ATHENS TEPID TO ROMANIA'S CFE FLANK DEMARCHE

C O N F I D E N T I A L BUCHAREST 001673

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

EUR/FO FOR DAS VOLKER AND DAS PEKALA
EUR/NCE JENSEN AND EUR/RPM LAURENDEAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2016
TAGS: KCFE MARR NATO PREL RO
SUBJECT: ATHENS TEPID TO ROMANIA'S CFE FLANK DEMARCHE

REF: A. ATHENS 2868


B. BUCHAREST 1637

C. BUCHAREST 1576

D. USNATO 569

E. STATE 110161

Classified By: Political Counselor Ted Tanoue; Reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) MFA Non-proliferation and Arms Control Director
Bogdan Neculeascu on October 31 briefed Polmiloff on the
results of Romania's demarche to Athens regarding possible
CFE Flank ACV Entitlement transfers (refs a and b). He
described the exchange between Romania's Ambassador in Athens
and Greece's Director for NATO affairs as "cordial, open
and frank." The Greeks reportedly argued that CFE Flank TLE
is about regional balance of forces ("security equilibrium"
was the term used),which includes the Aegean as well as the
Black Sea. Second, ACVs are higher-value equipment because
they are multi-functional across the security spectrum, from
Afghanistan to Kosovo (and Neculeascu added, of course
Cyprus). Third, Athens plans to purchase ACVs in 2007, and
needs sufficient entitlements for that reason. Athens
reportedly suggested Romania consider that Norway, Turkey and
Greece should share the burden evenly in all three respective
TLE categories (artillery, tanks and ACVs). In closing, the
Greek side reportedly thanked the Romanian Ambassador for the
meeting and suggested that Romania demarche Ankara.


2. (C) Neculeascu said that the GOR was increasingly
disturbed by an apparently growing benign neglect of CFE,
including within the HLTF. He said that Romania's position
is that it is essential to retain CFE--whether in an adapted
form or not-- since without some form of CFE (and Open Skies
arrangements) the region risks chaos. He added that the MFA
has been reviewing HLTF reports and it appeared that only
Romania and the US among the Allies are serious about
retaining a healthy CFE regime. He said that Romania is
feeling increasingly isolated among the EU in its position.
He noted recent attempts by Belgian OSCE Ambassador deQCrombrugghe to "walk back" on Istanbul Summit commitments,
adding that some other NATO Allies seem to be leaning in this
same direction.


3. (C) Polmiloff assured Neculeascu that the US could not
envision a Riga ministerial statement without mention of CFE
and the Istanbul Commitments. Neculeascu said that was
reassuring because Romania was even sensing some hesitation
from the U.S. in Vienna and Brussels on CFE.


4. (C) Neculeascu said that Romania wants to know what the
U.S. strategy is on CFE issues on the road to Riga. He added
that Romania was willing to assist the US on CFE issues as
much as possible. He also reiterated strong support for the
US-proposed public affairs strategy in response to Russian
claims on the CFE treaty, but he cautioned that this was not
enough. He added that Russia's growing vociferousness on
CFE, in general and on the Flank in particular, could easily
spin out of control within the context of the frozen
conflicts. NATO needs more coordination, collaboration and a
more comprehensive response that protects the integrity of
the CFE treaty. If the US has any strategy papers to share
with Romania, Neculeascu said, it would be very much
appreciated. In closing, he reiterated that Romania is
available and eager to work closely with the U.S. on these
issues.


5. (C) Comment: The MFA believes it took its best shot with
Athens on the CFE Flank entitlement issue, and will be
gratified to hear that Athens has relented on this issue (ref
A). Romania also recognizes that the US is its best hope for
getting the Alliance to be more serious about Black Sea
Security issues, and thus its appeal to work more closely to
help shape a more comprehensive NATO strategy that takes
regional concerns into account. The bottom line is that
Romania is increasingly concerned that the EU-Turkey-Cyprus
stalemate (Neculeascu mentioned the upcoming Finnish-Turkish
meeting) might encourage some NATO Allies to concede Black
Sea security issues to Russia and Turkey by default--a very
discomforting prospect for Romania. End Comment.
Taubman