ROMANIA INCREASES INVOLVEMENT IN THE PROLIFERATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L BUCHAREST 001583

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/NCE - AARON JENSEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/15/2016
TAGS: MNUC MOPS PARM PREL RO
SUBJECT: ROMANIA INCREASES INVOLVEMENT IN THE PROLIFERATION
SECURITY INITIATIVE

Classified By: DCM Mark A. Taplin for Reasons 1.4 (A) and (B).


1. (U) Summary. Romania has expanded its participation in
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) activities over the
past year. Romania has strengthened domestic legislation and
export controls, and improved interagency cooperation.
Romania has focused on working with regional counterparts on
parallel initiatives, including the Black Sea Basin Security
Initiative (BSBSI) and Black Sea Harmony. Romanian
authorities hope that under PSI aegis these initiatives will
persuade Russia and Turkeyto broaden their regional
cooperation. Romania wants tohost a large-scale joint
interdiction exercise within the next two years. End Summary.


2. (U) Over the past year, Romania has made nonproliferation
a priority in its policy agenda, creating the Export Control
Agency (ANCEX),the Romanian Counterproliferation Group, and
a separate counterproliferation division within the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and soon one within the Ministry of
Defense (MOD). The GOR had officially expressed its support
for the PSI through the "Paris Declaration" in May 2004.
Initially, Romania was only an observer at exercises such as
the Poland- and Czech Republic- sponsored "Bohemian Guard,"
but the GOR's interest increased after attending the Regional
Operational Experts Group (ROEG) in Hamburg in November 2005.
Before the ROEG, the GOR restricted itself to the
operational level. Afterwards Romanian officials aimed to
increase their political profile, evidenced by the MFA's
taking the reigns from the MOD for PSI coordination.


3. (U) In May 2006 The Turkish-sponsored "Anatolian Sun"
exercise provided the first opportunity for Romania's higher
profile involvement. MFA officials implied they pressured the
Turkish government for an invitation, having learned of it at
the ROEG. Despite time constraints that prevented the MOD
from sending forces and equipment as hoped, the GOR sent
representatives to participate in the exercise's operational
side. MFA and MOD authorities indicated that, given
budgetary constraints, future participation would hinge on
the value added to regional efforts.

Regional Efforts
--------------


4. (C) The GOR has emerged as a principal actor in regional
interdiction initiatives, such as he Black Sea Basin
Security Initiative (BSBSI) and Black Sea Harmony. In 2004,
the GOR founded the US-supported BSBSI to implement PSI
principles at the regional level. The GOR organized the
first exercise-- "Styx 2005" -- and, while characterized as a
success, MFA and MOD interlocutors were frustrated by
resistance from Russia, Turkey, and to a lesser extent
Bulgaria. A common argument was that the exercise wasted
time and resources because the Black Sea was not a likely
thoroughfare for WMD materials. Romanian MFA officials
responded that unlike narcotics or human trafficking, one
successful shipment of WMD materials could be devastating. In
2004, the Turkish government initiated "Black Sea Harmony" to
coordinate regional interdiction efforts. The MOD, the lead
Romanian ministry for the operation, said that this would be
the more successful regional arms control initiative given
its NATO component and the absence of a "consensus"
requirement. According to MOD officials, consensus
decision-making has often stalemated previous initiatives
involving Russia.


5. (C) Romanian officials concluded that both initiatives
lacked regional cooperation because of the differences
between national interdiction legislation and levels of
democratic development in Ukraine, Russia, and Georgia. The
GOR argued its neighbors would cooperate more fully if the
U.S. and other PSI core members were more supportive,
especially given that Russia is a PSI core state. While
Romanian authorities recognized that PSI and BSBSI are
distinct initiatives, they noted the shared goals and
expressed hope that the two could be integrated.

Romania's PSI Vision
--------------


6. (C) The GOR wants to lessen the gap between the PSI core
and like-minded states. Both the MFA and MOD are interested
in a more institutionalized PSI and clearer protocols for
multilateral cooperation, but only if the US agrees to move
the PSI in this direction. Romania can live with the status
quo, though MFA officials have hinted that while states have
demonstrated their capabilities during exercises, it is now
the time for more concrete action.


7. (U) The GOR is enthusiastic for a Romanian-sponsored PSI
Exercise within the next two years. Officials envisioned a
joint-interdiction Black Sea exercise involving all PSI
member states; however, they are aware that this could be
problematic given Russian sensitivities. The GOR would need
U.S. logistical support and input in designing such an
exercise.


8. (C) Comment. Romania's interest in PSI offers an
opportunity to strengthen counterproliferation efforts in the
Black Sea region, which remains a highly vulnerable route for
WMD transit between Europe and the Middle East. The GOR has
increased its PSI commitments over the past year, working
both internally and regionally to strengthen its ability to
implement PSI principles. Nonetheless, Romania faces resource
restraints but will continue to make its regional interests a
priority; Romania,s participation will likely remain
limited. MFA and MOD interlocutors seem to hope that their
PSI
involvement would make their Black Sea regional ambitions
more attractive to their regional partners. Absent greater
finesse future Romanian-sponsored PSI exercises could be
problematic as Romania becomes further entangled with their
neighbors, Black Sea sensitivities.
Taubman