EU CONSTITUTION AND ENLARGEMENT: PROSPECTS FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 000743

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2016
TAGS: PREL EAID EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: EU CONSTITUTION AND ENLARGEMENT: PROSPECTS FOR
THE FUTURE

Classified By: Political Officer Vincent Carver for reason 1.5 (b/d).



SUMMARY
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1. (C) Pundits and politicians have claimed that the EU
Constitution is everything from dead to simply waiting for
the European Council in June for resuscitation. Cries of a
"crisis" in the EU following the French and Dutch referenda
are overstated; the EU is functioning, even if it is not
meeting expectations of those seeking a stronger and more
unified Union. The EU may eventually decide to draft a
streamlined version, possibly along lines that French
Interior Minister Sarkozy has suggested, of the current text,
but such a decision probably will not come until at least
after the French national elections. A treaty on Croatian
accession, foreseen around 2009, may incorporate some of the
institutional reforms envisioned by the constitutional
treaty, but the EU must address its economic woes and
enlargement fatigue to help bolster such a treaty's
ratification chances. Several observers predict that the EU
will sponsor a new constitutional convention by the end of
the decade, but note that leaders will have to do a much
better job at "selling" a constitution -- and enlargement,
including to the Western Balkans and Turkey -- to skeptical
voters. END SUMMARY

CONSTITUTION: USEFUL DRAFT
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2. (C) Dutch FM Bot recently characterized the EU
constitution -- technically, it is a "treaty" on the
constitution of Europe -- as "dead." French Interior
Minister Sarkozy took a different track in mid-January,
calling for a slimmed down version focusing on how the EU at
25 could function better. Most of our contacts agree that
the Dutch and French governments will not resubmit the
current text to their voters for reconsideration. Several
sources, including Council Secretariat officials Guy Milton
and David Galloway (both of whom worked on the treaty draft),
have told us that the most likely scenario for a
"constitution" is for member states to agree on the need for
both a more streamlined text and a more active public
relations campaign to convince voters of the benefits a
constitutional treaty could bring. In this regard, several
of our contacts predicted that national parliaments and NGOs
would have a larger role in a future constitutional
convention than they had under Giscard d'Estaing's
convention. They also acknowledged the need to do a much
better job at "selling" the constitution in a public
relations campaign.

CURRENT "CRISIS?" NO, BUT ...
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3. (C) Various EU leaders have termed the constitutional
treaty's rejection by the French and the Dutch as a crisis.
From our view, this is an overstatement. The EU continues to
operate and take decisions, including on key foreign policy
issues that are priorities for the U.S., such as: the
Balkans, the MEPP, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Turkey and Croatia
were invited to begin accession negotiations in October 2005
and a financial framework for 2007-13 was agreed upon by the
25, albeit with much last-minute maneuvering; the framework
is still being negotiated with the European Parliament.
Would EU decision-making be more effective if the
constitutional treaty were to have been ratified? Probably,
as the constitutional treaty envisioned the creation of an EU
president (albeit one whose duties are vague) and foreign
minister, and provided for a rotating membership on the
Commission to accommodate further expansions of the EU. But
the EU -- a complex set of institutions combining the EU
bodies in Brussels (and elsewhere) and 25 national
governments is not operating in a crisis mode.

FIX ECONOMY; ADDRESS ENLARGEMENT FEARS
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4. (C) Almost all of our contacts polled, including
diplomats from the "new" member states, point to the
employment figures in the three EU countries -- the UK,
Ireland and Sweden -- that allowed free movement of labor
from the "new" member states with the 2004 accession to
discredit fears of the "Polish plumber" taking away jobs in
the old member states. Whether through the Lisbon Agenda
(the focus of the European Council March 23-24),Tony Blair's
call for investment in research and development, or through
individual policies adopted by member states, the EU must
increase economic growth and lower unemployment if it hopes
to avoid a repetition of the "no" votes in any subsequent
referendum on a constitutional treaty. It will also need a
climate of economic growth to help increase the ratification
chances of future enlargement. Barroso and his Commission
will have to push harder in these areas, however,
particularly given the current climate of defending
"national" verus "European" interests in strategic industries.


5. (C) Charles Grant, Director of the Center for European
Reform in London, has argued in a February 2006 presentation
that the demise of the constitutional treaty has created
major obstacles to further enlargement of the EU. Some of
Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn's staff have told us that
Rehn shares this view and therefore is increasingly
meticulous about demanding that candidate countries strictly
meet the acquis criteria. One cannot take for granted
support from all member states for continued enlargement,
they advise, especially if the Commission is viewed as
cutting corners to expedite any country's admission. One of
Rehn's advisors told us privately that the 2004 wave was
perhaps too large for the EU to absorb at one time, but the
momentum for uniting Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall
was strong enough to overcome any serious reservations. Now,
while Eurocrats seek to support the entry of the Western
Balkans and Turkey, common citizens -- and various
politicians -- are increasingly asking about the practical
effects of an enlarged EU.


6. (C) Rehn's public refrain on the value of enlargement in
the Western Balkans is simple: it is better for the EU to
export stability than to import instability. The accession
process for Macedonia, SaM, BiH, and Albania, however, likely
will be lengthy. Political leaders from those countries may
try to pressure the EU to reward them for "good political
behavior" with expedited accession, even if they fall short
of EU standards in other areas. They may also argue that
their populations are tiring of the reform process and need
the "lift" of membership to implement reforms.


7. (C) Rehn will resist such pressure. Given the current
climate, the Commission's turning a blind eye to acquis
requirements for political expediency would cause increased
public opposition to any such enlargement. The Commission
will also have to demonstrate clearly that Turkish accession
negotiations -- an unpopular issue in several member states
-- not only help reinforce reforms inside Turkey but also
strengthen a "Western" country whose population is
overwhelmingly Muslim. In the context of the current cartoon
controversy, Turkish accession negotiations may be seen in
both this positive light and, by xenophobic politicians and
their followers in member states, as yet another "problem"
imported by the EU.


8. (C) The June 2006 European Council in Vienna is slated to
debate the "future of Europe." Contacts at the UK and German
missions, as well as a Rehn staffer, have told us they hope
EU leaders will focus on Europe as a place of shared values
and will probably maintain the ambiguity of the Treaty of
Rome regarding enlargement -- it is open to all European
countries -- without defining exactly where Europe's borders
lie. Several of our contacts noted that, while consideration
of a Ukrainian candidacy is far off, member states would find
it difficult to argue against Ukrainian membership (once Kiev
implements serious economic and political reforms) while
continuing accession negotiations with Turkey.

WHY SHOULD WE EVEN CARE?
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9. (C) Other than presenting an interesting academic debate,
the future of the EU constitutional treaty is important to
the U.S. for four reasons: (1) continued debate over it will
consume some of the attention of European leaders over the
coming years, potentially diverting them from issues of
importance to us; (2) enlargement of the EU is treaty-based,
and the rejection of the constitution may "embolden" the
publics in various member states to demand greater say in
future enlargement decisions, complicating Turkish accession.
The French have amended their constitution to provide for a
referendum on any future enlargement (read Turkey) after
Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia join; (3) despite its critics,
EU enlargement has been a great success story and should be
extended to the Western Balkans, Turkey and possibly to other
areas of Europe to solidify economic, political and societal
reforms there; and (4) European integration and the single
market have energized economic growth; a strong Europe in a
rapidly changing global economy usually serves U.S.
interests.

TIMELINES
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10. (C) The current period of reflection over the
constitutional treaty, adopted following the failed
referenda, is due to end with the Austrian-led debate on the
future of Europe. Many of our contacts, however, do not see
real decisions being made on how to address the constitution
question until after the 2007 French national elections. At
that point, the German EU Presidency would be in its last
weeks, and it would be up to the Commission and the
Portuguese and Slovene presidencies to execute whatever plan
the German presidency might forge at the June 2007 European
Council. While the German Mission here is sticking to
Chancellor Merkel's line that Berlin supports the current
constitutional treaty text, many of our other contacts in the
Council, Commission, and member state missions here, doubt
that the text rejected by the French and the Dutch has much
hope for resuscitation.


11. (C) Parts of the constitution, particularly those
dealing with the creation of an EU foreign minister (and the
end of a commissioner for external relations) and diplomatic
service, could be attached to the treaty for Croatian
accession. All member states (presumably 27 at that time)
would have to ratify the Croatian accession treaty; most
member states likely would follow their practice of
ratification via national parliaments. Adding elements from
the constitutional treaty to the Croatian accession treaty
would be one way to introduce constitutional-type changes via
a "back door" approach. Such an approach, however, is not
risk-free, as the publics in member states could accuse their
governments and the Commission of ignoring the lessons of the
French and Dutch referenda. Much will depend on the economic
climate of Europe around 2009 and how well the proponents of
such an approach package the public relations campaign for
the Croatian accession treaty. Most of our contacts predict,
however, that a convention aimed at producing a slimmed down
version of the constitutional treaty, with participation by
more representatives of member state national parliaments and
civil society, will begin by the end of this decade.
GRAY
.