MOLDOVAN-ROMANIAN DIFFERENCES OVER SIGNING BASIC

C O N F I D E N T I A L BUCHAREST 000980

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE DEPT FOR EUR/NCE - BILL SILKWORTH
NSC FOR DAMON WILSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/20/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV MD RO
SUBJECT: MOLDOVAN-ROMANIAN DIFFERENCES OVER SIGNING BASIC
TREATY, BORDER AND VISA REGIMES

Classified By: CDA Mark Taplin for Reasons 1.4 (b) & (d).


1. (C) Summary: In a June 5 meeting with Deputy NSA J. D.
Crouch, Moldovan President Voronin sought U.S. assistance in
encouraging Romania to sign a "Basic Treaty" with Moldova.
The question of concluding a basic treaty between the two
countries is a long-standing one that is fraught with
domestic political sensitivities as well as cultural and
historical complications. In this latest surfacing of the
issue, Moldovan Ambassador to Romania Lidia Gutu tacitly
acknowledged in a follow-up meeting with Ambassador Taubman
on June 8 that Moldova hopes to get Romanian agreement to a
basic treaty as a pre-condition for signing separate border
and visa bilateral agreements which are already close to
having been successfully negotiated. Meanwhile, Romanian
government officials insist that Chisinau has sent
"conflicting signals" in recent months on any possible
linkage, even as they play down the political and historical
sensitivities that have bedeviled earlier efforts to bring
into force a basic treaty. We would welcome input from
colleagues at Embassy Chisinau as well as guidance from
colleagues in Washington on how we can work constructively to
help these two neighboring states, astride the NATO and --
imminently -- EU border, to avoid unnecessarily complicating
a bilateral relationship that has been on a marked upswing.
End Summary.


2. (C) During Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin's June 5
bilateral meeting with Deputy NSA J. D. Crouch, Voronin
complained that Romania has yet to sign a basic treaty with
Moldova. The Moldovan president argued that what he
characterized as the failure of the Romanian side to come to
terms on a "Treaty for Partnership and Cooperation" provided
ammunition to the Tiraspol separatists and their Moscow
patrons to resist the reassertion of Moldovan control over
the Transnistrian region. For her part, Moldovan Ambassador
to Romania Lidia Gutu argued in a separate meeting with the
Ambassador that Romania has signed such treaties with Ukraine
in 2003 and Russia in 2004, but has yet to formalize its
recognition of an independent Moldova in a basic treaty. She
pointed out that the Transnistrians and "others," presumably
their Russian backers, use the argument that the lack of a
basic treaty between Moldova and Romania is evidence that
Romanian-Moldovan integration is still possible in the
future.


3. (C) In the course of the June 8 meeting, Gutu acknowledged
that Moldova had first linked signature of the bilateral
border and visa agreements with conclusion of a basic treaty
during a February visit to Chisinau by Romanian FM Razvan
Ungureanu, and subsequently on the occasion of Gutu's
presentation of credentials in Bucharest in April. She
claimed that Ungureanu had raised the idea of Chisinau
signing an equivalent basic agreement with the EU rather than
with Romania, an idea that she labeled as unacceptable
because it would not contain responsibilities for Romania;
only a bilateral treaty would do. Chisinau reportedly sent a
revised draft of the basic treaty to the Romanian MFA in May
2006, based on an earlier version of the agreement that was
initialed by the two sides in 2000 but never ratified by the
two countries' parliaments. Gutu asserted Romania was
reluctant to sign and had tried to avoid discussing a basic
treaty at every turn. She argued that Moldova would never be
able to conclude a basic treaty with Romania if it did not
happen this year, i.e. before Romania's anticipated accession
into the EU on January 1, 2007. Gutu said it was Voronin's
idea to try to enlist U.S. support to influence Romania to
sign the treaty.


4. (C) In an informal response, the Ambassador emphasized to
Gutu that the U.S. is interested in promoting good relations
between neighboring states in this region, not in seeing
borders shut down to commerce and exchanges because necessary
agreements have not been signed. He mentioned that some might
ask whether signing the border and visa agreements ahead of
the basic treaty might not be a more practical approach,
since negotiating and concluding a basic treaty would take
time, and certainly would not be possible before January

2007. He also commented that it was striking that, by its
own account, Moldova had only recently brought to the
attention of the Romanian side its expectation that
successful conclusion of a basic treaty would have to precede
signing of the nearly complete bilateral agreements on visas
and borders. Gutu argued, however, that "any agreement
signed without having a basic treaty in force would not be
recognized internationally." She suggested that moving ahead
on the border and visa agreements without an umbrella
agreement would be "juridically not valuable" and "subject to
cancellation at any time."



5. (C) Romanian officials involved in these issues seemed
perplexed by the latest state of play on the Moldovan side,
if not overly worried. On June 7, Romanian MFA Director
General for Legal Affairs, Cosmin Dinescu, who heads the
Romanian negotiating effort on the Border Regime Agreement
with Moldova, explained that two rounds of negotiations had
been held so far: the first in January in Chisinau, and the
second in May in Bucharest. The Romanian side was awaiting an
invitation for a third round in Chisinau. Dinescu thought at
most "two or three" more rounds would be necessary to come to
agreement, as only "technical details" remained to be
resolved. A signing ceremony and then ratification would
follow, perhaps with much effort as early as this fall, but
more likely in the second half of 2007. (Note: As a
reference, the Ukrainian-Romanian Treaty took 17 rounds of
negotiations. End note.) Dinescu characterized the agreement
as 90-95% complete and said there were no complicated issues,
just remaining details such as how to actually mark the
border, how to designate a border along the meandering Prut
River, and how to repatriate people or animals that
unwittingly cross the border.


6. (C) Dinescu said that the Romanian-Moldovan frontier has
long been established since the same border marked the Soviet
Union's border with Romania. He said this was unlike the
Moldovan-Ukrainian treaty, which fixed a previously unclear
border between two post-Soviet successor states. Dinescu
commented on how this treaty, on occasion, has been perceived
by Moldovans and others as having a political angle to it,
but he insisted that Romania had repeatedly stated that it
had no territorial ambitions towards Moldova and no
disagreement with Moldova over their internationally
recognized mutual border.


7. (C) According to Romanian MFA Director for Moldova Dan
Iancu, the Moldovan experts involved in the border agreement
negotiations did not appear to have a political mandate to
negotiate. Instead, they just told the Romanian side their
position and served as messengers who had to present
proposals to their supervisors. Iancu said the Moldovans were
currently "reconfiguring their reply" to Romanian proposals
and that "a lot depends on how Moldovan leaders see it."
Iancu said the Moldovans were not ready to compromise on some
issues, in part because of restrictions in Moldovan law. For
example, according to Iancu, the Moldovan delegation did not
have the same flexibility as Romania on establishing a border
on water, which could change course according to floods. He
said this preoccupation reflects some fears in Chisinau
toward Moldova's other neighbor, Ukraine.


8. (C) On the separate visa agreement, Iancu said the draft
had been agreed in Bucharest at the experts level. Moldovan
negotiators now had to submit the draft to the political
level in Chisinau.


9. (C) Iancu did not wish to speculate when the agreements
would be signed. He said Romania has had "good and not so
good experience with the Moldovans on signing papers." He did
not think it should be much of a problem -- a matter of
months rather than years. In particular, he said the separate
visa agreement "must be in place before November in order to
be in effect on January 1." Iancu mentioned two or three
documents on mutual assistance and cooperation on the border
that remain to be signed. Neither Iancu nor Dinescu seemed to
be aware of any active Moldovan effort to sign a basic treaty
ahead of the other agreements with which they have been
engaged during the past year.


10. (C) Comment: Based on our limited interactions here in
Bucharest, the Moldovans seem to be pressing for U.S. help in
landing a Romanian signature on a basic treaty, and to make
that happen before the end of this year. That would seem to
be an unrealistic objective in light of the past interactions
between the two countries on this subject. In April 2000,
Moldova and Romania had actually reached the point at which
their two foreign ministers were able to initial a draft
agreement. That version, however, soon ran afoul of thorny
historical and linguistic issues that were difficult to
manage on the domestic political front. Bucharest, for
instance, wanted explicit reference to the 1939
Molotov-Ribbentrop pact that had led to the annexation of
Bessarabia and northern Bukovina, and resisted formulations
that gave credence to the existence of a distinct "Moldovan"
vice Romanian language. In the end, the treaty draft was
never ratified. Meanwhile, our working level Romanian
interlocutors still seem blissfully unaware that getting to
closure on the visa and border regime agreements before
Romania's EU accession may be in jeopardy. We leave it to

our colleagues in Chisinau to speculate over Voronin's
motives in taking this tack at this time. However, in light
of the diplomatic challenges that Moldova and the
international community face in resolving the Transnistria
situation, unnecessary distractions in the relationship
between Romania and Moldova, which now straddle the NATO and
EU fault line, are clearly not in anyone's interest. It may
be necessary for the U.S. and our European partners to try to
nudge both sides towards a more constructive approach. On
the other hand, there are plenty of reasons to be cautious
before setting out on this bumpy terrain of conflicting
historical sagas and national agendas. End Comment.


11. Amembassy Bucharest's reporting telegrams are available
on the Bucharest SIPRNet website:
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/bucharest
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