Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BUCHAREST436
2006-03-14 17:36:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bucharest
Cable title:  

BASESCU PREDICTS CALM ETHNIC HUNGARIAN "AUTONOMY

Tags:  PGOV PREL PHUM SOCI ECON ENRG EINV MARR HU RO 
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VZCZCXRO8840
PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHBM #0436/01 0731736
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 141736Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3937
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHUP/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 1042
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BUCHAREST 000436 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/NCE - WSILKWORTH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM SOCI ECON ENRG EINV MARR HU RO
SUBJECT: BASESCU PREDICTS CALM ETHNIC HUNGARIAN "AUTONOMY
DECLARATION," TOUTS NEW ENERGY INITIATIVES

REF: A. BUCHAREST 410


B. BUCHAREST 278

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Mark Taplin
for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BUCHAREST 000436

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/NCE - WSILKWORTH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM SOCI ECON ENRG EINV MARR HU RO
SUBJECT: BASESCU PREDICTS CALM ETHNIC HUNGARIAN "AUTONOMY
DECLARATION," TOUTS NEW ENERGY INITIATIVES

REF: A. BUCHAREST 410


B. BUCHAREST 278

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Mark Taplin
for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary. President Traian Basescu predicted to the
Ambassador during a March 13 meeting that a planned March 15
"autonomy declaration" organized by a fringe ethnic Hungarian
group would be a relatively low-key event. He characterized
it as the product of a power struggle between the mainstream
ethnic Hungarian party (UDMR) and radical fringe activists,
adding that he had taken steps to prevent the occurrence of a
"counter demonstration" by Romanian nationalists aligned with
Greater Romania Party (PRM) leader Corneliu Vadim Tudor. He
also made it clear he suspected nationalists in Hungary of
stirring the ethnic pot in Romania, citing Victor Orban and
Fidesz specifically. In response to the Ambassador's
expression of interest in Basescu's views on energy security,
the Romanian president asserted that while Romania was less
dependent on external sources of energy than many other
European countries, he was exploring various options for
energy diversification. Basescu claimed Romania would take a
position within the next month regarding its planned
acquisition of F-16 aircraft, saying the GOR hoped to acquire
F-16s from either the Netherlands or the U.S. At the same
time, he ruled out acquisition from Israel. End Summary.

"Intelligent" Response to Ethnic-Hungarian Gathering
-------------- --------------

2. (C) During a March 13 meeting in Basescu's office, the
Ambassador expressed his concern over the prospect of
violence at an ethnic Hungarian gathering in the
Transylvanian town of Odorheiul Secuiesc March 15, where a

tiny, fringe ethnic Hungarian group's declaration will
reportedly make a declaration of "autonomy" (Ref A). The
Ambassador reaffirmed the U.S. strongly supported Romania's
EU accession in January 2007 but added that any "untoward
incident" on March 15 could have a negative impact on May 15
(the date of Romania's crucial EU spring accession report.)
Basescu immediately assured the situation would remain under
control. "We are intelligent," he stressed, continuing that
"we will let the Magyars talk...and we will block the
Romanians from going to Odorheiul Secuiesc." Basescu said he
had recently spoken with extreme nationalist and Greater
Romania Party (PRM) leader Corneliu Vadim Tudor and warned
him not to go to Odorheiul Secuiesc or to send followers
there. The Romanian president reported that security forces
would block the roads and turn back any attempt by ethnic
Romanians to travel to Odorheiul Secuiesc for the March 15
event. (Note: March 14 press reports quoted Tudor as
stating that following discussions with Basescu, Interior
Minister Vasile Blaga and Romanian Intelligence Chief Radu
Timofte he had canceled plans to hold a counter-demonstration
in Odorheiul Secuiesc. End Note.)


3. (C) Basescu affirmed that for the majority of ethnic
Hungarians March 15 was "a celebration...a holiday for them."
The GOR would only react to the Odorheiul Secuiesc
declaration if "Romanian territorial integrity" were called
into question. The issue, he explained, was "whether the
declaration will be followed by actions that are
unconstitutional." In response to the Ambassador's question,
Basescu promised he would "follow constitutional means." He
acknowledged that he has been in contact with the organizers
of the March 15 declaration, including the Mayor of Odorheiul
Secuiesc, to see if they would "modify their statements."
In response to the Ambassador's question as to whether he
planned to travel to Odorheiul Secuiesc, Basescu admitted he
was "thinking about it," but would only go if he was assured
any declaration would not be "against the Constitution."


4. (C) The Ambassador told Basescu that he had recently met
with mainstream ethnic Hungarian party (UDMR) leader Bela
Marko, who had claimed that the impasse over the proposed
minorities law, a subject near and dear to the heart of UDMR
members, had contributed to the splinter group's planned
autonomy declaration. (Ref A) Basescu retorted that "the
minority law is not the issue, the issue is the internal
dispute within the Hungarian community." He pointed to a
power struggle between the mainstream UDMR's leaders and
radical ethnic Hungarians as the root of the problem.
Basescu also blamed outsider agitators, singling out Viktor
Orban, "one of Europe's last extremists," and Hungary's
Fidesz party, and expressing the hope that "Orban won't push
for undemocratic processes." Basescu asserted that the

BUCHAREST 00000436 002 OF 003


"standard for minorities in Romania is very high compared to
other European countries." He ticked off a list of benefits
enjoyed by ethnic Hungarians, such as schools, a university
and theaters employing the Hungarian language. Basescu
concluded by reiterating his earlier promise to handle the
March 15 events "with intelligence," assuring the Ambassador
that the day's events would not negatively affect Romania's
EU accession prospects.

Diverse Energy Options
--------------

5. (C) The Ambassador stated that the U.S. supports a
competitive and diverse energy sector in the region. Basescu
remarked that Romania is relatively less dependent on
imported energy sources than other states in the region,
observing, however, that its dependence on imported gas, in
particular, became more acute in winter months. Last year,
at the EU Hampton Court gathering, he had advocated that
other European countries consider "relaunching their nuclear
plants," an idea which only Berlusconi had seconded.
Germany, he observed, along with the Scandinavians, were
sitting on the fence. The Ambassador agreed that Romania had
some domestic energy sources but pointed out that it would
require more energy in the future to fuel a growing economy.
Basescu asserted "we are putting huge amounts of dollars into
supporting undemocratic states" which produce oil, implying
that these resources could be better spent elsewhere. He
stated that Romania supported the Nabucco natural gas
pipeline, explaining, "we don't want energy from one source."


6. (C) Basescu also bruited the possibility of building a
compressed natural gas terminal at the Black Sea port of
Constanta for Qatari gas, noting that Qatar currently
supplies natural gas to Japan, India and Spain. According to
Basescu, "Romania is prepared to receive Qatar's natural
gas...and we can build pipelines to Poland and Ukraine."
Romania is preparing to "do a study to determine what part of
Europe can be supplied (with natural gas) from Constanta,"
adding that unspecified "other European countries" could
pitch in. Basescu added that he would like American
compressed natural gas handling equipment, which he had seen
during his February visit to Qatar, and which he labeled as
"the best." Basescu, a former sea captain, asserted that
300-meter ships carrying gas from Qatar would have "no
problem" passing through the Bosphorous, since the Turks in
recent years had taken the necessary safety measures for this
type of ship traffic.


Come Fly With Me: Romania Evaluates F-16 Acquisition
-------------- --------------

7. (C) Basescu reported that Romania planned to take a
position "in the next month" regarding its planned
acquisition of F-16 aircraft. He stated that Romania's
decision would be based upon the underlying premise of "how
we can adapt our armed forces to NATO standards." Basescu
said it was "clear" that Israeli-provided fighters "are not a
solution" and Romania has "drawn a line through" the
possibility of acquiring F-16s from Israel. Basescu
continued that Romania would choose between "new F-16s (from
the U.S.) or Dutch F-16s." He noted that the "Dutch price is
good" but expressed uncertainty about the maintenance
contracts for the Dutch-provided F-16s. Basescu described
Romania's ultimate goal as the acquisition of Joint Strike
Fighters (JSF) and speculated about whether new or used F-16s
would provide the "best access to the new JSF." He stated
that he would appreciate guidance on whether it was better to
obtain new or used F-16s, but stressed he was conscious of
the advantages of acquiring new planes. The Ambassador
observed that proper aircraft maintenance would be vital,
and took note of the fact that Romania had experienced some
difficulties in meeting the less complex requirements for
keeping up its modest fleet of C-130s.


8. (C) Comment. Although Basescu was deliberately evasive
about whether he would attend the March 15 event in Odorheiul
Secuiesc, he appeared confident the gathering would unfold
peacefully, twice assuring the Ambassador of an "intelligent"
response by the GOR. Basescu's polite but forceful
insistence that the March 15 declaration was in no way linked
to the Romanian parliament's failure to pass a minorities law
sought by the ethnic Hungarian community suggested that this
episode is as much about domestic politics as it is about
national security. The fact that Basescu acknowledged he has
been in direct contact with Hungarian minority politicians
who are behind the Odorheiul Secuiesc event -- and vying for

BUCHAREST 00000436 003 OF 003


political leverage with their UDMR rivals -- suggests that
the Romanian president is, as usual, playing all the angles.
End Comment.


9. (U) Amembassy Bucharest's reporting telegrams are
available on
the Bucharest SIPRNet website:
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/bucharest
TAUBMAN