ROMANIA PLEDGES SUPPORT ON KOSOVO INDEPENDENCE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BUCHAREST 000881

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SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/NCE BILL SILKWORTH; EUR/SCE STEPHEN GEE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/30/2021
TAGS: PREL PGOV YI EU RO
SUBJECT: ROMANIA PLEDGES SUPPORT ON KOSOVO INDEPENDENCE
DURING WISNER VISIT

Classified By: DCM Mark Taplin, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Romania's president, foreign minister, and
national security advisor agreed to support U.S. efforts to
resolve Kosovo's final status when they met in Bucharest with
Ambassador Frank Wisner, the Secretary's Special
Representative to the Kosovo Status Talks. While noting
serious concerns for the stability of Kosovo and Serbia, as
well as possible implications for separatist enclaves in
Moldova and Georgia, President Basescu stated that he would
assist U.S. efforts to help Serbia move beyond resentments
over Kosovo towards Euro-Atlantic integration. At the same
time, Basescu and other interlocutors expressed strong
concern about potential instability in Serbia, particularly
if Kosovo independence produced a Serbian government led by
the extreme nationalist Radicals. National Security Advisor
Sergiu Medar said Romania feared an eventual NATO departure
from Kosovo, producing potential instability given Europe's
"previously poor record" in the Western Balkans without U.S.
help. Other Romanian senior foreign policy officials, as
well as members of the center-left social democratic
opposition, expressed appreciation for Ambassador Wisner's
consultations in Bucharest, but expressed similar concerns
about potential radicalization and instability along
Romania's southwest frontier. End Summary.


2. (C) President Traian Basescu received Ambassadors Taubman
and Wisner in his hospital suite on May 23 for consultations
regarding the Kosovo Status Talks. Basescu, who was
recuperating after his surgery in Vienna for a herniated disc
in his lower back, was dressed in a business suit and walked
cautiously, with a limp, to the adjoining room for the talks.
Ambassador Taubman began the meeting by handing President
Basescu the get-well note from President Bush. Basescu seemed
relatively well, although he tired a bit towards the end of
the hour-long meeting -- twice the scheduled length.


Basescu: Romania Stands with the U.S. on Kosovo
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3. (C) Basescu told Ambassadors Wisner and Taubman that
Romania stands behind U.S. efforts to resolve the status of
Kosovo, despite deep concerns about the effect that Kosovo
independence would have on the stability of the Western
Balkans. The President said he earlier held a different
stance, but had changed it after conversations with Assistant
Secretary Fried and Vice President Cheney, in which he

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concluded that "Kosovo status is not our baby, but is an
American baby."


4. (C) Basescu outlined his concerns about the possibility of
the Serbian Radical Party coming to power after independence,
leading to Serbia's continued isolation within Europe. He
believes a Radical victory is a strong possibility if an
election is held after Kosovo independence has been
determined. A Radical government would lead to Serbia's
further isolation. In order to counterbalance this, he said,
elections should be held in Serbia immediately before
independence is granted. This would give the democratic
forces led by President Tadic and PM Kostunica a chance to
win a clear majority, and then to use a full four years to
recover from the blow of independence. Basescu added that
there would likely need to be new elections in Serbia as a
result of Montenegrin independence, and asked Wisner to
consider delaying independence until after the elections have
been completed. Basescu does not believe Kostunica will call
for a referendum on independence.


5. (C) Basescu said the negotiations, as they are currently
being conducted, make Tadic and Kostunica appear "as monkeys,
sent to negotiate a decision that has already been taken."
He challenged, "why should you make Serbia in charge of
negotiating decentralization and churches, if this is indeed
the legitimate concern of Kosovars?" At the same time, the
President said, Serbia needs to be offered something to help
it through this difficult time. He doubted that membership
in the EU and NATO was a strong enough incentive.
"Politicians understand the EU," Basescu asserted, "but the
people of Serbia don't make a close connection between the EU
and their daily problems." The lack of enthusiasm among EU
members for further enlargement also diminished the power of
the EU carrot.


6. (C) Basescu warned that there would need to be a continued
international military presence in Kosovo after independence
because of the deep distrust between the Albanian and Serb
communities. He feared that the United States was in a hurry
to hand off Kosovo to the Europeans, and that Europe was not

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prepared to shoulder the burden of keeping the peace there.
Basescu said he also thought the Russians would use Kosovo
independence to support independence movements in
Transnistria, Abkhazia, and Nagorno-Karabakh, and expected FM
Lavrov to make increasingly harsh public statements comparing
Kosovo to these issues.


7. (C) Ambassador Wisner asked President Basescu to talk to
Kostunica and Tadic, as a friend, and urge them to be
realistic about independence. The United States does want to
strengthen its partnership with Serbia, but we cannot help
Serbia unless Serbia wants to join with us. Wisner also
asked Basescu to be an advocate for Serbia's European
perspective in Brussels. He asked the Romanians to engage
with the leaders in Pristina too, who would very much need
the support of their neighbors in order to move along the
European path. Basescu said that regardless of reservations
he had, he recognized the decision had been taken and that
"all of us have to put our shoulders behind the wheel." He
pledged, "I will do my part." He said he would call
Kostunica personally, keep an eye on the other problems in
Kosovo and Serbia, and keep an eye on the Russians.


NSA Medar: Basescu will engage Kostunica
--------------

8. (C) During a separate, National Security Advisor Medar
stated that President Basescu would, indeed, talk to
Kostunica as requested by Ambassador Wisner. Basescu
recognized that Romania, which is perceived as the most
pro-Serbian of Serbia's neighbors, could play an important
role in encouraging Belgrade to take a rational approach
toward Kosovo independence. Medar asserted that Romania is
pro-Serb because it has been in the best interests of
Romania, although over time Bucharest has noticed that the
Serbs "rarely give anything in return." He said, for
example, that President Basescu had only asked for one thing
during his trip to Belgrade -- official recognition of the
Romanian Orthodox Church in Serbia. Medar noted that the
Serbian response to this request was passage of new
legislation by the parliament a few weeks later that flatly
denied such recognition. Fundamentally, however, Romania
seeks "stability and security" along its western border.
Medar said Romania does not want to have to deploy troops
along the frontier with Serbia in the event of instability
brought by the rise of an extremist-led government.


9. (S) Ambassador Wisner asked how the Romanians could "even
remotely believe" that the Russians would be able to link
Kosovo independence with the frozen conflicts in
Transnistria, Abkhazia, and Nagorno-Karabakh. Medar said
that Romania had obtained information that Lavrov and Smirnov
had actually developed a plan to this effect in the event
Kosovo was granted independence. Ambassador Wisner
underscored that there is absolutely no parallel and that
neither the U.S. nor the international community would allow
such linkage. NSA Medar reiterated Basescu's assertion that
the prospect of eventual EU membership could be used as a
carrot for the Serbs, but that new skepticism among EU member
states towards expansion had diminished the potency of this
incentive. He added that once Romania is in the EU -- as
expected in January 2007 -- Bucharest will be a strong
advocate for EU expansion in the Western Balkans. In
addition to the potential stability it would provide, he
confided that Bucharest also hopes EU member states will
agree to begin talks on accession for Moldova at the same
time. Although Romania does not seek reunification with
Moldova, Medar said the GOR views Moldova's eventual
inclusion in the EU as a means for bringing the two
historically linked countries closer together.


10. (C) Medar underscored that Romania wants NATO to remain
in Kosovo -- the Europeans cannot take care of Kosovo alone
and renewed instability in the Western Balkans would have a
direct impact on Romania. He also emphasized the importance
of exposing young Serbs to the West, noting how important
such exposure had been for Romania's development as a
democracy. Medar suggested that one way for engaging the
Serbs constructively might be to encourage Serbia to deploy a
platoon in Afghanistan, perhaps alongside the Romanian troops
there. Ambassador Wisner expressed appreciation for Romanian
support, urged continued creative thinking, and committed to
remain in close contact with Bucharest throughout discussions
on Kosovo's status.


FM Ungureanu: Engage the EU
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11. (C) On May 24, Foreign Minister Ungureanu told Ambassador
Wisner that he had paid a call on President Basescu
immediately after Wisner had left the hospital. Ungureanu
said that a "second, and therefore unusual," EU informal
ministerial meeting would take place in Vienna at the end of
the week that might signal whether the EU would stall or
resume enlargement towards the Western Balkans. Ungureanu
said there was no consensus among EU states on policy toward
the Western Balkans and described policy formulation in an
expanded EU as "27 cats ) try to herd them." He urged
Ambassador Wisner to engage the EU on Kosovo before the
ministerial to try to ensure a positive view towards EU
expansion in the Western Balkans. Ungureanu asked, "How much
of our relations with Belgrade are valuable to you?" Wisner
responded, "what is at stake is not Kosovo, but Serbia," and
emphasized the importance of helping Serbia move forward
towards Euro-Atlantic integration. Ungureanu promised to try
to help, but worried about the precedent an independent
Kosovo might set for Russia to use in other frozen conflicts.
Wisner assured him of Kosovo's special circumstance and the
extreme difficulty Russia would have if it tried to
unilaterally change borders apart from the international
community. Ungureanu concluded, "Serbia's neighbors should
participate" in resolving Kosovo and offered, "let us know
how we can help."


12. (C) Presidential Counselor for International Relations
Anca Ilinoiu also met with Ambassador Wisner and emphasized
security concerns on both sides of Romania ) in Serbia and
in Moldova. She noted that the international community was
focused on the future status of Kosovo as a way to extract
itself from Kosovo, but stressed that the "day after"
mattered. She said Romania's own experience showed how little
a revolution solved in transitioning toward democracy, and
noted that Kosovo never had a democratic tradition that it
could recapture. Ilinoiu noted that the EU should have a
stronger role in the Western Balkans, but added that it was
not sufficiently "complex and coherent at this time." She
also noted concern that Kosovo was the "wrong model" as a
nation-state rather than a "civic state" like Montenegro,
since its population became 90% Albanian as a result of
processes since 1999. Overall, she emphasized the
difficulties following Kosovo independence and argued that
the "U.S. should stay engaged for Kosovo, Europe, and other
examples that wish to follow Kosovo." Wisner assured her "the
U.S. would not walk away lightly," but would also want stable
and effective governance in Kosovo.


13. (C) Ambassador Wisner also met with three members of the
center-left opposition. Social Democrat Senator George Maior
commented that he met Tadic at the Socialist International in
Athens and found him "inflexible and radical on Kosovo."
Maior commented that public opinion was not prepared in
Serbia, that Serbians feel surrounded with no end in sight,
but added that the only realistic solution was independence
in Kosovo. EU Parliamentary Observer and former Defense
Minister Ion Pascu said Romania could reach out to Serbia to
help them cope and prepare them for EU membership since
"Romanians are credible in Belgrade." He cautioned, however,
that Kosovo's territory is arranged according to five clans
with feuds, and "we could end up with non-Europeans with
Albanian blood laws." Social Democrat leader Mircea Geoana
also met very briefly with Wisner.
TAUBMAN