Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BRUSSELS891
2006-03-15 08:21:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Brussels
Cable title:  

EUR DAS BRYZA DISCUSSES TURKEY AND CYPRUS WITH EU

Tags:  PGOV PREL CY TU GR USEU BRUSSELS 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 000891 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL CY TU GR USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: EUR DAS BRYZA DISCUSSES TURKEY AND CYPRUS WITH EU
OFFICIALS


Classified By: USEU POLCOUNS LEE LITZENBERGER; REASONS 1.4 (B,D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 000891

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL CY TU GR USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: EUR DAS BRYZA DISCUSSES TURKEY AND CYPRUS WITH EU
OFFICIALS


Classified By: USEU POLCOUNS LEE LITZENBERGER; REASONS 1.4 (B,D)


1. (C) Summary: EUR DAS Matt Bryza discussed Turkey's
accession talks and Cyprus with EU Council Head of Unit for
Enlargement Christos Katharios and Enlargement Unit Principal
Adminstrator David Johns on
February 23. Katharios stressed his full commitment to
implementing the European Council,s decision to proceed with
Turkey,s EU accession process. He stressed the need for
Turkey to reforms that had been stalled for much of the past
year. On Cyprus, Katharios agreed to examine options for
opening Famagusta port, perhaps in conjunction with return of
Varosha to the ROC, as a way to help Turkey implement its
obligation to open Turkish ports to Greek Cypriot shipping.
End summary.

Turkey
--------------


2. (C) EU Council Head of Unit for Enlargement Katharios
presented his view of how Turkish accession talks are
proceeding and how the US and the EU can cooperate in this
area. His main goal as Head of Unit, he said at the outset,
is to make irreversible the European Council decision to
proceed with Turkey,s EU accession process. He worried that
the longer Turkey,s reforms remain stalled, as they had been
for the past year, the deeper the disconnect will get between
the EU and Turkey.


3. (C) Katharios said Turkish politics was increasingly split
between political Islam and
Kemalism The EU is trying to convince Kemalists to promote a
better image of Turkey in the international community - which
has been dented after recent trials in Ankara on insulting
"Turkishness" - and trying to find a 'modus vivendi' for
political Islam. Turkey will have to convince European
publics that it shares European values. Katharios asked for
US help in trying to send a strong message to the Turkish
government on the need for improved treatment of its
Christian minority population.


4. (C) David Johns, Katharios' deputy, cited the challenge of
the Turkish negotiating 'mindset.' The US and the EU should
try to convince the Turkish establishment to "give, give,
give" in the beginning of
accession talks and then, in the end, Turkey will get
something big out of the negotiations -- EU membership. The
Turks, on the other hand, have a different attitude toward
negotiation. They think they have to get something
substantial out of every round of negotiations they have;
they should realize they are not losing face by not getting
something out of every negotiation. Turkey cannot let the
small irritants get in the way of the bigger picture - EU
accession. Turkey would need to recognize the Republic of
Cyprus and implement its obligations to open its ports to
Greek Cypriot ships.


5. (C) DAS Bryza recognized that these frustrations stem from
Turkey,s simultaneously feeling strategically indispensable
and insecure in its place in Europe. He expressed hope that
as Turkey felt increasingly secure about its place in Europe,
it would become less obstinate in accession negotiations. In
any event, pressing Turkey to recognize the Republic of
Cyprus and open its ports with no corresponding benefits for
Turkish Cypriots risked driving Turkey away from the EU
accession process. Such steps could also jeopardize a
comprehensive Cyprus settlement by forcing Ankara to play its
last two cards prematurely, thereby allowing the Republic of
Cyprus to dig in its heels even deeper, as it operates from a
position of strength within the EU.

Cyprus
--------------


6. (C) Katharios acknowledged that the Republic of Cyprus has
been obstructionist with respect to Turkey,s EU accession.
He agreed with DAS Bryza that the U.S. and EU should build on
Ankara,s recent proposal to open Turkish ports to Greek
Cypriot ships in exchange for lifting all restrictions on
Turkish Cypriot ports. Katharios further agreed that one way
to do so would be to take another look at the
"Famagusta/Varosha" proposal of Luxembourg,s EU Presidency,
according to which Famagusta port would be open for commerce
with Turkish Cypriots under the administration of the UN (for
security) and EU (for customs, documentation, etc),while the
village of Varosha would be returned to Greek Cypriot
administration. Katharios and Bryza agreed that neither
Turkey, Turkish Cypriots, nor Greek Cypriots would accept
this proposal as it currently stood, but that it might prove
workable with some adjustments. Katharios was encouraged by
the initiative of the Austrian Presidency (including from
Chancellor Schussel) to pass an aid package for northern
Cyprus on February 27 in the General Affairs Council of the
EU. All agreed that the UN should remain the primary actor
in brokering a comprehensive Cyprus settlement, although the
EU and U.S. could help the sides' breach their differences.


7. (U) DAS Bryza has cleared this cable.
Gray
.