CLAMOR SURROUNDING ETHNIC HUNGARIAN FRINGE GROUP'S

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BUCHAREST 000410

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/NCE - WSILKWORTH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM SOCI HU RO
SUBJECT: CLAMOR SURROUNDING ETHNIC HUNGARIAN FRINGE GROUP'S
PLANNED DECLARATION OF "AUTONOMY"

REF: 05 BUCHAREST 2423

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Mark Taplin
for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary. Ethnic Hungarian party (UDMR) leader and
Deputy Prime Minister Bela Marko told the Ambassador on March
10 that Marko and his party do not support a March 15 ethnic
Hungarian "autonomy proclamation," slated to occur in a small
Transylvanian town. He predicted a small and peaceful event,
although senior GOR officials insist they are worried about a
violent confrontation. Marko expressed frustration, however,
with the center-right government's failure to pass a draft
law on minority status, blaming President Traian Basescu and
his Democratic Party (PD) for the impasse. Basescu's
advisers claim that they are angry the UDMR has not supported
recent anti-corruption legislation. The UDMR is looking at
the "big picture" -- EU Accession in 2007 -- and is unlikely
to formally break with the center-right coalition. End
Summary.

A Celebration in the Szekler Homeland
--------------

2. (C) A tiny group of extremists within the ethnic
Hungarian "Szekler" community has chosen March 15, the date
Hungarians around the world commemorate the Revolution of
1848, to proclaim "autonomy" for the "Szekler land" region in
Transylvania. However, mainstream ethnic Hungarian party
(UDMR) leader and Deputy Prime Minister Bela Marko told the
Ambassador March 10 that the UDMR has unequivocally
disassociated itself from this endeavor. The event in
question is slated to occur in the mid-sized Transylvanian
town of Odorheiul Secuiesc, smack dab in the heartland of the
Szekler minority. Marko stressed that he -- and the vast
majority of Romania's ethnic Hungarians -- viewed March 15 as
a sort of "Hungarian national pride" day without a specific
political context. Marko stressed that since 1997 Romanian
presidents and prime ministers had sent a congratulatory
message to ethnic Hungarians every March 15.


3. (C) Marko stressed to the Ambassador that March 15 was "a
big festival" for ethnic Hungarians of virtually all
political stripes and that the vast majority of attendees at
the March 15 event in Odorheiul Secuiesc would be there for a
"celebration," not an overt political display. Marko stated
that he, like most ethnic Hungarians, did not want March 15
"to be used for political purposes." He predicted that the
event would transpire peacefully and without untoward
incident, as the "organizers will be very careful." Marko
recommended against a uniformed police presence in Odorheiul
Secuiesc March 15, wryly opining that if one person "gets
slapped" there would be a media uproar. (Note: A senior
intelligence official told the Ambassador on March 9 that
while the GOR was worried about the prospect of violence at
the event, it planned a "discreet" security presence. End
Note.) Marko mentioned that he and the Hungarian Ambassador
would attend and participate in another town's festival
marking March 15.


4. (C) Marko told the Ambassador that, in his view, the
proposed autonomy proclamation was an effort by a splinter
group of radical Szeklers to thwart the political standing of
the UDMR, which is a member of the governing center-right
coalition. According to Marko's personal advisor Viktor
Sata, the National Szekler Council (CNS),the party which is
leading the move to proclaim autonomy March 15, has a
membership of less than 2,000. (Note: About 1.5 million
ethnic Hungarians live in Romania. End Note.) Marko
characterized Odorheiul Secuiesc Mayor Jeno Szasz as a man
"with no values, only interests," focused exclusively on
advancing his own political agenda. UDMR leaders, including
Marko, predict a relatively modest turnout in Odorheiul
Secuiesc, between 5,000 and 10,000 people. Marko did
acknowledge that the opposition FIDESZ party in Hungary might
be attempting to gain votes in the upcoming Hungarian
elections by appealing to the more radical Szeklers, whose
relatives live in Hungary.


5. (C) According to several ethnic Hungarian sources, the
draft proclamation has not been finalized. Even the ethnic
Hungarian senator representing Odorheiul Secuiesc told PolOff
that he had "not seen" the proclamation. According to
various sources, the proclamation may be either a relatively
straightforward list of demands for greater civil liberties
and cultural protections for ethnic-Hungarians in the Szekler
region or an outright "declaration of independence."
Odorheiul Secuiesc Mayor and CNS leader Jeno Szasz told
EmbOff that the Szekler minority is "tired of waiting" and

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impatient with what he described as Romanian bureaucratic
indifference. He asserted that ethnic minorities in other
countries achieved results through "active resistance."


6. (C) The planned Odorheiul Secuiesc autonomy proclamation
might have gone largely unnoticed on the national scene but
for Corneliu Vadim Tudor's extreme nationalist Greater
Romania Party (PRM),always ready to fan the flames of ethnic
unrest. In recent days, the PRM has called for a
counter-demonstration of 100,000 Romanians in Odorheiul
Secuiesc on March 15. Marko dismissed as hyperbole the
possibility of Tudor staging a massive rally there, noting
that the region is "almost entirely ethnic Hungarian" and
that, in any case, Tudor would not receive an assembly permit
from Mayor Szasz. Nonetheless, Tudor's vitriolic
denunciation of the proposed autonomy declaration has
received wide press coverage.

Against a Background of Partisan Politics...
--------------

7. (C) During the meeting with the Ambassador, Marko
acknowledged that relations between the UDMR and President
Basescu's Democratic Party (PD) were at a low ebb. Echoing
observations made by other UDMR leaders, Marko stated that
his party -- and the ethnic Hungarian constituency -- was
frustrated that the PD had failed to deliver on its promise
to pass a law giving "cultural autonomy" to regions with a
majority of ethnic Hungarians (Ref). Marko stressed that
when the UDMR ended its alliance with the PSD and joined the
center-right alliance in late 2004, the center-right Alliance
promised the passage of a cultural autonomy law as the key
condition for the UDMR entry into the alliance. Marko
underscored to the Ambassador that, within the center-right
coalition, only the PD opposes the UDMR's proposed
legislation. According to Marko, the other two coalition
partners, the National Liberal Party (PNL) and Conservative
Party (PC),back the UDMR's proposed legislation.


8. (C) Marko told the Ambassador that Basescu and his party
opposed the draft legislation on purely political grounds, in
order to gain traction with nationalist voters. (Note:
Earlier this week, Marko publicly denounced Basescu for
attempting to "improve his popularity through nationalistic
rhetoric." End Note.) The Ambassador stated that he had
heard reports that Basescu might travel to Odorheiul Secuiesc
March 15. Marko rejoined that he had not heard Basescu was
planning on attending, adding that his presence there would
add to tension and would be a "big mistake." Marko asked the
Ambassador to urge Basescu to support the proposed minority
law and also to urge the Romanian president to refrain from
traveling to Odorheiul Secuiesc. The Ambassador promised to
discuss these issues with the Romanian president during a
planned meeting March 13.


9. (C) Marko told the Ambassador that the UDMR would "not
quit the coalition at this time because EU accession on
January 2007 is our biggest priority." He opined that the
political tumult that would result from the UDMR's withdrawal
from the coalition, ending the center-right alliance's
parliamentary majority, would create political instability
that would, in turn, put January 2007 EU accession in
jeopardy. Nonetheless, Marko noted, without elaborating,
that a "very droll situation" would result if a suitable law
on minority status does not eventually pass.


10. (C) Presidential Domestic Policy Adviser Claudiu Saftoiu
told visiting Deputy Assistant Secretary Mark Pekala and DCM
March 8 that Basescu was in fact considering the possibility
of showing up in Odorheiul Secuiesc March 15, although
Saftoiu did not elaborate on why Basescu might go or what he
might seek to accomplish. Saftoiu stated that Basescu and
his senior advisers concluded that the UDMR had "retaliated"
when the draft law on cultural autonomy failed to pass by
refusing to support recent anti-corruption and judicial
reform legislation. Saftoiu suggested the real reason for
the UDMR's reticence reflected the fact that "the UDMR has
been in power for ten years" under various governments and
included many "corrupt leaders" who feared effective
anti-corruption laws. Prosecutors, he suggested, should
actively investigate some of them.


11. (C) Comment. The UDMR is the only ethnic Hungarian
party (or ethnic party of any stripe),which has obtained the
five percent threshold required for entry into Parliament.
The vast majority of Hungarians have no truck with the tiny
CNS or its radical demands. That said, what might have been
a little-noticed local event in an obscure Transylvanian town
could conceivably become a flash point for the tensions among

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Basescu, his erstwhile coalition partner the UDMR, and the
followers of extreme nationalist Vadim Tudor. As emotional
as some of our GOR contacts have been in recent days in
expressing their fear of an ugly confrontation at the March
15 event, our assessment at the moment is that there has been
at least as much political theater as sober thinking applied
by Cotroceni and the intelligence agencies. EC Delegation
head Scheele, who spoke to Ambassador on March 10 after a
meeting with Basescu, agrees and generally discounts the
chances of a major flare-up next week among Szeklers and
Romanian nationalists. Bela Marko is resolutely looking at
the big picture, even as he angles for a more favorable
position on the minorities legislation. UDMR leaders have
told us that Romania's EU entry represents the best possible
outcome for Romania and ethnic Hungarians. They, at least,
have no intention of sabotaging Romania's 2007 EU accession
chances by provoking a political crisis. End Comment.


12. (C) Amembassy Bucharest's reporting telegrams are
available on the Bucharest SIPRNet website:
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/bucharest
TAUBMAN