SUPREME DEFENSE COUNCIL NIXES PRIME MINISTER'S

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BUCHAREST 001072

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/NCE - WILLIAM SILKWORTH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS MARR NATO AF IZ RO
SUBJECT: SUPREME DEFENSE COUNCIL NIXES PRIME MINISTER'S
CALL TO WITHDRAW ROMANIAN TROOPS FROM IRAQ

REF: BUCHAREST 1058

Classified By: DCM Mark Taplin for Reasons 1.4(a),(b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary. Romania's Supreme Council for National
Defense (CSAT) flatly rejected June 30 the unexpected call by
Prime Minister Calin Popescu Tariceanu and Defense Minister
Teodor Atanasiu for a Romanian troop pullout from Iraq. (Ref)
Announcing the CSAT's decision, President Basescu rebuked
Tariceanu, Atanasiu and other members of the National Liberal
Party (PNL) for undermining Romania's international
credibility. Basescu reaffirmed Romania's strong strategic
relationship with the United States as well as its links to
the EU. Following the CSAT decision, the PM reaffirmed his
call for a troop withdrawal, asserting that Romania had
completed its mission in Iraq. Leaders of the opposition
center-left Social Democratic Party (PSD),however,
criticized the PM and his supporters for an "unprofessional"
approach to foreign policy. Foreign Minister Ungureanu, who
has lined up against the Prime Minister despite their common
party affiliation, told the Ambassador that the Prime
Minister's political gambit was entirely improvised, and that
he and his Defense Minister did not expect the harsh reaction
to which they have been subjected. End Summary.

Basescu Blasts PM - CSAT Rejects Iraq Withdrawal Bid
-------------- --------------

2. (C) A subdued but confident Basescu appeared live on
national TV on June 30 to announce that the Supreme Council
for National Defense (CSAT) had rejected by a 9 to 2 vote the
previous day's call by Prime Minister Calin Popescu Tariceanu
and Defense Minister Teodor Atanasiu for a withdrawal of
Romania's troops from Iraq. Acknowledging that Romania was
discussing with its coalition partners "reconfiguring"
Romania's troop presence in Iraq, Basescu made it clear that
the CSAT had flatly rejected the call for a withdrawal. (He
was referring to London discussions among U.K., Italian and
Australian representatives on June 23 in which Romania had
indicated it would "reconfigure" its troops in Iraq
participating in coalition activities from 784 to 628
personnel.) Basescu also acknowledged that a public debate
was necessary regarding Romania's role in Iraq, but the
solution was "not to flee" from peacekeeping and stability
operations. "Romania must demonstrate seriousness and
stability in its international relations," Basescu continued
and "must not base foreign policy on emotion...nor change its
policy overnight." Basescu chided the PM for a "lack of
coherence in foreign and military policies" and for failing
to consult with him, other members of the GOR and coalition
partners. He also criticized the PM and DefMin for failing
to present an "analysis" to the CSAT explaining the basis and
potential consequences of their recommendation for a
withdrawal.


3. (C) Basescu singled out for criticism National Liberal
Party (PNL) Tariceanu loyalist and Chamber of Deputies
President Bogdan Olteanu who in televised remarks earlier in
the day had tried to justify his mentor's call for a
withdrawal from Iraq to the ostensible opposition of the EU
to the war in Iraq. Basescu reaffirmed the centrality of the
U.S.-Romanian strategic relationship, noting that Romania
needs "strong relations" with both the United States and
Europe and the "EU and the U.S. need each other." He
stressed that, despite initial criticism from some EU states
of Romania's engagement in Iraq, most European states now
accept Romania's position. He faulted Olteanu for
demonstrating a "lack of understanding" and undermining
Romanian credibility.


4. (C) Basescu's June 30 statements following the CSAT
meeting were presaged in a June 29 nationally televised
interview in which a visibly angry Romanian president accused
the PM of undermining Romania's national security interests
and seeking to destroy Romania's good relations with the U.S.
and UK. He noted that the U.S., and NATO, guaranteed
Romania's national security. Basescu added that he
"reproaches" himself for appointing Tariceanu PM, whom he
accused of failing to carry out needed reforms of government
institutions.

FM Ungureanu: Stunned By PM's "Off-the-Cuff" Initiative
-------------- --------------

5. (C) Foreign Minister Mihai-Razvan Ungureanu told the
Ambassador on June 30 that Basescu conducted today's CSAT
meeting in an "impeccable, calm, tactful and mature fashion."
According to the FM, DefMin Atanasiu attempted to present a
"memorandum" in support of a troop withdrawal from Iraq.

BUCHAREST 00001072 002 OF 004


Instead, Basescu insisted that Atanasiu submit a "defense
capabilities report," which Romanian law requires the Defense
Minister to present each year to the CSAT by June 30. The
meeting was adjourned, for about one hour, to allow Atanasiu
time to retrieve the report from his office at the Defense
Ministry. (It was duly approved by the CSAT, but both
Basescu and the Romanian media took note of the Defense
Minister's lack of preparation.)


6. (C) Per Ungureanu, the PM presented a "political
justification" for his proposed withdrawal, asserting that a
continued Romanian troop presence unnecessarily risked
Romanian lives and was too costly. Tariceanu also argued
"other European countries have withdrawn from Iraq and lost
nothing thereby." Basescu retorted that the question of
Romanian deployments was a matter "for analysis, not
politics, and requires a military assessment." All CSAT
participants, except the heads of the internal and external
intelligence services, offered their views during the
meeting. The FM said he argued the PM/DefMin proposal had
been improperly launched in the public arena without
appropriate consultation. In a break with the CSAT tradition
of consensus-based decision-making, Basescu called for a
"symbolic vote" on the issue of whether Romania should
withdraw troops from Iraq. Only the PM and DefMin voted in
favor of withdrawal. Ungureanu told the Ambassador, without
elaborating, that in the course of the CSAT meeting the PM
appeared very uncomfortable and "became aware of his
mistake", but Ungureanu predicted that the PM would not
publicly admit his error.


7. (C) Ungureanu also confirmed other reports that many PNL
party leaders were "taken by surprise" and "shocked" by the
PM's June 29 announcement. Even many within the PM's
entourage "did not know what happened," Ungureanu related.
He said he himself was "stunned" and confided to the
Ambassador that he was still considering resignation as FM if
Tariceanu did not backtrack. Ungureanu said the PM met with
senior party leaders, including the FM and fellow CSAT
member, Finance Minister Sebastian Vladescu, prior to the
meeting. The FM insisted that the PNL's senior leadership,
except for the DefMin, expressed their opposition to the PM's
call for a withdrawal. Ungureanu opined that the PM's June
29 announcement was the product of a last minute, "off the
cuff" decision; both the PM and DefMin "did not anticipate"
the resulting brouhaha.


PM, Defense Minister Stick to Their Guns
--------------

8. (C) In a televised press conference from PNL headquarters
a few hours after the CSAT decision, Tariceanu reaffirmed his
call for a troop withdrawal, asserting that the time was ripe
for a withdrawal as "our mission in Iraq draws to a close."
With the DefMin seated to his right, Tariceanu complained
that the CSAT decision had attempted to "close the debate" on
Romania's Iraq deployment. He characterized this a "mistake"
and called for a referendum on Romania's overseas military
presence, including in Iraq. The PM defended his decision
not to consult with other GOR officials, averring that
"certain steps" needed to be taken. In what was likely a
veiled threat aimed at dissident PNL members, Tariceanu said
future PNL meetings would examine the "problem" of party
members who had opposed the proposal to withdraw. (Note.
This was probably a reference to, inter alia, Foreign
Minister Mihai-Razvan Ungureanu and Finance Minister
Sebastian Vladescu, both PNL and CSAT members, who opposed
the call to withdraw. End Note.)

The Liberal Reaction
--------------

9. (C) The Prime Minister's PNL loyalists trotted out various
explanations for the PM's actions, some of which were more
plausible than others. Chamber of Deputies President Bogdan
Olteanu, a close confidante of Tariceanu and the most senior
PNL official aside from the PM himself, was the most active
public voice calling for a Romanian withdrawal from Iraq,
which he linked to Romania's EU commitments. In a June 30
meeting with Olteanu, PolChief expressed dismay that neither
the GOR nor the PNL -- with which the Embassy has maintained
a regular dialogue -- had consulted with the U.S. or other
partners prior to the call for an Iraq withdrawal. It was
particularly surprising in light of the PM and DefMin's
repeated assurances that Romanian troops would remain in Iraq
as long as they were needed and that no changes would be made
without prior consultation. Even European diplomats without
troops in Iraq had called the Embassy to express concern

BUCHAREST 00001072 003 OF 004


about Romania's reliability as a partner.


10. (C) Olteanu acknowledged that that the PM and DefMin's
proposal had similarly taken many in his party off-guard, but
that the PNL leadership had made the decision in light of
public opposition to and concern for the high cost of the
troop presence in Iraq. Olteanu apologized for any
"misunderstanding" by the U.S. or others with regard to
Romanian intentions, which he claimed were not intended to
bring into question Romania's commitment as a NATO ally or
strategic partner in other areas. At the same time, he
admitted that the proposal was based "just as much on
domestic politics" as it was on the PNL's views about
military spending priorities. He insisted that the PNL had
learned Basescu was himself on the brink of announcing a
drawdown of Romanian troops in Iraq, and that Tariceanu
sought to "steal the wind" from the president on the issue.
He also asserted that the PM believed that the U.S. had come
to "overly focus" on the staunchly pro-American president.
He lamented that the U.S. dialogue with the PM was "thin" and
had overly emphasized negative aspects of our bilateral
relationship. This, he stressed, had also been part of the
PM's calculations in launching his proposal for a Romanian
withdrawal from Iraq. highlight. At the same time, Olteanu
said he would seek to keep the debate over Romania's
contribution in Iraq did not lapse into broader anti-American
rhetoric. He said he would also work to keep the issue from
impacting other areas in our bilateral relationship.


11. (C) Other PNL officials were more forthcoming in
admitting that the PM had made a mistake in not consulting
more widely, including with U.S. and U.K. officials. Still,
PNL Deputy and party youth leader Cristian Adomnitei insisted
to PolMilOff that a "public discussion" about Iraq was
necessary, and Tariceanu had launched that discussion.
PolMilOff countered that the PM and DefMin had, in fact,
launched not a discussion but a surprise attack on both their
political rival Basescu and Romania's long-standing,
bipartisan policy of Euro-Atlantic engagement.

Opposition Rejects "Frivolous," "Unprofessional" Approach
-------------- --------------

12. (C) Senate Foreign Relations Committee President and
President of the center-left opposition Social Democratic
Party (PSD) Mircea Geoana told the Ambassador June 30 that he
was "outraged" by the PM's and DefMin's "frivolous
orchestration" of the call to withdraw from Iraq. Noting
that DefMin Atanasiu failed to disclose the withdrawal plan
to both the President and parliamentary leaders, Geoana
stated that PSD would call for his resignation. He observed
that strategic decisions needed to be handled
"institutionally" and transparently, not through political
showmanship. Geoana predicted, however, that the PM would
not back down on his political gamble but would continue to
call for a complete withdrawal from Iraq based on the
financial and human cost to Romania of a continued
deployment.


13. (C) Senate Defense Committee President and senior PSD
member George Cristian Maior likewise emphasized that it was
imperative for Romania to have "a predictable international
policy." Alluding to his own tenure as MOD State Secretary
under the previous PSD-led government, Maior continued that
"we worked very hard" to establish a strong security
relationship with the U.S. and it was "unprofessional" and
"contrary to the spirit of our alliance" for the PM and
DefMin to announce support for withdrawal from Iraq without
first speaking with the USG, HMG and other coalition
partners. He predicted that the CSAT would maintain
Romania's troop presence in Iraq and the current flurry of
media attention would pass "within three days."


14. (C) Comment. Although polling indicates that many
Romanians oppose a troop presence in Iraq, public opposition
to Romania's engagement has been muted. Support for the
strategic partnership with the U.S., on the other hand,
remains strong across the political spectrum and has been the
centerpiece of Romania's foreign policy under the last three
presidential administrations. Ironically, the PNL has in
fact long been a strong proponent of U.S.-Romanian
strategic links. Consequently, many even in the PNL were
taken aback by Tariceanu's unexpected move. A number of PNL
insiders have suggested to us privately that Tariceanu's
position against a Romanian troop presence in Iraq reflects
less a policy conviction than a poorly calculated attempt to
gain the upper hand in his ongoing political feud with
Basescu. We have heard, as well, about the Prime Minister's

BUCHAREST 00001072 004 OF 004


resentment over the close engagement Washington has with his
rival Basescu. The fact that Basescu will travel to
Washington in July for a second official visit, while the
Prime Minister has not yet earned a trip, also grates.
Tariceanu's failure to consult in advance on this proposal,
even with his closest advisors, lends credence to Ungureanu's
assertion that the PNL President made up his mind at the last
minute, and with little consideration of the long-term
consequences of his statement. It is possible that this
latest political stumble by the Prime Minister could prove to
be fatal, although he has displayed surprising staying power
until now. While we can feel some measure of satisfaction at
Basescu's political strength and his skillful handling of
this unexpected challenge from the Prime Minister and his
Defense Minister ally, the episode has brought the question
of Romania's continued military presence in Iraq to the front
burner of public debate.
TAUBMAN