are not seeking a formal rupture of the
party, but it is likely that de facto two parties will emerge
after the convention, one that will back President Kirchner
for re-election and one that will support an opposition
candidate in 2007, most likely Roberto Lavagna. End Comment.)


4. (SBU) Leading Radical K, San Isidro Mayor Gustavo Posse,
told the ADCM on August 18 that his faction is aligning with
President Kirchner because of their need for Kirchner's
support in order to govern. Posse said it is no coincidence
that the pro-Kirchner bloc is composed of most of the UCR
leaders that govern significant pieces of territory. "There
are no real political parties anymore in Argentina. Our only
option is to join with Kirchner in governing the country."
Posse said his faction would seek to get the party convention
to approve the freedom of conscience for UCR members to

BUENOS AIR 00001901 002 OF 003


support whoever they wanted for President next year. (Note:
Argentina's odd tax system that gives the national government
control over the majority of the tax receipts, while
obligating the provinces and municipalities with the majority
of the expenditures, gives the national government enormous
power over provincial and local leaders. With the weakness
of the UCR and the opposition writ large at the national
level, this power has been accentuated. End Note.)


5. (SBU) Leader of the Buenos Aires City UCR and prominent
member of the pro-opposition bloc, Jesus Rodriguez told the
ADCM on August 16 that the Radicales K did not represent the
majority of the party and will lack influence at the party
convention. Rodriguez said that 80 percent of the delegates
support the national party's position on maintaining the UCR
as an opposition party. Rodriguez also said that the party
convention would not formally endorse Lavagna for President,
as the selection of candidates would be decided at a later
date. Rodriguez dismissed the recent meetings of the
Radicales K as a "photo op" that did not threaten the UCR
national leadership. Rodriguez reported that the convention
would not approve freedom of conscience for next year's
presidential campaign and would also affirm the opposition
stance of the party.


6. (SBU) Many of the Radicales K leaders have already so
thoroughly aligned themselves with President Kirchner that it
is difficult to view them as anything but members of
Kirchner's Victory Front (FPV). Mendoza Governor Julio Cobos
in particular has been publicly proclaiming his allegiance to
Kirchner in recent public events with Kirchner and Cabinet
Chief Alberto Fernandez. Cobos is reportedly a strong
candidate to be President Kirchner's vice presidential
running mate in 2007. (Note: A Peronist president taking a
Radical running mate is not without precedent, as Juan Peron
named a dissident UCR leader as his vice presidential
candidate when he first ran for President in 1946. End Note.)

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


7. (C) In his obsessive pursuit to accumulate power,
Kirchner has taken advantage of the weakness of the only
opposition party with a nationwide structure and pushed it to
the brink of rupture. Kirchner did not create the UCR's
weakness, nor many of its divisions, but he has skillfully
utilized his power over the purse strings to force UCR
Governors and Mayors to fall into line behind him. Kirchner
and his allies have recently stepped up the pressure on the
national UCR leadership by flaunting their alliance with the
Radicales K and by re-igniting a six-year-old corruption
scandal that occurred when UCR President Fernando de la Rua
was President.


8. (C) In a country with already weak democratic
institutions and a lack of a strong political opposition, the
crisis within the UCR further weakens Argentina's democratic
system. The UCR is the only opposition party that has the
nationwide network of poll workers that would allow an
opposition presidential candidate to compete fairly with
President Kirchner in 2007.


9. (C) Kirchner's recent command to his new Radical allies
to boycott the party convention means that the differences
within the UCR may not be debated at the party gathering.
This would be a serious setback for what may be argued is the
only true institutional democratic party that Argentina has
ever had and would ensure the split of the UCR into
pro-Kirchner and pro-opposition parties. Kirchner appears
destined to inherit the most significant remaining leaders in
the party, making it even more difficult for the UCR to
recover from its five-year tailspin that began during the
economic crisis in 2001.


10. (C) The UCR has split several times in the past and
recovered, but this split is more serious, as both factions

BUENOS AIR 00001901 003 OF 003


seek their salvation in one of two Peronist leaders --
President Kirchner and Roberto Lavagna. Past splits always
involved differing UCR leaders and political programs, such
as the split between the followers of Hipolito Yrigoyen and
Marcelo T. de Alvear in 1928, and the fracture in 1956
between the supporters of Arturo Frondizi and Ricardo Balbin.
The current split lacks strong leaders with a national
following and the principal conflict is whether or not to
accept incorporation into Peronist President Kirchner's
political machine, rather than substantive policy
differences. The trouble with aligning so closely to another
political force is that it leaves the aligning party's voter
base with no incentive to remain in the party. Why continue
to remain a Radical if most the UCR Governors and Mayors have
gone over to Kirchner's side? Those Radicales that are
seeking to sign onto Kirchner's cause would do well to
remember the fate of leading third parties in their day that
largely disappeared within a few years of aligning themselves
with President de la Rua (Frepaso) and President Menem (the
UcDe). After more than a century of contributions to
Argentina's democracy, it could be argued that the UCR may be
finally in its death throes, with the principal beneficiary
being President Kirchner. END COMMENT.


MATERA