Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BRUSSELS731
2006-03-06 08:00:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Brussels
Cable title:  

EUR DAS BRYZA DISCUSSES CAUCASUS, CENTRAL ASIA,

Tags:  PGOV PREL GG AM AJ TX KZ TI KG USEU BRUSSELS 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRUSSELS 000731 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/CACEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL GG AM AJ TX KZ TI KG USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: EUR DAS BRYZA DISCUSSES CAUCASUS, CENTRAL ASIA,
AND ENERGY SECURITY WITH EU OFFICIALS

Classified By: USEU POLCOUNS LEE LITZENBERGER; REASONS 1.4 (B,D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRUSSELS 000731

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/CACEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL GG AM AJ TX KZ TI KG USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: EUR DAS BRYZA DISCUSSES CAUCASUS, CENTRAL ASIA,
AND ENERGY SECURITY WITH EU OFFICIALS

Classified By: USEU POLCOUNS LEE LITZENBERGER; REASONS 1.4 (B,D)


1. (C) Summary: In U.S.-EU COEST Troika consultations on
Caucasus and Central Asia on February 23, EUR DAS Matt Bryza
discussed with EU officials how to change the dynamic of
discussions on South Ossetia. Echoing an EU Presidency
statement on February 21, EU representatives agreed that the
international community should explore the idea of a new
forum besides the Joint Control Commission (JCC) to negotiate
a political settlement for South Ossetia. EU officials
acknowledged that Russian intransigence is
an impediment in negotiations but said that Georgian rhetoric
and behavior should also be moderated. EU Special
Representative (EUSR) for Caucasus Talvitie said that it is
also important to say that the JCC still has a function in
implementing previous agreements and in advancing Phases 1
and 2 of Georgia,s South Ossetia settlement plan:
de-militarization/confidence building measures; and economic
rehabilitation. All agreed that discussions on
Nagorno-Karabakh (N-K) should continue despite the missed
opportunities at the Feb.10-11 summit at Rambouillet. The
Austrian Presidency said it would like to help the cause of
Armenian/Turkish relations during its tenure. EUSR believes
that the South Caucasus has a European future and it would be
valuable to try to convince officials in Moscow of this. On
Central Asia, the Austrian Presidency said it will have a
series of events focused on Central Asia starting in April in
Astana. On Kazakhstan, the European Commission highlighted
three goals: 1) Support democratic
reforms; 2) Assist in WTO accession; 3) Engage on energy. On
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, EU has not been able to
effectively address its priorities of democratization and
poverty alleviation because of its limited representation.
However, all agreed that promotion of moderate Islam in
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan would be key to EU/US interests in

the region. There are no improvements in EU relations
with Uzbekistan. Regarding Turkmenistan, the EU pushed the
idea of having human rights consultations in Ashgabat and
promoting a constructive energy dialogue to promote European
energy security. End Summary.

Georgia-Russia-South Ossetia
--------------


2. (C) DAS Bryza acknowledged the Austrian EU Presidency,s
February 21 statement on South Ossetia, which noted that the
JCC should be judged according to the results it achieved,
and that the international community should look at other
avenues for negotiation. Bryza suggested that one
possibility could be a
forthcoming OSCE Donors' Conference for South Ossetia, which
would be attended by the EU and OSCE and member states from
these organizations, and which could build momentum towards a
new and potentially more successful negotiation process.
Commission staff expressed caution, and Talvitie, while
acknowledging
the JCC's limitations, stressed that it is important for us
to say that the JCC still has a function: implementing
previous agreements and in advancing Phases 1 and 2 of
Georgia,s South Ossetia settlement plan:
de-militarization/confidence building measures; and economic
rehabilitation.


3. (C) Talvitie urged a cautious approach on negotiations,
wondering whether we should first acknowledge Russia,s
preference to discuss de-militarization of South Ossetia
before moving on status discussions. Talvitie nevertheless
stressed it should be made clear to the Russians that we do
want to discuss status soon. DAS Bryza acknowledged this
reality but expressed concern that the Georgians need to see
soon that there is a "light at the end of the tunnel" before
they get discouraged and therefore emboldened. The Russians
need to understand that our leverage over the Georgians faces
real limits, and Georgians may resort to force if they feel
they lack support in the international community to press
Russia to cooperate in advancing a peaceful, negotiated
settlement. Thus, the status quo that Russia seems to seek
may not actually exist. DAS Bryza expressed appreciation at
the February 21 EU statement on South Ossetia noting we might
build on it to changeing the dynamic of negotiations over
the conflict. Bryza lamented that Russia had taken several
provocative steps in recent days with respect to the South
Ossetia conflict, including: walking back its agreement to
attend a JCC session in Vienna if the Georgian parliament
moderated its resolution calling for the withdrawal of
Russia,s peacekeeping operation, (which the Georgian
Parliament did in fact do); falsely dubbing a meeting in
Moscow with the Ossetians a JCC (even though Amb. Kenyaikin
assured Bryza this would be only an informal, preparatory
meeting for a later JCC),and then claiming Georgia and the
OSCE refused to attend the "JCC;" canceling Georgian Prime
Minister Noghaideli,s meeting with Russian PM Fradkov,
(which the Russians pledged to hold if the Georgian
Parliament moderated its resolution); and reportedly
conducting military over flights of Georgian territory. EU
interlocutors agreed such Russian behavior appeared designed
to be provocative, and recognized that the Georgian side had
indeed moderated its behavior in recent weeks, as requested
by Moscow.

Armenia/Azerbaijan
--------------


4. (C) Representing the incoming Finnish Presidency, Petteri
Vuoromaki urged the continued work of OSCE
co-chairs on N-K negotiations and believed that we needed to
"rein in" both parties because the rhetoric is getting too
aggressive. He expressed concern that Azerbaijan may soon
become bellicose on N-K as it begins to fortify its army from
its oil windfall. EUSR Talvitie conveyed that one high-level
Azeri official expressed to him the desire for additional
peace negotiations since the Rambouillet talks failed to make
any progress. The Austrian Presidency believed that we could
see a Russian effort "to deliver" a solution for N-K by this
summer's G-8 summit in order to portray itself as a
peacemaking nation while continuing to forestall negotiations
on South Ossetia.


5. (C) DAS Bryza said that Rambouillet was not a complete
failure, that Azerbaijani President Aliyev had made a
significant offer, that the ball was now in the Armenian
court, and that Moscow had a chance to deliver Yerevan. DAS
Bryza expressed hope that Turkey would agree to open its
border with Armenia should Armenia withdraw from territories
it currently occupies in Azerbaijan as part of a broader deal
on NK. The Austrian Presidency said that it is interested
in advancing Turkish/Armenian relations during its tenure and
would work to achieve this end.


6. (C) EUSR Talvitie said that we needed to approach
democratization of Armenia and Azerbaijan in an
"evolutionary" mindset. He welcomed the U.S. statement
following Azerbaijani elections in early November. He
believes transformation can happen there but that we will
have to be patient. In a humorous aside, EUSR said that when
he goes to Baku and Yerevan to speak to their respective
Parliaments, he gets standing ovations when he proclaims that
the "EU is for evolution, not for revolution!" However, he
receives a standing ovation in Tbilisi when he propounds in
Parliament that "the EU is for revolution, not for
evolution!" However, he believes that it is worthwhile to
convince a tough crowd in Europe that the South Caucasus has
a European identity and future; he thought this was common
ground for the EU and US to work together. Expressing
optimism about President Aliyev, Talvitie said that Aliyev
will need time to simultaneously shed the "dead-wood" from
his father's entourage while building his
own political base. The EC said it will be opening offices
in Azerbaijan in 2007.

Kazakhstan
--------------


7. (C) The Commission said its goals for Kazakhstan are
threefold: 1) Support democratic reforms; 2) Assist in WTO
accession; 3) Engage on energy. The EC believes that
market-driven energy climate in Kazakhstan is important and
it will work to achieve this; it supports the idea of
multiple sources of energy through multiple pipelines. DAS
Bryza said that Kazakhstan is emerging as the key partner in
the region and that the EU/US should work with Kazakhstan,s
new Deputy Prime Minister, Karim Masimov, to help him move
reforms forward. All agreed that Kazakhstan's bid for the
2009 OSCE Chairman-in-Office is problematic, but we should
not rule out future bids.

Tajikistan
--------------


8. (C) The Commission pointed out that Tajikistan is the most
important and biggest recipient of the Commission's aid in
Central Asia. However, given the EU's limited representation
in Dushanbe, efforts to channel this aid to effective use for
poverty alleviation are hamstrung. The EC expressed concern
about President Rahmonov's systematic repression of political
candidates and the Tajik Parliament's consideration of an NGO
law that would require continued re-registration of foreign
NGOs represented in
the country; the EC considers this proposal misguided and
would seriously impede their NGO operations.


9. (C) All parties agreed on the importance of helping
Tajikistan Bolster its traditions of tolerant faith and
scientific learning to counter foreign missionaries,
attempts to import extremist interpretations of Islam. DAS
Bryza conveyed that this is an important area for EU/US
cooperation and that together we can help remind Tajiks of
the importance of their indigenous history and their
deeply-held, moderate Islamic roots. The Austrian Presidency
believed that, together, the EU and US should convey to
Rahmonov that having a moderate Islamic political party in
his government is a positive sign. DAS Bryza concurred and
said that the USG has been trying to send this message but
Rahmonov's
mistrust of political opposition is hindering progress on
this front.

Kyrgyzstan
--------------


10. (C) EU officials expressed worry about Kyrgyzstan
trending "from bad to worse." Political discussions between
the EU and the Kyrgyz government have been disappointing,
Council officials said, and the economy is not only slowing,
but contracting. The Commission made reference to a
cooperation agreement that was signed on February 3 between
Turkish Cypriots and Kyrgyzstan; the EC believes that Moscow
might have encouraged this deal to be signed as a way to
drive a wedge between Brussels and
Bishkek. Further enshrouding this situation was when the EU
asked the Kyrgyz government for the substance of the
agreement, the Kyrgyz declined saying the agreement is
confidential. Furthermore, the EC thought it was odd that

SIPDIS
the Turkish Prime Minister recently received the Kyrgyz
Foreign Minister. DAS Bryza believed that the pull from
Moscow is strong right now in Bishkek (as it is in Dushanbe)
and therefore we have to work extra hard to advance
democratization in these two countries. We have a
real interest in seeing Kyrgyzstan succeed - therefore, we
have to promote democracy. Stability comes
legitimacy, which derives from democracy. EU officials
agreed with DAS Bryza that the GOK risked prompting a
resurgence of civil unrest if it failed to advance democratic
and constitutional reform and fight corruption. Civil
society (fortunately) remained vibrant in Kyrgyzstan, and
expected President Bakiyev to deliver on his promises to
provide justice and prosperity.

Uzbekistan/Turkmenistan
--------------


11. (C) The Austrian Presidency conveyed that there have been
no improvements in the EU's relationship with Tashkent.
There is little incentive for the EU to cooperate with
Uzbekistan as the Karimov government says it wants to be able
to choose which EU NGOs can operate in the country; if the EU
does not allow this, the Commission said, the government has
said it will make life extremely difficult
for NGOs there. Citing no improvement in US-Uzbek relations,
DAS Bryza said the U.S. aimed to sustain its current - albeit
modest - level of engagement with Uzbekistan. The U.S. had
made a conscious decision to criticize the GOU,s
indiscriminate use of force in Andijan, in full recognition
that this would likely cost us access to the air base at
Karshi Khanabad. Karimov was uncomfortable in the
position he is in right now being wholly dependent on Beijing
and Moscow. Perhaps he would come to his senses and realize
the only way to end the descending spiral of
repression-extremism-repression-extremism was to embrace
reform rather than repression. In the long run, the United
States and the people of Uzbekistan would hopefully be able
to work together to help the people of Uzbekistan embrace the
moderate traditions of Classical Islam that were born a
millennium ago in what is today Uzbekistan. This was perhaps
the most effective way to counter the extremist threat that
Hizb-U-Tahir poses to Uzbekistan.


12. (C) On Turkmenistan, DAS Bryza called on the EU/US to
explore whether a trans-Caspian gas pipeline might bolster
European energy security. DAS Bryza explained that Niyazov
was indicating interest in a Trans-Caspian Pipeline to
provide him some leverage in dealing with Gazprom, thereby
allowing him to negotiate a gas sales price that Gazprom
could no longer dictate and which was closer to prices in the
European market. The Austrian Presidency shared these
opinions but also pushed to have
human rights conversations with Turkmen officials in Ashgabat
(where, they said, a lot of government officials actually
show up for these meetings). DAS Bryza agreed, recounting
how he told President Niyazov in January that securing the
participation of U.S. companies and/or export finance
organizations like OPIC in a trans-Caspian pipeline would
require progress on democracy and human rights.

Energy Security
--------------


13. (C) DAS Bryza discussed the broader issue of European
energy security with EU officials. The U.S. sought to
enhance European energy security because the more secure
Europe is, the more secure the U.S. will be, and because U.S.
interests are served when markets function well. While we do
not want confrontation with Russia's gas monopoly Gazprom, we
share an interest with our European friends in Europe
diversifying Europe,s gas supplies away from Gazprom. We
could do so by relying on market mechanisms. Our goal is to
accelerate upstream investment by private companies in gas
production in Azerbaijan, Central Asia, and Iraq, which in
turn will provide Europe confidence that it can negotiate
more firmly with Gazprom on pricing without locking itself
into long-term deals that increase its dependence on a singly
supplier of gas. But convincing upstream producers to
accelerate their investments would require Europeans to
provide requisite regulatory reforms and pipeline
infrastructure to receive Central Asian gas. Turkmenistan
figures prominently in this strategy, since its gas reserves
are the largest currently in play for delivery to Europe via
either the Gazprom network or a new corridor running across
the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan, then through Georgia and
Turkey to Greece and Italy, and/or to Romania, Bulgaria,
Hungary, and Austria. As such a "Southern Corridor" emerges,
the large split between Central Asian and European gas prices
would gradually diminish, thereby eliminating the enormous
rents that fuel organized crime and lack of energy sector
reform along pipeline routes. Moreover, as Gazprom lost the
ability to force Central Asian countries to sell it cheap
gas, it would need to reform itself internally to attract
foreign investors required to develop gas fields in Russia.
This was the only way to channel Gazprom toward more
market-based and therefore, constructive behavior. EU
officials took on board this message. They agreed on the
need to eliminate the price differentials between gas bought
in Central Asia and Europe and agreed commercial competition
was the best and perhaps only way to channel Gazprom toward
reform rather than acquisition of European energy assets.
EUSR said that the EU will play an important role in
advancing energy security in its dialogue with Turkey. The
EU said a green paper on European energy security would be
forthcoming in the spring.


14. (U) DAS Bryza has cleared this cable.
McKinley
.