Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BUCHAREST1444
2006-09-14 09:01:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bucharest
Cable title:  

DAS KRAMER DISCUSSIONS WITH FM UNGUREANU AND

Tags:  PREL PGOV PNAT MD EU RO 
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DE RUEHBM #1444/01 2570901
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P 140901Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5167
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BUCHAREST 001444 

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DEPT FOR EUR/NCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/13/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PNAT MD EU RO
SUBJECT: DAS KRAMER DISCUSSIONS WITH FM UNGUREANU AND
SENIOR ROMANIAN ADVISORS ON TRANSNISTRIA "REFERENDUM"

Classified By: DCM Mark A. Taplin for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BUCHAREST 001444

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/NCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/13/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PNAT MD EU RO
SUBJECT: DAS KRAMER DISCUSSIONS WITH FM UNGUREANU AND
SENIOR ROMANIAN ADVISORS ON TRANSNISTRIA "REFERENDUM"

Classified By: DCM Mark A. Taplin for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: During separate meetings with Foreign
Minister Ungureanu and senior advisors in the offices of the
President and Prime Minister on September 7 in Bucharest, EUR
DAS Kramer provided the Department's perspective on regional
issues including the upcoming independence referendum in
Transnistria. Kramer urged Romanian authorities to join the
international community in forcefully rejecting the
legitimacy of the referendum, and underscored the need to put
the focus squarely back on Russia's unhelpful role in solving
the Transnistria question. Ungureanu readily agreed, noting
that he would direct the Foreign Ministry to seek a clear EU
position on the referendum at the next GAERC September 15.
Ungureanu also said he would raise the idea of a Justice and
Home Affairs peacekeeping mission as a way to push the
Russians to withdraw their "peacekeeping" forces. Senior
advisors in the Prime Minister's office told DAS Kramer that
the Romanian side wanted a bilateral agreement with Moldova
to underscore joint commitment to a European "vocation" for
the two countries, with a focus on concrete projects
including transportation corridors, customs, and joint
initiatives against organized crime. Presidential counselors
largely agreed with DAS Kramer's points regarding the
illegality of the Transnistrian referendum, but at least
initially counseled a low-key approach, citing the sometimes
prickly nature of relations between Romania and Moldova. All
of our interlocutors appreciated the opportunity to hear our
views from DAS Kramer and to coordinate our approaches. End
Summary.

Meeting with Foreign Minister
--------------


2. (C) Foreign Minister Mihai Razvan Ungureanu heartily
endorsed EUR Deputy Assistant Secretary David Kramer's
outline of the U.S. approach to dealing with the
Transnistrian conflict, including the need for the
international community to be clear that it does not accept

the Transnistrian September 18 referendum. DAS Kramer
emphasized that the Transnistrian referendum was unlikely to
reflect the popular will given the heavy-handed Russian role,
the loaded referendum questions, and lack of a genuine
democratic process. He said that the USG, OSCE, EU, and
Ukraine had issued clear statements that they will not
recognize the referendum, and urged the Romanian government
to take similar steps. He added that if Russia recognizes
the referendum, the international community should stop the
"charade" of pretending there was an impartial Russian role
in Moldova. Saying that "You speak my language," Ungureanu
agreed with Kramer that considerable emphasis ought to be
placed on pushing Russia to make a clear choice -- either to
make its opposition to the referendum clearly known, or to
have its endorsement of the referendum lead to a
reconsideration of Russia's role as an mediator on
Transnistria.


3. (C) Ungureanu said some European colleagues had called on
the EU to issue a statement on the illegality of the
Transnistrian referendum during the EU's informal General
Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) on September

1. He said all the new EU states as well as Germany strongly
supported Moldova and referred to the referendum as illegal
at that meeting. Ungureanu tasked his staff with the need to
"get a clear EU position" on the Transnistrian referendum at
the next GAERC on September 15. Ungureanu suggested it could
be a powerful statement, coming either from European Council
Secretary General Javier Solana or the Finnish Presidency of

SIPDIS
the EU. He mentioned the Finnish were busy finalizing the EU
partnership agreement with Russia and that a strong statement
on Transnistria could make the Russians take note. Ungureanu
suggested it would be good for the U.S. to push for a strong
EU statement condemning the referendum in Brussels and
Helsinki as well.


4. (C) Raising the issue of Russian forces stationed in
Transnistria, DAS Kramer commented that a much smaller
contingent, perhaps a third of the size and consisting of
300-500 police and customs personnel as well as a smaller,
rapid-reaction kind of military force, could do the job.
Ungureanu said he would raise the idea of a "Justice and Home
Affairs peacekeeping mission" at the next GAERC meeting. He
agreed that gathering the political commitments for such a
force could help answer Russia's unwillingness to withdraw
troops from Transnistria by offering an intermediate solution
that would not leave a void and allow Russian participation.
Kramer noted that structuring command and control of any such
OSCE-EU Russia peacekeeping operation would be a delicate
matter.


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5. (C) In response to comments made by DAS Kramer in regard
to Belgian efforts to solve Transnistria under its OSCE
chairmanship, Ungureanu was likewise skeptical of their
value. He said he would look to pull aside the Belgian
permanent representative to the OSCE in Vienna to discourage
the Belgians' planned trip to Tiraspol the following week.
Ungureanu said he would also raise issues of Transnistrian
human rights violations in the Council of Europe, making sure
to press on a "point that aches" for the Russian chair.
Ungureanu also wondered whether the UN Mission in Kosovo
(UNMIK) would consider issuing a statement rejecting any
comparisons between Kosovo and other frozen conflicts such as
Transnistria.


6. (C) Regarding Ukraine, Ungureanu said he believed FM
Tarasyuk was uneasy in his position. He felt he would
however "take the challenge" and continue in his position,
with the unfortunate result that he would be called upon to
"whitewash" abroad the new government's actions. Ungureanu
agreed that it was critical to keep Ukraine on track in its
actions regarding Transnistria. Ungureanu was skeptical
regarding Transnistria Supreme Soviet chairman Shevchuk, whom
he believed could be tied to former Ukrainian national
security and defense council head Poroshenko. Regarding the
changes within Ukraine, Ungureanu concluded that he "wasn't a
false prophet in Sofia" when he was wary of Ukraine's
readiness to join NATO.

Engaging the Two Palaces
--------------


7. (C) PM Chief of Staff Mihnea Constantinescu underscored
Romania's continued interest in developments in Moldova,
noting that Romania wanted a basic bilateral agreement to
underscore the countries' commitment to European values and
identity, and to a common European space. (Note: referring
obliquely to President Basescu's recent statements on
unifying with Moldova, he added that he wanted to "dispel the
myth" that the objective was to seek Moldovan acknowledgement
of a common "Romanian" space.) He acknowledged that these
talks were complicated by matters of choreography, language,
form, and titles. While an empty "Soviet-style" friendship
treaty made no sense, the Romanian objective was to clearly
enunciate a common European vocation for Moldova and to focus
on concrete matters including transportation corridors to be
financed by the EU, customs, and joint initiatives to combat
organized crime. He said other Romanian initiatives
currently underway were consistent with this approach,
including moves to include Moldova as part of the Southeast
European Cooperation process and in a Central European FTA
(with Romania, Croatia, and Bulgaria.). Foreign Policy
counselor Calin Fabian said that the Moldovan preference was
for concrete, pragmatic issues including improvements in
transportation, gas, and petroleum infrastructure. For
example, they were interested in modifying their rail network
to meet EU standards. While the political picture in
Moldova complicated the way ahead, Fabian stressed,
growing economic relations and bilateral trade could provide
a useful lever.


8. (C) Constantinescu said that he "totally agreed" with the
approach Kramer outlined to confronting the validity of the
Transnistrian referendum. The issue would be a litmus test
of the weight of the United States and the EU in Moldova, he
went on, and might result in convincing Chisinau that relying
on the support of the West could bring better results than a
policy of just "being stubborn" or by seeking favors from
Moscow. Constantinescu said he was pleased that longtime
Romanian warnings about the significance of Transnistria as a
"black hole" of criminality and lawlessness were being
heeded, but also added that the weakness of the Romanian
position was that it was seen by many in terms of
black-and-white stereotypes. He said that the Romanian
interest now was to be as persuasive as possible within the
European Union, noting that that it could be a good platform
for EU cooperation with the United States.


9. (C) DAS Kramer also met with the Romanian President's
Political Advisor Claudiu Saftoiu, Foreign Affairs Advisor
Anca Ilinoiu, and Deputy National Security Counselor
Constantin Degeratu. Ilinoiu said Moldova remained a
priority of President Basescu's foreign policy agenda, and
expressed appreciation for DAS Kramer's trip. She bemoaned
the fact that the international community appeared to be
reacting to events in Transnistria rather than taking a
proactive approach to frozen conflicts in general. While
confirming that Romania would not recognize the referendum,
she urged DAS Kramer to "minimize" the significance of the
event itself. She also cited the need to link events in
Transnistria with the lack of democratic institutions in

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Chisinau. General Degeratu said that while Transnistria was
not a military threat, one nevertheless needed to remember
that there was a Soviet-style army there, with structures
staffed by senior officials on the Russian payroll. (note:
Degeratu likened the Russian presence in Transnistria to that
of the Republika Serpska officials on Milosevic's payroll in
the former Yugoslavia.) Saftoiu echoed Ilinoiu's call for
"minimizing" the importance of the referendum, citing
Voronin's unpredictable behavior and the history of difficult
bilateral relations between Romania and Moldova. He
concluded, however, that "you can count on our commitment" on
this issue. As he did in other meetings, Kramer pushed
strongly for Romania to take a firm, unambiguous position on
the referendum. He also gently chided Saftoiu and Ilinoiu on
President Basescu,s recent "unhelpful" comments on
unification with Moldova.


10. (C) Comment: The presidential counselors, especially
Ilinoiu, appeared eager to be heard on the subject of
Transnistria, but their points at first were not entirely in
synch with the Foreign Ministry and Prime Minister's office.
Saftoiu subsequently told Polcouns that he had wanted to
express Romanian concern about putting too much pressure on a
prickly Russia, but that Romania would nevertheless stand
beside the U.S. position. National Security Advisor Medar
told us privately on the margins of the V-10 defense
officials conference the next day that he would announce in
Chisinau over the weekend that Romania would not/not
recognize the legitimacy of the Transnistrian referendum.
End comment.
Taubman