Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BUCHAREST460
2006-03-16 16:39:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bucharest
Cable title:  

BLACK SEA BORDER SECURITY INITIATIVE REAL TIME

Tags:  PGOV PREL ETTC KCRM PTER KNNP RO 
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VZCZCXYZ0039
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBM #0460/01 0751639
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 161639Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3970
INFO RUEHUP/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 1049
RUEHCH/AMEMBASSY CHISINAU 1126
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV 1208
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0804
RUEHSF/AMEMBASSY SOFIA 4738
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0053
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L BUCHAREST 000460 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/NCE - WSILKWORTH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL ETTC KCRM PTER KNNP RO
SUBJECT: BLACK SEA BORDER SECURITY INITIATIVE REAL TIME
OPERATION

Classified By: DCM MARK TAPLIN FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) (C) (D) AND (F)

C O N F I D E N T I A L BUCHAREST 000460

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/NCE - WSILKWORTH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL ETTC KCRM PTER KNNP RO
SUBJECT: BLACK SEA BORDER SECURITY INITIATIVE REAL TIME
OPERATION

Classified By: DCM MARK TAPLIN FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) (C) (D) AND (F)


1. (C) Summary: On January 30-31, Romaia hosted the Black
Sea Border Security Initiativ (BSBSI) "real-time operation."
As the final evnt of the &STYX 20058 scenario, the
Romanians deonstrated a mock seizure of a truck carrying a
rdiological commodity to representatives of Bulgari,
Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, with TDY PolOff erving as
U.S. observer. All participant statesagreed to
cooperatively building coordination neworks between their
respective operational nonprliferation infrastructures. Of
the five BSBSI prticipants, Romania, Moldova, and Georgia
showed he greatest enthusiasm. Bulgaria agreed in princile
with the goals of the initiative, but is concrned time spent
on BSBSI is time lost elsewhere. This conference was clearly
useful as a forum fr increasing cooperation, but it was also
in manyrespects a Romanian show. For BSBSI to have further
value, it needs to demonstrate an increase in cooperation
between nonproliferation institutions. Absent U.S. (or
external) pressure to the contrary, Romania will continue to
use BSBSI as a mechanism for this nonproliferation
institutional development. The Romanians are adamant that
such cooperation will not develop without the political
impetus provided by BSBSI or some similar initiative.
Bulgaria,s reaction to Romania,s bilateral overtures will
be useful to gauge whether BSBSI will prove an effective
mechanism for increasing regional cooperation. End Summary.

OPENING REMARKS
--------------

2. (SBU) Romanian MFA Arms Control, Nonproliferation and
Combating Terrorism Office Chief Dan Neculaescu opened the
&Third BSBSI Reunion8 conference by noting the threat posed
by the Black Sea region as a route for illicit trafficking of
WMD materials. He emphasized BSBSI,s role as an ad hoc
forum for enhanced cooperation of Black Sea countries.
Ukrainian Intelligence Service officer Olexander Krasenekov

noted that, for the first time, Ukraine had sent a delegation
to a BSBSI activity from their capital. Bulgarian MFA
official Parisa Popnikolova noted that the fight against WMD
was a central component of Bulgaria,s national strategy.
She noted the importance of information sharing, developing
joint border activities, and export control. She also noted
that it was not clear how the Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI) and BSBSI relate, but she noted the
potential for the two initiatives to be complementary.
Georgian Customs officer David Akhdlediany noted the
importance of regional cooperation in building trust and
security. Moldovan Special and Intelligence Service officer
Vadim Vrabie noted that the fight against WMD was of critical
importance to Moldova, and further hoped that the countries
of the region could generally strengthen cooperation on
cross-border issues.

THE REAL-TIME OPERATION
--------------

3. (SBU) Following the opening session at the MFA, the GOR
demonstrated its procedure for interdicting radiological
material in transit at a mock border crossing. They
constructed the border crossing at a police training facility
on the outskirts of Bucharest. A van, operated by the faux
terrorist organization EMANON, and &carrying8 a quantity
of Cobalt-60, passed through the mock border crossing. For
purposes of the exercise, the Romanians stipulated that they
had information given them by other BSBSI states regarding
the illicit nature of the van,s cargo. Upon identification
of the van by Border Police and Customs personnel, a SWAT
team under the jurisdiction of the Romanian Intelligence
Service (the so-called &Antiterrorist Brigade) prepared an
ambush. Knowing that the van was going to be ambushed, the
border police allowed the van to cross into Romanian
territory, after which the Intelligence Service SWAT team
blocked the van,s route with their own vehicle while a team
descended on the van, arresting the driver at gunpoint.
Meanwhile, the Gendarmerie cordoned off the wider perimeter
(a cordon that was maintained throughout the entire
operation.)


4. (SBU) After the arrest of the driver, there commenced a
review of the van for pyrotechnics or incendiaries. The
Interior Ministry NBC service investigated the van for traces

of WMD material. Upon their detection of radioactivity from
one of the van,s containers, Interior Ministry NBC service
troops contacted the National Commission for Nuclear
Activities Control (CNCAN). CNCAN placed the Cobalt-60 in
custody, and was decontaminated by Interior Ministry NBC
troops. CNCAN official Viviana Grama advised the
international delegations that CNCAN would retain custody of
the material pending the conclusion of the terrorist,s
trial, in order to ensure that the Romanian Prosecutor,s
office can demonstrate a documented chain of custody. They
would also advise the IAEA illicit trafficking database of
the seizure. Following the conclusion of the trial, the
material would be disposed of in one of Romania,s two
disposition sites with sufficient physical protection. (In
another presentation Grama identified that one site was for
nuclear material, and the other for radiological sources.)

WRAP-UP SESSION
--------------

5. (SBU) During the concluding session, the delegations
broadly agreed to the &terms of reference8 document
circulated by the Romanians prior to the real-time operation.
The Romanians advised the other BSBSI delegations that the
&terms of reference8 would be used to clarify to other
countries on BSBSI,s methodologies, goals, and objectives.
They proposed to use the &terms of reference8 to formally
brief Russia, Turkey, and other potential Balkan states on
BSBSI,s accomplishments to date. The Romanians then
submitted a questionnaire, asking the BSBSI states their own
procedures for responding to incidents similar to the mock
radiological seizure that the Romanians demonstrated during
the real-time operation. They also requested the other BSBSI
states to develop national points-of-contact to continue
development of BSBSI projects following conclusion of the
&STYX 20058 exercise. All delegations agreed, but the
Bulgarians noted that they had already established
points-of-contact to meet their PSI obligations. Therefore,
they proposed to use the same networks for any BSBSI
activities. The Ukrainian delegation stated that they would
shortly develop an interagency nonproliferation working group
as a means of meeting their own PSI responsibilities, whom
they would use for BSBSI activities as well. They were also
careful to note that they were not formally committed to
BSBSI.

BULGARIA,S CONCERNS REGARDING BSBSI,S UTILITY
--------------

6. (C) In a candid setting, TDY PolOff discussed BSBSI with
Bulgarian MFA nonproliferation official Paris Popnikolova and
Romanian MFA official Dana Marca on Bulgarian participation
in BSBSI. Popnikolova responded that Bulgaria was in
agreement with BSBSI,s objectives, and agreed in principle
regarding the need to enhance regional nonproliferation
cooperation. Popnikolova questioned, however, the particular
value-added that BSBSI could bring, stating that she was
concerned that it was duplicative with other initiatives and
fora, and PSI in particular. She also noted that she felt
somewhat overwhelmed by the multiplicity of international
nonproliferation programs and initiatives, citing BSEC and
the Stability Pact as also having nonproliferation
components. Popnikolova opined that much of the coordination
between national institutions that BSBSI sought to create
already existed de facto. Marca responded that BSBSI,s
advantage was that it focused on a regional setting. The
connections between nonproliferation institutions fostered by
BSBSI should be occurring on an ad hoc basis around the
globe, but it was BSBSI that was actually doing it in the
Black Sea region.



7. (U) PARTICIPANTS
--------------

Bulgaria
--------------

Mr. Kiril Mishev, MFA
Mr. Emil Bonev, Nuclear Agency
Mr. Dragomir Markov, Border Agency
Ms. Parisa Popnikolova, MFA
Mr. Volodya Velkov, Ministry of the Interior

Mr. Dimo Tzonev, Ministry of the Interior

Georgia
--------------

Mr. Vakhtang Gelashvili, Directorate for Customs Control
Mr. Mindia Janelidze, Special Service of Foreign Intelligence
Mr. David Akhdlediani, Directorate for Customs Control

Moldova
--------------

Mr. Vadim Vrabie, Special and Intelligence Service
Mr. Sergiu Cracium, Border Directorate
Mr. Vadim Dumitrasco, National Customs Directorate

Romania
--------------

Mr. Dan Neculaescu, Director, Office for Nonproliferation,
Arms Control and Combating Terrorism, MFA
Ms. Dana Marca, MFA
Mr. Victor Mircescu, MFA
Mr. Dorin Grosu, Romanian Police, NBC Service, Ministry of
Administration and Interior
Mr. Alin Tanase, Romanian Police, NBC Service, Ministry of
Administration and Interior
Mr. Ivan Lucian, Ministry of Administration and Interior
Mr. Cristian Ionascu, Border Police, Ministry of
Administration and Interior
Mr. Razvan Budeanu, Border Police, Ministry of Administration
and Interior
Mr. Mircea Olaru, General Inspectorate of the Romanian
Gendarmerie
Mr. Vilmos Zsombori, President, National Commission for
Nuclear Activities Control
Ms. Viviana Grama, National Commission for Nuclear Activities
Control
Mr. Nicolae Dumitrescu, National Commission for Nuclear
Activities Control
Ms. Adriana Baciu, National Commission for Nuclear Activities
Control
Ms. Anca Marinescu, National Customs Authority
Mr. Dragos Mihai, National Customs Authority
Mr. Iulian Spanu, National Customs Authority
Ms. Mihaela Polezache, Romanian Intelligence Service
Mr. Laurentiu Tomiuc, Romanian Intelligence Service
Mr. Horatiu Grigorescu, Romanian Intelligence Service
Mr. Alexandru Florea, Romanian Intelligence Service
Ms. Alina Ion, Romanian Intelligence Service
Mr. Nicolae Neferoiu, Foreign Intelligence Service
Mr. Augustin Aculai, Nuclear Agency
Mr. Dragos Tocae, National Agency for Export Control
Mr. Ioan Onofrievici, Ministry of Defense

Ukraine
--------------

Ms. Ianina Ivanovna Ignatenko, National Border Authority
Mr. Olexandr Ninelovici Krasenekov, Intelligence Service
Mr. Ivan Zaitsev, Interior Attache, Embassy of Ukraine to
Romania

U.S. (observer)
--------------

Mr. John Conlon, EUR/PRA, U.S. Department of State


8. (U) U) AmEmbassy Bucharest's reporting telegrams are
available on the Bucharest SIPRNet website:
www.state.sgov.gov/eur/Bucharest
TAUBMAN