Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BUCHAREST1451
2006-09-14 16:23:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bucharest
Cable title:  

ROMANIAN VIEWS ON SERBIA, ICTY AND PFP

Tags:  PGOV PREL PINR ICTY SR YI RO 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO3428
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHBM #1451 2571623
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 141623Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5175
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L BUCHAREST 001451 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/13/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR ICTY SR YI RO
SUBJECT: ROMANIAN VIEWS ON SERBIA, ICTY AND PFP

REF: A. PRAGUE 1100


B. SECSTATE 146343

Classified By: Charge d' Affairs, Mark A Taplin Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
.

C O N F I D E N T I A L BUCHAREST 001451

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/13/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR ICTY SR YI RO
SUBJECT: ROMANIAN VIEWS ON SERBIA, ICTY AND PFP

REF: A. PRAGUE 1100


B. SECSTATE 146343

Classified By: Charge d' Affairs, Mark A Taplin Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
.


1. (C) In discussions of reftel demarche at the MFA and
conversations with both MFA and MOD officials around the
margins of a recent V-10 informal defense officials
gathering, Romanian officials took our comments on board but
also expressed some concern about the diplomatic pressure
currently being placed on Belgrade. Contacts opined that the
Serbs were unlikely to bow to western pressure and argued
that sending Mladic to The Hague might provide a new rallying
point for Serbian ultra-nationalists who could steer Serbian
elections away from Euro-Atlantic goals.


2. (C) Romanian officials also evinced hope that ICTY
conditionality could be back-loaded onto the MAP process
rather than as a condition for PfP entrance. MFA NATO
Director Maghiar and Presidential National Security Counselor
Degeratu said such a move might give Belgrade a chance to
take more ambitious steps forward. State Secretary Dobritoiu
on the margins of the V-10 meeting, surrounded by various
civilian and uniformed department heads, told Polmiloff that
there was unanimity among Romanians that Serbia might become
further isolated in Europe. This could occur, he went on,
not because of a lack of will, but rather due to accelerated
push to resolve the Kosovo problem by the end of the. They
assured us that in their conversations with their Serbian
counterparts, they will press for ICTY compliance and the
importance of handing Mladic to The Hague. Our Romanian
interlocutors acknowledged that Serbian stubbornness and
pride were holding back Belgrade.


3. (C) Comments: The bottom line is that the Romanians
appear to agree--however reluctantly--with our request to
stress PIFWC conditionality in their conversations with
Serbian counterparts. At the same time, they appear to be
more focused on carrots than sticks in eliciting a change of
Belgrade's behavior. We note with interest Embassy Prague,s
report (Ref A),as the Romanians are reflecting similar
enthusiasm for loosening PIFWC conditionality on PFP entry.
Romania,s military has an extensive history with the Serbian
military, and is open to closer collaboration. Romanian
officials, for instance, have suggested that one carrot would
be to allow a Serbian unit to join with a NATO ally or
partner in an exercise or possibly a deployment. They said
that they would be pleased to have the Serbs embedded with a
Romanian unit, "in any place except Kosovo,
of course." End Comment.
Taplin