BUDAPEST DEMONSTRATIONS: FIDESZ OUT FOR A SPIN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BUDAPEST 001953

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO NSC - DAMON WILSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2011
TAGS: PGOV KDEM ECON HU
SUBJECT: BUDAPEST DEMONSTRATIONS: FIDESZ OUT FOR A SPIN

REF: BUDAPEST 1941 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Classified by POL/C Eric V. Gaudiosi; Reasons 1.4 (b) an
d (d)


FIDESZ OFFICIALS: A CRISIS FIT FOR AN EXPERT


1. (U) Addressing an "emergency session" of diplomatic and
business community leaders at the Budapest Atlantic Forum
September 26, former FM Janos Martonyi and MP Zsolt Nemeth
presented FIDESZ's views on the demonstrations.


2. (SBU) Martonyi cast the "Gyurcsany tape" in the context
of the government's "creeping assault" on Hungary's
democratic institutions, commenting that "only the PM's
language should have surprised us." The government, he
continued, is "legal but no longer legitimate," and having
"lost credibility" with the public it would inevitably "lose
credit" from the international community. FIDESZ MP Janos
Horvath echoed this comment, attacking the "myth" that only
the Gyurcsany government could implement reforms and
insisting the financial community would care more about
"credibility than any balance sheet."


3. (SBU) Turning to the October 1 local elections, Martonyi
walked back from recent FIDESZ references to the vote as a
referendum, characterizing it now as a "message." "Whatever
happens in the elections," he continued, FIDESZ believes the
parties must "sit down October 2" to agree on the formation
of a "one-year provisional government of experts" to "manage
the crisis." Although he believes the PM to be "morally
dead," he would respect the MSZP's decision to have him
participate in the talks.


4. (SBU) Nemeth went further in his brief remarks,
describing the PM as "a notorious pathological liar." He
cast the Gyurcsany government's policies as "living Kadarism"
and stated, "this is about our past - about communism" and
about the betrayal of "Hungary's judeo-christian values."
That is why the nation had "spontaneously" and
"fantastically" risen up in response. Should Gyurcsany not
pursue the government of experts, he concluded, there are
"more negative scenarios" including a "declining moral and
economic situation" and "growing social unrest and
instability."


5. (C) President Solyom, known as a staunch proponent of the
rule of law, sought out the Ambassador September 26 to make
clear that his "first priority" is "Hungary's economic
stability." Although he commented that one cannot "tolerate
lies," he indicated that he is focused on getting through the
present economic straits rather than getting rid of PM
Gyurcsany.

COMMENT: USED ORBAN - GOOD ACCELERATION; BAD STEERING; NO
BRAKES


6. (C) FIDESZ continues to spin ... perhaps slightly out of
control. With only days left before the elections, their
leaders - albeit with Orban conspicuous in his absence - are
trying to chart a course beyond the local elections. Their
call for a "government of experts," as Nemeth admitted to the
Ambassador September 25, has no constitutional basis, and
their argument that FIDESZ could better implement reforms
lacks credibility given their campaign promises.

7. (C) This highlights FIDESZ's central dilemma: although
the demonstrations have mobilized the party's base, it is not
clear that they have expanded it. The tape may reinforce
criticism of Gyurcsany as insincere and even autocratic
(heard even within the coalition),but thus far there is no
sign that Hungary's critical swing voters are more offended
by Gyurcsany's comments than they are by the opposition's
actions. Indeed, many doubt Orban is in any position to cast
stones. Despite his public comment this weekend that he has
"never lied to the Hungarian people," our colleagues in the
diplomatic community clearly recall Orban's remarks to EU
Ambassadors during the campaign, in which he urged them to
"pay no attention to what I say to get elected" and promised
to pursue radical reforms upon taking office. Orban has been
largely silent - or silenced - since.


8. (C) The elections are a target of opportunity to attack
Gyurcsany, and FIDESZ spokesmen appear to be setting few
limits on their rhetorical outbursts, perhaps in part because
they see little legitimacy in a regime they can only see as
"communist." But they may succeed only in making the mad
madder. Coalition insiders maintain that the demonstrations
will increase their turn-out more than the opposition's, and
recent polls indicate a 14% increase in those planning to
vote on October 1.

BUDAPEST 00001953 002 OF 002




9. (C) Although he has put FIDESZ on the offensive, it is
important to remember that Orban is attacking from a position
of tactical strength but strategic weakness. His rhetoric
notwithstanding, the local elections have no impact on the
composition of Parliament. The more he inflates their
importance, the more he risks the perception that a poor
showing makes him a three-time loser. His government took
little action to right Hungary's economic course, and he is
offering few constructive alternatives to the Gyurcsany plan
now. In an open letter released September 26, Hungarian
Democratic Forum (MDF) President Ibolya David criticized both
the government and FIDESZ in equal measure, branding FIDESZ a
"left-wing party" that had embraced "populist demagoguery"
and "affiliated with right-wing extremists" because "the
political stance of Victor Orban is simple: gaining power at
any price." There are already those in the party - even
among its founding members - who believe the time has come
for a change in leadership if FIDESZ is to remain a party
rather than become a cult of personality.










FOLEY