ROMANIA SEEKS "POSITIVE POLITICAL SIGNAL" FROM

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BUCHAREST 000278

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/NCE - WSILKWORTH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON ETRD ENRG SENV PTER EPET TU
RS, UP, GG, BU
SUBJECT: ROMANIA SEEKS "POSITIVE POLITICAL SIGNAL" FROM
U.S. FOR PROPOSED JUNE BLACK SEA FORUM AND SUMMIT

REF: A. 05 BUCHREST 1778

B. 05 BUCHAREST 1989

C. 05BUCHAREST 2017

Classified By: Ambassador Nichols Taubman
for Reasons 1.4 (b),(c) and (d)


1. U) This is an Action Request. Please see paragrap 11.


2. (C) Last summer, Romania proposed a "Back Sea Forum for
Dialogue and Partnership Summi" as a launching pad for a
process of dialogue ad partnership among Black Sea states,
the U.S. an the E.U. (Refs) The proposed forum focuses on
"oft security" concerns such as promoting democrati
governance, economic development and environmenal
protection. Originally envisaged for Decembe, the forum's
proposed date is now 5 June. Romana plans to invite the
littoral states plus Armena, Azerbaijan, Greece, and
Moldova. The GOR envisages the forum producing a "Joint
Declaration" by "heads of state or governments" from the
Black Sea area. A key goal of the event is to launch the
"Black Sea Forum for Dialogue and Partnership" as a regional
platform for concrete cooperation. (The full texts of the
proposed declaration, draft program and other documents
prepared by the MFA were forwarded to EUR/NCE Bill Silkworth
on February 10.))


3. (C) Romanian interlocutors have expressed to us their
concern that, without U.S. support, the forum could either
transpire at a disappointingly low level or even be
cancelled. This would be a considerable embarrassment for
President Basescu and the Romanian government, and would
represent a significant setback for Bucharest's efforts to
play a more active role in promoting stability and reform in
the region. In a recent conversation with MFA Director
General for Political Affairs Ovidiu Dranga, one of the MFA
officials responsible for organizing the forum, Dranga
underscored that U.S. support for the event would help
convince reluctant countries to participate at an appropriate
level. While he stressed that the GOR seeks USG weigh-in
with other countries, he felt, rather contradictorily, that
some countries (read: Russia and Turkey) might hesitate to
participate in a forum that they perceived as U.S.-driven.
Another area in which Dranga solicited input was in the
content of the draft Joint Declaration and program for the
proposed forum. Dranga also made clear that the GOR
envisioned inviting NGO and business leaders as well.


4. (C) Other MFA interlocutors, including the Ministry's
number two official, State Secretary for Global Affairs
Teodor Baconschi, have also shared their views on the Black
Sea Forum initiative with us in recent days. In Baconschi's
words, Bucharest is looking for a "positive political signal"
from the U.S. as well as from Romania's principal European
partners. Romania had accepted the "guidance" that it had
received from its allies to focus more on "regional outreach"
and "soft security issues." What it needed now was a direct
expression of support for the June 5 Forum from Washington,
EU capitals, NATO and the OSCE.

5. (C) At this point, there are already some encouraging
signs about participation. The British Embassy has informed
us that Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott is penciled-in
for the event. Bulgaria and Georgia, Baconschi reported,
were fully in support of Romania's initiative and our GOR
sources have expressed confidence that both Tbilisi and Sofia
would be represented in June at the head-of-state level.
Likewise, both Romanian officials as well as Ukrainian and
Moldovan Embassy staff have told us Presidents Yushchenko and
Voronin have agreed in principle to attend, Yushchenko in
part because Basescu's recent visit to Kiev was planned with
the understanding the Ukrainian president would take part in
the Black Sea Forum.


6. (S) The calculations in Ankara and Moscow, apparently,
are less straightforward, however. Baconschi described a
dialogue with his Turkish counterparts that has linked the
level of Turkish participation in the June Black Sea forum to
Romania's position on BLACKSEAFOR, a sore point between the
two countries. Romania, with the quiet support of Bulgaria,
had resisted Russian and Turkish overtures last fall to give
BLACKSEAFOR a more robust role in the region, and a six-month
"cooling-off" period had been declared after a stormy meeting
in Tbilisi in December. In return for a Romanian decision to
allow BLACKSEAFOR to expand its mandate and open up
intelligence sharing among the member states, including
Russia, Turkey has indicated it would agree to have Prime

BUCHAREST 00000278 002 OF 002


Minister Erdogan take part in the Black Sea Forum. It was a
form of "friendly blackmail," Baconschi observed: "Make
BLACKSEAFOR operational and we'll come up with a high-level
attendee at the Forum." Otherwise, Ankara would take part,
but at a much more modest level. Other Romanian
interlocutors have consistently told us that they are loathe
to share intelligence with the Russians under the rubric of
BLACKSEAFOR, underscoring that an expanded BLACKSEAFOR would
provide opportunities for Russian intelligence gathering near
new U.S. military facilities on the Black Sea coast.


7. (C) As for Moscow, our GOR contacts offer conflicting
analyses and appear to have wildly divergent expectations.
The MFA's Director-General for "Wider Europe," Razvan Rusu,
was upbeat as recently as February 10 about the prospects for
a high-level Russian presence. Maintaining that it was not
out of the question for President Putin to attend, he told us
that he would be "very surprised" if neither the Russian
President or FM Lavrov made it for the June forum. This rosy
outlook was flatly contradicted by one of President Basescu's
national security advisors, Constantin Degeratu, who said on
February 9 that for Moscow to be represented at the Black Sea
Forum at the deputy FM level would "in and of itself be a
success."


8. (C) Since initially bruiting the proposed Black Sea Forum
for Dialogue and Partnership Summit with us last August, GOR
interlocutors have frequently reminded us that they view
active U.S. support for the forum as the sine qua non of its
success. Since setting a firm June 5 date, the urgency of
their demarches has increased. In post's view, Romania's
proposed forum properly focuses on "soft" security issues and
provides a good starting point for serious intergovernmental
discussions on Black Sea regional cooperation. The Romanians
have made an earnest effort to explore Black Sea regional
cooperation in areas that are less problematic to their more
reluctant littoral partners, especially Russia and Turkey, as
we have been consistently urging them ever since NSA Hadley's
October visit to Bucharest. Consequently, the draft program
includes workshops on themes such as good governance,
sustainable development, and cooperation in joint energy
development. Further, the proposed Joint Declaration singles
out the importance of soft security issues.


9. (C) From our perspective, an ideal USG senior participant
might be a Cabinet-level representative such as the Secretary
of Energy or Commerce, whose presence would reinforce the
impulse for broad engagement and regional consultation in the
Black Sea area, while reinforcing our policy message in a
priority area like energy security or expanded trade and
investment. By lending our support to Romania's forum, we
could contribute to a more positive dialogue among the often
fractious Black Sea countries and, eventually, more tangible
cooperation.


10. (C) No less importantly, a straightforward endorsement
of Bucharest's June forum would demonstrate that we take
President Basescu's policy agenda seriously, just as he has
consistently backed our priority goals in Iraq, Afghanistan
and elsewhere. No topic is nearer and dearer to his heart
than the future of the Black Sea region, and to Romania's
long-term strategy to play a positive transformative role on
the margins of Europe. Now is the moment for a clear
commitment on our part to participate in the Black Sea Forum,
at an appropriate senior level, and to make clear we are
ready to help advise the Romanians on how best to make their
initiative a success.


11. (C) Action Request: Post requests guidance and views we
may share with the GOR regarding the proposed forum.
Specifically, Post seeks the Department's approval to assure
the GOR that the U.S. fully supports the event and will tell
other governments that it plans to participate at an
appropriate senior level.


12. (U) Amembassy Bucharest's reporting telegrams are
available on
the Bucharest SIPRNet website:
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/bucharest
TAUBMAN