INSIDE LOOKING OUT: MAKING HUNGARIAN FOREIGN POLICY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BUDAPEST 002500

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DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO NSC FOR ADAM STERLING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR HU
SUBJECT: INSIDE LOOKING OUT: MAKING HUNGARIAN FOREIGN POLICY

REF: A) BUDAPEST 1823 B) BUDAPEST 2269 C) BUDAPEST

2383 D) BUDAPEST 2419 E) BUDAPEST 2230

Classified By: POL/C ERIC V. GAUDIOSI; REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) Summary: Hungarian foreign policy has remained a
notable exception to partisan domestic disputes to date, but
new individuals and new institutions are testing the waters
in the policy process. Although EU membership allows the GoH
to default to the consensus position on the many issues in
which it has no direct national interest, the introduction of
austerity measures has left many Hungarians increasingly
ambivalent about the Union. Hungary will remain selectively
active on key issues including the Balkans, but the Gyurcsany
government seems content to take a lower-key approach in
managing questions regarding Hungarian minorities in
neighboring states. Indeed, even supporters agree that
Gyurcsany has centralized decision-making authority in the
PM's office without improving operational efficiency, and for
many Hungarian politicians foreign policy remains an issue to
be kept at arms length or considered in the context of
domestic political advantage. Continued consultation and
public outreach will help promote selective activism on
issues of mutual concern. End Summary.

MADE IN BRUSSELS?


2. (C) With the allure of accession fading and the economic
impact of austerity measures looming ahead, Hungary is
expressing a degree of ambivalence regarding its membership
in the European Union. Having made the EU its overarching
policy goal for so long, the GoH has yet to fill the void
following accession with new objectives. Many of its
accession requirements had been considered foreign policy
issues but have now been internalized as it adjusts to
membership.


3. (C) Budapest is often content to follow the EU consensus,
and effectively "outsourcing" its policy to the Union is
clearly a temptation for a country principally concerned with
its internal political issues. As former President Arpad
Goncze commented to Ambassador Foley, "influence Brussels and
you influence Budapest." Although this is not yet a foregone
conclusion, Hungary often has little interest in issues where
it has no perceived national interest.


4. (C) There are exceptions to this rule. Hungary has
engaged on Cuba and remains actively focused on the Balkans
due to its interest in regional stability and its position as
a gateway for investment. Budapest is still looking for a
constructive role in multilateral fora, however, particularly
after a sharp clash with the UK over Croatia's EU accession
in 2005.

WHAT BORDER?


5. (C) The presence of Hungarian minorities in the region
will continue to prompt a degree of Hungarian activism,
though more often rhetorical than practical. Although
concerns over their co-ethnicists are sincere, the issue also
remains a political football as the opposition continues to
maintain strong ties to ethnic Hungarians abroad. The
opposition has been muted in criticizing the government on
this issue (most notably during this fall's incident in which
an ethnic Hungarian student in Slovakia claimed to have been
assaulted),and FIDESZ officials have candidly conceded that
they remained silent largely to avoid giving the Gyurcsany
government the opportunity to portray itself as the champion
of ethnic Hungarians (ref a).


6. (C) Others have been less reticent. Representatives of
international Hungarian associations have criticized the
government's "inaction" on this issue, describing the
Gyurcsany government as unwilling to engage on an issue they
believe "can only hurt them and not help them." They suspect
that the government's decision to give the bureaucratic lead
on ethnic Hungarian issues to the Prime Minister's Office
reflects Gyurcsany's recognition that "nothing will happen
without him" ... and his desire to ensure that "nothing
happens at all."

CONTROLLING THE MEANS OF POLICY PRODUCTION


7. (C) This centralization of decision-making authority in
the PM's Office is part of a broader trend. Even Gyurcsany's
supporters concede that his reliance on his personal staff
and ad hoc commissions has opened him to political criticism
without noticeably increasing efficiency (ref b). Gabor
Kuncze, outgoing president of the junior coalition partner
SZDSZ, notes that cabinet ministers have been relegated to
"giving the bad news while Gyurcsany takes all the credit."

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"Despite his exceptional talents," Kuncze concludes,
"Gyurcsany has no leadership skills."


8. (C) The government is expected to make changes after the
New Year, including the establishment of a Chief of Staff
within the Prime Minister's Office. These will also
reportedly involve reinstating the position of Administrative
Secretaries in each Ministry, reversing a recent cost-saving

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move in light of widespread dissatisfaction with poor
bureaucratic performance. The MFA has also established a
Strategic Planning office, and is bringing back former
Ambassador to the UK and France (and Cultural Attache in
Washington) Bela Szombati as its director. (Note: We
understand Szombati met recently in Washington with DAS
Karsner and with representatives from the Brookings Institute
and the Heritage Foundation. End Note.) Other changes to
streamline the GoH bureaucracy and improve its strategic
focus are also under consideration (septel).


9. (C) There is a growing sense that changes are overdue.
The deployment of Hungary's PRT in Afghanistan is straining
the GoH. We understand there have been sharp clashes between
officials in the Prime Minister's Office and the MFA
regarding plans for civil reconstruction, and communication
between some high-level officials has all but broken down.
Inter-agency coordination is often limited to various
ministries each talking to the embassy but not to each other.
Senior MFA officials have intimated to us that "solutions to
these problems are already in train."


10. (C) FM Goncz has, on balance, exceeded the very modest
expectations that followed her surprise appointment. She
remains the target of occasional sniping from the opposition,
which has cast itself as the defender of "professional
expertise" in foreign affairs. Moreover, Goncz's reportedly
good relationship with PM Gyurcsany has not made her the
government's leading voice on foreign policy. Nor has it
spared the MFA from significant personnel cuts in its
domestic and overseas staffing. In a cabinet filled with
political players, Goncz lacks the independent power base
enjoyed by many of her colleagues and remains far from first
among equals.

CONSENSUS, COMMITTEES, AND KATALIN


11. (C) Foreign policy is no longer the exclusive purview of
the executive agencies. As underscored by the Parliamentary
Foreign Affairs Committee's discussion of NATO issues in
anticipation of the Riga Summit (ref c),the bipartisan
consensus on most foreign policy issues remains strong
despite Hungary's domestic political situation. Committees,
members, and staffers are developing expertise and moving
cautiously toward a more active role in the policy process,
and we are redoubling our outreach with them.


12. (C) Parliamentary Speaker Katalin Szili has also
established a markedly higher international profile than her
predecessors. She has travelled frequently in the region -
so much so that our MFA contacts play the occasional game of
"where's Katalin?" - and tried with mixed success to use her
office to organize and host international conferences in
Budapest. Szili's interest may have more to do with her own
political ambitions than a pure interest in foreign affairs,
but she, too, has established a position supportive of our
key priorities.

THE WILD CARD AT THE TOP OF THE DECK


13. (C) President Solyom has also ventured into foreign
policy. He has travelled to meet with foreign counterparts,
including trips to Cyprus and Egypt this month to visit
Hungarian troops serving in peacekeeping missions there. His
limited constitutional powers do include the right to refer
legislation to Parliament for reconsideration, and many
political scientists see Solyom as trying to expand the
prerogatives he worked to limit as President of the
Constitutional Court. He demonstrated his willingness to do
so on the question of the US-EU passenger data sharing
agreement. Although Solyom's relationship with the MFA is
reportedly distant, he has recently raised eyebrows by
asserting his right to go directly to the Ministries contrary
to traditional practice. Most observers agree that his
(often ill-timed) engagement is driven by his legalistic
attitude, but our EU colleagues tell us that Solyom has been
exceedingly candid regarding his strong personal antipathy
for PM Gyurcsany, whom he has described as "morally unfit"
for his position. Although Solyom's motives may not be
anti-American, his opinions may reflect a tendency to
question the Gyurcsany's government's actions. His actions
may also remain largely immune to diplomatic engagement.


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WHEN THINGS SOUND TOO GOOD TO BE TRUE ...


14. (C) Finally, the Hungarian Embassy in Washington is
always a variable in the equation. The MFA often finds
itself running - and sometimes only grudgingly walking - to
catch up with commitments made in Washington. Their Embassy
often tries to lead from afar - and usually in the right
direction - but their activism contrasts sharply with
bureaucratic inertia here and can exacerbate Hungary's
reputation for "overpromising and underdelivering."

INNOCENTS ABROAD


15. (C) Comment: On balance, the gradual emergence of
alternate sources of opinion and expertise in foreign affairs
is a positive development that will bring foreign policy
closer to the public. This will be a gradual process, and
the temptation to use foreign policy as a pawn in domestic
politics will continue. Domestic experience remains the key
to political prominence in Hungary, and Brussels is more
often a pasture than a stepping stone to promotion for
Hungarian officials. Even senior party officials are visibly
uncomfortable in their dealings with the diplomatic
community. Our colleagues in the diplomatic corps confide
that PM Gyurcsany's recent trip to Germany was "painful," and
the government has relied on former PM Medgyessey as an
Ambassador-at-large in dealings with the EU and other
European capitals. While the growing visibility of
international political fora such as the European Peoples
Party (of which Viktor Orban is Vice-President) does provide
a source of support and an avenue for foreign exposure, the
parties often leave foreign contacts to selected officials
(ref d). As Hungary tries to put its economic house in
order, the best-case scenario is that a more fiscally sound
GoH will adopt a more active foreign policy working in close
concert to advance our mutual interest (ref e). Continued
high-level consultations will help enormously in encouraging
this outcome. The worst-case is the relegation of foreign
policy to a new venue for domestic political arguments which
are rapidly getting old. End Comment.


FOLEY