ROMANIA: DAS KRAMER, AMBASSADOR HODGES -

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BUCHAREST 000629

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE DEPT FOR EUR/NCE BILL SILKWORTH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV MD RS BO UP KDEM PHUM RO
SUBJECT: ROMANIA: DAS KRAMER, AMBASSADOR HODGES -
CONSULTATIONS IN BUCHAREST


Classified By: CHARGE MARK TAPLIN FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) & (D).


1. (C) Summary: DAS David Kramer and Ambassador to Moldova
Heather Hodges shared views with leading Romanian
interlocutors on recent developments involving Ukraine,
Moldova, Belarus and Russia during a visit to Bucharest on
April 3-4. Although Romanian interlocutors described growing
strains in the relationship with Moscow, they reiterated
Romania's commitment to encouraging positive developments in
Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus. Foreign Minister Ungureanu
said Russia had definitely taken note of Romania's growing
strategic partnership with the U.S. and was suspicious of
Romania's motives, including in promoting more Black Sea
cooperation. National Security Advisor Medar and others
sounded generally pessimistic about Ukraine's prospects, but
emphasized their determination to help Ukraine. Opposition
Social Democratic Party (PSD) leader Mircea Geoana criticized
President Triaian Basescu for "frivolously antagonizing"
Russia, while offering few specifics as to how he would
pursue regional relations differently. All interlocutors
expressed strong appreciation for the visit of DAS Kramer and
Ambassador Hodges, emphasizing the value and importance of
regular consultation on countries that are in the top echelon
of Romania's foreign policy and security concerns. End
Summary.


2. (C) EUR DAS David Kramer and U.S. Ambassador to Moldova
Heather Hodges consulted with key interlocutors in the
Romanian MFA, presidency, prime minister's office, and civil
society during an April 3-4 visit to Bucharest. Throughout
his meetings, DAS Kramer expressed his appreciation for
Romania's efforts to promote security and democracy in
Eastern Europe and beyond. Recognizing our common interests
as well as our strong bilateral relations, he emphasized that
he had come both to provide a perspective from Washington on
the countries under his purview as well as to hear the views
of Romanian policymakers and analysts. DAS Kramer said he
would try to return to Bucharest before he attends the next 5
plus 2 talks on Transnistria. Ambassador Hodges emphasized
the important role Romania can continue to play in supporting
Moldova diplomatically and in helping strengthen democratic
institutions in Moldova. FM Ungureanu and other Romanians
repeatedly expressed appreciation for the visit, with
Ungureanu expressing his view that it is "critical" the U.S.
and Romania "keep in close touch" on key issues and countries
"we both watch closely."

FM Ungureanu: "Russia is Tightening the Screws"
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3. (C) DAS Kramer and Ambassador Hodges met first with
relevant senior and working level MFA officials, including
Director General for "Wider Europe" Rasvan Rusu and Special
Envoy for Moldova Bogdan Aurescu. FM Ungureunu subsequently
joined the meeting. Concerning Romania's regional role,
Ungureanu commented that Moscow was "tightening the screws"
in its relations with Bucharest. He expressed the view that
Romania's strong strategic partnership with the U.S. had not
gone unnoticed in Moscow. He said Russia views Romania's
initiatives in the Black Sea along with its interest in
Moldova and Transnistria as problematic. He opined that
Russia is "concerned that behind Romania, the U.S. is pulling
the strings." Nonetheless, he noted that the current Romanian
government has sought to engage Russia on a number of issues
and is working to the extent possible to achieve a
constructive relationship.


4. (C) With regard to the domestic situation in Russia,
Ungureanu assessed that the Kremlin was purposefully pursuing
a more authoritarian path. He added that many both inside
Russia and outside are now looking ahead to the post-Putin
era, although they do not know where to look yet. Russian
foreign policymaking was split between career diplomats under
Lavrov and the increasingly powerful intelligence services
that "hold the reins." Ungureanu commented that Russian
officials appear to be concentrating their attention
increasingly on central European countries, after recent
high-level visits to Prague and Budapest, where the Russians
believe they can use their leverage on energy supplies as a
tool to manage relations. He mentioned that he wouldmeet
Russian FM Lavrov in Sofia on April 27-28 a the NATO
informal ministerial meeting, since Lavov had asked for a
"closed talk." Ungureanu proised to provide a readout of
his discussion withLavrov to the Secretary, per his March 28
meetin with the Secretary in Washington. DAS Kramer
exressed concern over Russia's movements in a negativ
direction, even in a period in which Russia wasunder

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increased scrutiny before the G8 meeting in St. Petersburg in
July, and suggested that the situation would likely worsen
afterwards. FM Ungureanu agreed with DAS Kramer's assessment
that the main problem is the windfall income the Russians are
enjoying from high oil prices, which has prompted a more
arrogant foreign policy approach.

Romania "Committed to Help" Moldova
--------------

5. (C) Turning to Moldova and Transnistria, Ambassador Hodges
noted the "delicate dance" Romania sometimes has to play,
given continued underlying suspicions in some corners of
Chisinau about Romanian intentions towards its neighbor. FM
Ungureanu and DG Rusu emphasized Romania's commitment to
helping Moldova in its path toward integration with Western
institutions. On Transnistria, DAS Kramer underlined that
the recent implementation of the Ukrainian-Moldovan customs
agreement represented a true change in the status quo. He
said it could potentially spur some movement in 5 2 talks on
settling Transnistria. Ambassador Hodges recalled
Transnistrian "foreign minister" Litskai had commented that
"this is economic war from now on," and that Tiraspol then
refused to participate in the scheduled 5 2 meeting and
Moscow subsequently imposed its ban on Moldovan and Georgian
wine. FM Ungureanu agreed with Ambassador Hodges' positive
assessment of the EU Border Assistance Mission, which was
crucial to implementing the bilateral customs agreement.
Ungureanu said he was pleased that the mission had been
staffed by many qualified individuals, and led by a long-time
employee at the SECI Center in Bucharest. With regard to the
5 plus 2 talks, Ungureanu questioned what the dismissal of
Ukrainian negotiator Tkach meant for the talks and whether
Ukraine would continue to stand by its customs agreement with
Moldova. DAS Kramer noted it would be difficult for Ukraine
to back out given its desire to further its relationship with
the European Union, in particular.


6. (C) Romania's Special Envoy for Moldova Bogdan Aurescu
spoke of the "need to solve Transnistria in order to advance
Moldova on a European path," but cautioned that current
developments "might lead to a dangerous situation" because
Russians were blaming the EU for the "blockade" around
Transnistria. He said that the "parties are heading in
opposite directions," with an increasingly worse climate in
the negotiations after four inconclusive rounds of talks.
While Romania was not at the negotiating table, it would
continue to express its concerns appropriately and by
offering its analysis to the U.S. and EU. More broadly on
Moldova-Romanian relations, Aurescu acknowledged that one
irritant was what he characterized as a "lack of reaction"
from Chisinau on the need to upgrade their border regime.
Romania, he asserted, had been trying to get Chisinau's
attention in order to update the 1961 Soviet treaty since

2003. Aurescu said Romania would raise the need for a new
Border Treaty again in negotiations scheduled for April 13-14
in Chisinau.


7. (C) On Ukraine, Ungureanu asserted that Ukrainian Foreign
Minister Tarasyuk, did not want the Foreign Minister position
again under a new government, adding that he had indicated he
"would be happier in parliament." Below Tarasyuk, Ungureanu
insisted, other candidates for Foreign Minister were "all old
ones," making it clear he was not optimistic about finding
common ground with others in the Ukrainian MFA. DAS Kramer
agreed that the Foreign Minister had played a crucial role in
furthering Ukraine's western orientation. Ungureanu said
Romania would appreciate hearing from the U.S. "any rumors"
about Snake Island or other bilateral issues with Romania
such as Ukrainian plans for the Bystroe Canal.


8. (C) On Belarus, DG Rusu emphasized Romania's view that
Russia was trying to strengthen its grip on Belarus. Rusu
and others emphasized that that Romania's approach to Belarus
was very similar to that of the U.S., and formulated in close
coordination with the EU. MFA interlocutors reported that
there was agreement in the EU on extending the visa bans, but
that it would take longer to develop financial sanctions.
They argued against placing broad economic sanctions on
Belarus and said that the West should support civil society
and the democratic opposition as two distinct elements,
targeting rural areas as well as Minsk. Romania, they
stressed, was also "closely monitoring" Belarus as from its
current position as chair of the Council of Europe.

NSA Medar: "Give Ukraine a MAP"
--------------

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9. (C) At a dinner hosted by Ambassador Taubman, DAS Kramer
and Ambassador Hodges met with a core group of senior
Romanian foreign policy advisors from multiple agencies,
including National Security Advisor Sergiu Medar, Deputy NSA
Constantin Degeratu, Presidential Foreign Policy Counselor
Anca Ilinoiu, MOD State Secretary Ioan Mircea Planga, Foreign
Policy Advisor to the prime minister Calin Fabian, and MFA
Directors General Rasvan Rusu, Stelian Stoian, and Cristian
Istrate. NSA Medar reiterated Romania's commitment to its
strategic partnership with the U.S. and appreciation for the
"weight" the U.S. brings to issues of mutual concern in the
region.


10. (C) Dinner conversation centered on Ukraine's future,
with Ambassador Taubman posing the question of whether
Romania's experience getting into NATO and the EU could be
instructive for Ukraine if it was still headed westward after
the parliamentary elections. Medar and others argued that
whatever challenges lay ahead in reuniting the "Orange team"
following Ukraine's recent parliamentary elections, it was
the only plausible way forward. Several guests commented that
former PM Yanukovych could not be trusted. Others said the
vote demonstrated the confusion of the electorate -- the
tendency for people to vote based on their short-term
perception of the economic situation. Romanian interlocutors
viewed the risk of secession of the eastern half of Ukraine
as a "red herring." Degeratu commented that the expectation
of NATO membership accelerated Romania's democratization and
believed the same could be applied for Ukraine. He also said
it was important for Romania to reach out to Ukraine to
create a better economic partnership. MOD State Secretary
Planga cautioned that there was a huge difference in popular
support for NATO between pre-NATO membership Romania and
present-day Ukraine, with only 18% of Ukrainians currently
supporting NATO membership. He labeled the parliamentary vote
as a reaction to the corruption of the Orange leaders and
added "it would be difficult to help Ukraine from Romania,"
but Romania would be "open to share with Ukraine its
experience" in joining NATO and the EU.


11. (C) NSA Medar mentioned that Ukraine faced a question in
2004 -- East or West? -- which Romania never needed to
decide. He supported, however, offering Ukraine a Membership
Action Plan (MAP) that would make Ukrainians understand that
"we're serious if they are." Medar commented that the West's
biggest mistake in Kosovo was that "we didn't educate young
Kosovars," and argued, "we need to do it in Ukraine."
Presidential Counselor Ilinoiu surmised that "Ukraine's only
way to the EU is through NATO," and that "Ukraine is the test
case for how the West handles Russia." She stated, "it is no
one's right to deny...Ukraine of the hope of reaching the
borders of democracy." She said that Russia's bases in Crimea
"cannot be a disqualifier to NATO membership -- otherwise we
give Russia a veto." DAS Kramer noted that the West should
deal with Russia by helping its neighboring countries
establish themselves as democracies. He pointed out that
Russia had spent hundreds of millions of dollars in Ukraine
while the West had focused on getting the democratic process
right, which in the long term would support our interests in
Russia as well. One of the Romanian MFA officials reported
that Russia had encouraged Romania to reach out to the
Transnistrians to promote a more positive dialogue.
Ambassador Hodges discouraged the idea, suggested that it
might be a trap; instead, she offered to work with the
Romanian Ambassador to Moldova on ways to reach out to
Transnistrian civil society.

Opposition Leader Geoana: Basescu's Russia Policy "Off Course"
-------------- --------------

12. (C) Kramer and Hodges also met with former FM and leader
of the Social Democratic Party (PSD),Mircea Geoana. Adding
a partisan tinge to their visit, Geoana accused President
Traian Basescu of steering Romania's policy towards Romania
"off course" and "disrupting diplomatic ties" with the
Kremlin. He compared Basescu with a boy shouting at a
schoolyard antagonist because his older brother -- in this
case, the U.S. -- was around to protect him. He complained
that this "frivolous antagonizing" of Russia had caused
Romania to have the highest gas prices in Europe and an
Ambassador to Russia who had not been able to received by
President Putin in six months. Geoana argued that Romania's
Black Sea strategy should court Russia more, in part on the
basis of the two countries' common concern with terrorism. He
concluded that Romanians were "intoxicated by anti-Russian
themes" and that President Basescu was "speaking for the
polls" instead of building better regional relations. Geoana

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said he would like to see more coordination with other
countries in eastern Europe and less emphasis on the Black
Sea; greater engagement on Moldova but without playing a
"stupid game...because we are concerned we are left out" of
the negotiations; and less "strategic overstretch" and more
consensus building on Romania's national objectives now that
it had achieved NATO and (almost) EU accession.


13. (C) Comment: By all accounts, the Romanian foreign policy
team, including advisors from the President's and Prime
Minister's offices as well as the Foreign Ministry, greatly
appreciated this visit by Ambassador Hodges and DAS Kramer.
Such broad engagement -- senior interlocutors cleared
schedules on short notice when they heard of their visit --
demonstrates the importance they ascribe to consultations
with the U.S. on these countries. The Romanians are eager to
play an active role in their strategically important corner
of Europe, as a NATO and nearly-finalized EU member. The most
common Bucharest metaphor for the country's future
geostrategic role in the region has Romania watchfully gazing
over the ramparts, guarding Western civilization from
instability and chaos to the East. Yet Romanian policymakers,
as well as local NGO representatives like those Kramer and
Hodges met informally, understand that the type of subtle and
patient engagement it is going to take to promote democracy
and stability in this part of the world in the long-term will
belie that type of watchtower imagery. End Comment.


14. (U) This cable has been cleared by DAS Kramer and
Ambassador Hodges.


15. (U) AmEmbassy Bucharest's reporting telegrams are
available on the Bucharest SIPRNet
website:www.state.sgov.gov/eur/Bucharest
TAPLIN