Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BUDAPEST2269
2006-11-09 08:41:00
SECRET
Embassy Budapest
Cable title:  

HUNGARY'S PARTIES PREPARE FOR A WINTER OF

Tags:  PGOV KDEM ECON HU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO4243
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV
DE RUEHUP #2269/01 3130841
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 090841Z NOV 06 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0367
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BUDAPEST 002269 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO NSC FOR DAMON WILSON AND ADAM
STERLING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/07/2016
TAGS: PGOV KDEM ECON HU
SUBJECT: HUNGARY'S PARTIES PREPARE FOR A WINTER OF
DISCONTENT

REF: A) BUDAPEST 2236 B) BUDAPEST 2230 C) BUDAPEST 2229

Classified By: POL/C ERIC V. GAUDIOSI; REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BUDAPEST 002269

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO NSC FOR DAMON WILSON AND ADAM
STERLING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/07/2016
TAGS: PGOV KDEM ECON HU
SUBJECT: HUNGARY'S PARTIES PREPARE FOR A WINTER OF
DISCONTENT

REF: A) BUDAPEST 2236 B) BUDAPEST 2230 C) BUDAPEST 2229

Classified By: POL/C ERIC V. GAUDIOSI; REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (S) Summary: Conflict between and within Hungary's
political parties continues even as the likelihood of
large-scale public demonstrations declines. In a meeting
with the Ambassador November 7, opposition FIDESZ party
leader Viktor Orban alleged that the Gyurcsany government is
enforcing party discipline by distributing public funds to
MSZP officials and urged us to "follow the money." MSZP
insiders report that the Prime Minister is "shaken" but still
firmly in control of the party ... for the moment. They
perceive jockeying for position among the FIDESZ leadership
as well, and most observers predict protracted gridlock as
Hungary approaches the holiday season. End Summary.

"Limousine Socialists" ...


2. (S) In a meeting with Ambassador Foley November 7, FIDESZ
leader Viktor Orban reiterated his denunciation of the
Gyurcsany government's convergence plan as "taxation - not
reform." In response to the Ambassador's comments re
Hungary's economic vulnerability, he evinced no willingness
to move forward on reform by engaging on the substance of the
debate (ref a). As in previous contacts, he indicated that
the opposition has neither the obligation nor the practical
ability to propose alternatives. (Note: FIDESZ MP Zsolt
Nemeth, among the party's most vocal critics of the MSZP's
"limousine socialists," summed up FIDESZ's "1-step economic
program" as "dump Gyurcsany." End note.)

In Stolen Limousines?


3. (S) Orban did, however, launch a salvo at the government
on the basis of corrupt practices, alleging that the
government is using pay-offs - particularly from construction
contracts - to enforce party discipline. According to Orban,
Gyurcsany is backing off on transparency initiatives not due
to political pressure (ref b),but because he needs the funds
to buy the continued loyalty of the MSZP rank and file.
"Money," Orban stated, "will determine whether the party
stays with Gyurcsany." He also identified a 3 billion forint

(approximately USD 15 million) line item in the budget for
"pro-reform propaganda" as an alleged slush fund for the
MSZP's use. Orban strongly urged us to follow up with former
FM Martonyi to "follow the money," particularly regarding
party financing and the energy sector.


4. (S) Although FIDESZ continues to stick by its
"excommunication" policy toward PM Gyurcsany in particular,
Orban warned that the problem is endemic. He alleged that
former PM Medgyessey had been "created" and directed by
financial interests, and charged that the same elements
already "have paper on DefMin Szekeres" - among the potential
successors should the MSZP look to replace Gyurcsany.

Gyurcsany: "Shaken" but not Stirred


5. (C) MSZP MP (and Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee
Deputy Chair) Vilmos Szabo minimized the prospects of any
immediate steps to remove Gyurcsany. In a meeting November 7
following the Foreign Affairs Committee's discussion of
Hungary's PRT in Afghanistan, Szabo described the PM as
"shaken" but still firmly in control of the party. Gyurcsany
is "already in charge in all but name," Szabo commented, and
the party has few alternatives. Although his internal
critics may continue to leak information, he believes the PM
is unlikely to face overt challenges until next spring's MSZP
party caucus. At present, as one of our colleagues in the
diplomatic community observed, "Orban is the biggest thing
holding the MSZP together." Szabo advised that his "friends
in FIDESZ" often suggest that Gyurcsany's ouster would be the
price of "returning to normal," but he noted that he can
"always end the conversation" by suggesting Orban's
resignation as FIDESZ party president as a quid pro quo.


6. (C) Despite his expression of support for Gyurcsany,
Szabo was candid in describing the PM as almost completely
distracted by the domestic situation and "unable to focus" on
foreign policy (ref b). As an example, Szabo noted that he
had been unable to get the government to engage on the
question of supporting democratic forces in Serbia, an
important issue and one he suggested should be easy ... but
not under the present circumstances.


7. (C) Szabo also expressed concerns re the government's
operating efficiency, particularly regarding the near-total
breakdown of communication between State Secretary Ferenc

BUDAPEST 00002269 002 OF 002


Gemesi in the PM's office (an office Szabo held during the
first Gyurcsany government) and the MFA hierarchy. He
believes the PM has centralized authority for many issues in
his office but is now unable to manage them effectively,
joking that this approach "didn't work for the communists
either." He gave credence to recent reports that Gyurcsany
will make personnel changes in the New Year, including by
installing a Chief of Staff in the PM's office to help
improve internal coordination.


8. (C) Much as FIDESZ members have predicted cracks in the
MSZP's united front (ref b),Szabo suggested that FIDESZ
members are also waiting in the wings if Orban crashes and
burns. As with many others - on both sides of the aisle -
Szabo mentioned Debrecen Mayor Kosa as someone to watch, and
also identified former Finance Minister and MP Mihaly Varga
as another FIDESZ up-and-comer. Though he sees continued
political skirmishing in the near-term, Szabo believes a
winter lull is likely. He welcomed FIDESZ's proposed
referendum (ref c) as a positive sign, noting that it would
at least take the opposition's efforts "away from the street"
and back into constitutional means of expression. Looking
back on the local elections, Szabo indicated that the
opposition's strong performance in the regions could "make it
easier" to make the personnel and funding cuts required by
the convergence plan.

Fear and Loathing in Budapest


9. (S) Comment: Winter may bring a cease-fire in large-scale
protests but a fundamental truce remains unlikely. As the
publication HVG recently observed, the wide and growing gap
between the right and left has become an almost theological
divide. Comparing the situation to Northern Island, HVG
laments the current atmosphere of "poisonous snakes and
poison chalices." Orban's corruption allegations may be the
latest card played in FIDESZ's continuing campaign against
the government, but that does not mean that his charges are
unsubstantiated, particularly in a political culture where
changes of government have meant changes of personal fortune.
We will continue our efforts to promote transparency and to
learn more about the tangled web of party financing. End
Comment.


FOLEY