Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BUCHAREST1126
2006-07-13 15:37:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bucharest
Cable title:  

NEW MOD STATE SECRETARY'S MODEST VISION FOR

Tags:  PGOV PREL SOCI ECON MOPS MARR NATO RO 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO7951
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHBM #1126/01 1941537
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 131537Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4809
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BUCHAREST 001126 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/NCE - WSILKWORTH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/13/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL SOCI ECON MOPS MARR NATO RO
SUBJECT: NEW MOD STATE SECRETARY'S MODEST VISION FOR
ROMANIA'S ARMED FORCES

REF: BUCHAREST 1093 (AND PREVIOUS)

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Mark Taplin
for Reasons 1.4 (a) (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BUCHAREST 001126

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/NCE - WSILKWORTH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/13/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL SOCI ECON MOPS MARR NATO RO
SUBJECT: NEW MOD STATE SECRETARY'S MODEST VISION FOR
ROMANIA'S ARMED FORCES

REF: BUCHAREST 1093 (AND PREVIOUS)

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Mark Taplin
for Reasons 1.4 (a) (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary. During a July 11 meeting, the newly
appointed MOD State Secretary, Corneliu Dobrotoiu reaffirmed
the "centrality" of the U.S.-Romania strategic relationship
but insisted that budgetary limitations would force Romania
to reexamine its defense commitments. He singled out
overseas deployments, the total number of MOD personnel and
overall defense spending as among the areas that might be
subject to reductions. According to Dobrotoiu, the GOR will
"approach" NATO to discuss its contributions to the Alliance,
since Romania is in a "critical situation" financially. The
DCM stressed the importance of keeping the U.S.-Romanian
strategic dialogue separate from spontaneous political
impulses. However, the worsening feud between President
Traian Basescu and Prime Minister Calin Popescu-Tariceanu --
aggravated by the PM's recent surprise call for an Iraq troop
withdrawal (Ref) -- could spill over into other aspects of
our strategic dialogue. End Summary.

Under the Volcano?
--------------

2. (C) State Secretary for Defense Policy Major General
(retired) Corneliu Dobrotoiu, whose first day on the job
coincided with Prime Minister Calin Popescu-Tariceanu's and
Defense Minister Teodor Atanasiu's June 29 unexpected call
for a withdrawal of Romanian troops from Iraq (Ref),invited
the DCM to meeting at the MOD July 11 to discuss "our most
important bilateral relationship -- the U.S.-Romanian
relationship." Dobrotoiu acknowledged that the PM/DefMin's
Iraq withdrawal call had provoked a "volcanic response" both
within Romania and internationally. Dobrotoiu asserted that
the PM/DefMin had raised the possibility of a withdrawal

because of "the increased maturity of Iraqi forces" and
"principally because of problems with funding." Pausing,
Dobrotoiu acknowledged that "in a normal situation we should
have approached the topic (of Iraq withdrawal) informally"
but the "domestic political dialogue has been fractured for
some time."


3. (C) Dobrotoiu averred that Romania was in "a critical
situation" financially and he insisted that "funding issues
were what raised the issue (of withdrawal from Iraq) in the
first place." He expressed concern that "if the defense
budget flattens we will face critical shortages as a NATO
ally," since, he continued, costs regarding international
deployments would increase. He further asserted that costs
related to the impact of the nationwide "flood crisis" over
the past year as well as unspecified pressures from the
Finance Ministry would force the MOD to reevaluate its NATO
commitments. Specifically, Dobrotoiu continued, "I am not
sure how long the government can allocate money for our
overly ambitious needs...the government will not approve our
request for a defense budget in 2007 equal to 2.38 percent of
the GDP (in line with Romania's NATO commitment)." Indeed,
he continued, the defense budget "could fall to 1.9 percent
next year" and to about 1.2 percent of GDP over the next
several years. Further, "it's worth pointing out that we
must evaluate the pros and cons of maintaining a peacetime
strength of 90,000" both uniformed and civilian MOD
personnel. In discussions within the GOR, "the overall size
of the peacetime force will be on the table." (Note: The MOD
has planned for some time to downsize its peacetime uniformed
and civilian personnel, and reduction of the armed forces,
especially the army, has been continuously underway as part
of a broader military reform effort. End Note.)

Overseas Ops: How Much is Enough?
--------------

4. (C) Dobrotoiu reported that a discussion is underway
within the MOD regarding "how much international deployment
is enough" for Romania. According to Dobrotoiu, "we
recognize that the military is a tool for promoting the
national interest, but increasing operational readiness is
key." He suggested that "too many" overseas deployments
actually reduce operational readiness since "we must build
capabilities here -- deployments alone won't do that."
Romania, he continued, should not be an all-purpose "knight
in shining armor" but should "improve the quality" of its
armed forces. Alluding for a second time in the meeting to
Romania's "over ambitious commitments," he asserted that "we
need to find a way out...and we will get back to NATO."
(Comment: Notwithstanding the State Secretary's observations,
senior Romanian officers have repeatedly stressed to Army

BUCHAREST 00001126 002 OF 002


Attache and other Embassy officers that overseas deployments,
including to Iraq and Afghanistan, have enhanced the armed
force's readiness and overall capabilities. End Comment.)


5. (C) Dobrotoiu admitted that discussions regarding defense
spending would be subject to domestic political concerns,
noting that the "entire subject" of determining defense
budgets has become "entirely politicized". He stated "we've
briefed the President on what we want for the defense
budget...the President is fully aware and we count on his
support." As the DCM exited the MOD, Dobrotoiu vowed, out of
earshot of the advisers who had accompanied him to the
meeting, that "we will fight" to maintain adequate levels of
defense spending. He also acknowledged that the withdrawal
announcement had been poorly managed and that the Ministry
remained deeply divided over the issue. He expressed thanks
for the DCM's offer to help underscore the importance of
Romania's honoring its defense commitments, including its
defense spending pledges to NATO.


6. (C) Dobrotoiu stated that "a core priority will be to
improve dialogue" within the MOD since "we need to reassess
the level of democratic civilian control of the military."
Without offering details, he asserted that "we should leave
the military estate out of the political details." In a
slightly worrisome juxtaposition, he added that he was
determined to root out corruption in military circles.
Dobrotoiu's reference was almost certainly an allusion, at
least in part, to CHOD Eugen Badalan's public expressions of
dissent last year from the GOR's proposed defense budget,
along with his recent vote in the CSAT against the Defense
Minister's call for an Iraq troop withdrawal. (Ref)
Privately, other senior uniformed personnel have expressed
their disappointment with the MOD's civilian leadership,
especially the lackluster, highly partisan DefMin, a longtime
National Liberal Party (PNL) funder and crony of the PM.


7. (C) Comment. In response to Dobrotoiu's attempts to link
the PM/DefMin's Iraq withdrawal announcement after the fact
to "higher costs," "pressure from the Ministry of Finance,"
and "flooding," the DCM noted that these issues were not new
and, in any event, did not justify a unilateral call without
consultation with allies for an Iraq pullout. Our continuing
assessment, he said, was that the decision to call for an
Iraq withdrawal was made for domestic political reasons. The
DCM underscored that such spontaneous "political impulses"
should remain separate from our close and productive dialogue
on defense and security issues. At one point in the meeting,
Dobrotoiu admitted, in passing, that the DefMin had "not
expected" the reaction to the announcement. Indeed,
Dobrotoiu's request for a meeting with the DCM was almost
certainly an attempt to mend fences in the wake of the
PM/DefMin's Iraq announcement. Dobrotoiu had also met
several days earlier with the ODC chief, during which he
underscored the GOR's financial woes while insisting on the
solidity of the fundamental U.S.-Romania strategic
relationship. While we agree that our relationship remains
robust -- and that Dobrotoiu, as number two in the MOD, will
likely be an accessible interlocutor -- he remains under the
thumb of the DefMin, who is in turn solidly allied with PM
Tariceanu. The PM's running feud with the staunchly
pro-American Basescu has now spilled over, in dramatic
fashion, into the defense, security and foreign policy
fields. In the months ahead, that will continue to color our
interaction with Bucharest -- and particularly with the Prime
Minister and the Ministry of Defense. End Comment.


8. (U) Amembassy Bucharest's reporting telegrams are
available on
the Bucharest SIPRNet website:
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/bucharest
TAUBMAN