Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BRUSSELS509
2006-02-15 07:33:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Brussels
Cable title:  

EUROPEAN COUNCIL AFRICA TASK FORCE COMMITS TO

Tags:  PREL PGOV EAID XA EUN USEU BRUSSELS 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 000509 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV EAID XA EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: EUROPEAN COUNCIL AFRICA TASK FORCE COMMITS TO
FURTHER ENGAGEMENT IN DRC, SUDAN, CHAD, HORN OF AFRICA

Classified By: USEU POLMINCOUNS LEE LITZENBERGER
FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

(U) SUMMARY: Assistant Secretary of State for African
Affairs Jendayi Frazer met with European Council Africa Task
Force representatives on January 26 on a stop-over en route
to Washington. EU Africa Task Force Head Koen Vervaeke and EU
Africa specialist Jean-Christophe Belliard provided European
Council views and discussions ensued on recent developments
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC),Sudan, Chad,
Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia and Eritrea. This meeting was held
separately from a meeting on the same topics with European
Commission Development representatives. The latter is
covered septel. END SUMMARY.

-------------------------------------
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (DRC)
-------------------------------------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 000509

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV EAID XA EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: EUROPEAN COUNCIL AFRICA TASK FORCE COMMITS TO
FURTHER ENGAGEMENT IN DRC, SUDAN, CHAD, HORN OF AFRICA

Classified By: USEU POLMINCOUNS LEE LITZENBERGER
FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

(U) SUMMARY: Assistant Secretary of State for African
Affairs Jendayi Frazer met with European Council Africa Task
Force representatives on January 26 on a stop-over en route
to Washington. EU Africa Task Force Head Koen Vervaeke and EU
Africa specialist Jean-Christophe Belliard provided European
Council views and discussions ensued on recent developments
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC),Sudan, Chad,
Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia and Eritrea. This meeting was held
separately from a meeting on the same topics with European
Commission Development representatives. The latter is
covered septel. END SUMMARY.

--------------
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (DRC)
--------------


1. (C) Vervaeke initiated the discussion by noting the
European Union (EU) had received a letter from the UN,
requesting EU support for a flexible "rapid reaction" force
to assist, if needed, to ensure electoral stability in DRC.
Vervaeke indicated the UN request lacked specificity, but
that the EU would explore options. He stated the EU would
soon send a political/military fact-finding team to the DRC
in order to best assess possible EU support. The team
planned to travel only to Kinshasa and would meet with
representatives of the DRC. Vervaeke stated EU High
Representative Solana contacted DRC President Kabila in order
to apprise him of the planned assessment and to assure him of
EU intent to work cooperatively with the government.


2. (C) Vervaeke said that if there was no agreement on DRC's
electoral law by February -- when Parliament resumes -- it
would be difficult to hold timely elections. He added the
need for international pressure in order to maintain the pace
of the legislative and presidential elections, planned for
March and June, respectively. Vervake expressed concerns
about eastern Congo, including North Kivu and Kundu, and
recommended a close watch on developments. He assessed that
the post-election transition period -- whatever the election

outcome -- would necessitate a strong U.S. profile in the
Tripartite Plus One(DRC, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi) Process.


3. (C) Assistant Secretary (A/S) Frazer noted that Burundi
was planning to organize a conference, but timing was not
clear. She forecast that training the Congolese police force
would require a long-term strategy. Vervaeke noted that the
UN Organizing Mission in the DRC (MONUC) required assistance
and that it was critical that there be no interference from
the Tripartite countries in DRC elections -- but the need for
a gradual, phase out with specific benchmarks. Vervaeke
indicated he planned to soon travel to meet with UN
representatives in New York with the aim of identifying
specific political and military objectives of any EU-assisted
effort and that he would communicate to the U.S. his
assessment.

--------------
Sudan
--------------


4. (C) A/S Frazer mentioned the transition of the African
Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to a UN "blue hat" force and
suggested options during the interim (next 6 to 9 months)
period. She recommended that the UN begin addressing
re-tooling and consider NATO support in light of its past
support in providing airlifts for AMIS. Frazer noted France
is concerned about NATO "globalization" and asked the nature
of perceived institutional rivalry between the EU and NATO.


5. (C) Vervaeke and Belliard hinted that the Government of
Sudan (GOS) might use the use of NATO assets as a rallying
cry of sorts -- "if you want to bring the terrorists, bring
NATO." Vervaeke emphasized that AMIS must be consulted and
its sensitivities considered. It is clear, he said, that
Africa wants to maintain a presence. Vervaeke stated the EU
is committed to continued support in Sudan and that
complementary strategies should be explored.


6. (C) A/S Frazer expressed pessimism on the current state of
peace talks in Abuja as Sudanese political alliances are
quite fluid. Vervaeke noted HiRep Solana, in a recent
meeting with U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Zoellick,
advocated a U.S.-EU common approach in the Abuja Peace Talks.
He questioned what could be done to get the process moved
further along.


7. (C) Belliard offered that he was not optimistic the Abuja
Peace Talks would be successful due to political rivalries
within Sudan. He raised the issue of whether Chad's internal
situation complicated the Sudanese peace talks. Noting that
Chad cannot "fight the World Bank and Sudan" at the same
time, Belliard predicted negative implications for peace in
Sudan if Chadian President Idriss Deby should be severely
weakened or lose power. A/S Frazer questioned whether France
has the current capacity to place troops on the Chad-Sudan
border. Belliard responded that the U.S. should consider
directly approaching France on this issue.


8. (C) Vervaeke added that given Chad's role in transition to
peace in Sudan, something must be done to help with the
ceasefire arrangement.


9. (C) A/S Frazer strongly encouraged EU support for Sudanese
People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) training as it faces
fundamental challenges, including its leadership, in order to
build party structures. Funds for "quick impact" training to
build a sense of confidence within the SPLM could go far, she
assessed.
--------------
Cote d'Ivoire
--------------


10. (C) Vervaeke noted that EU HiRep Solana requested he
participate in the International Working Group (IWG) on Cote
d'Ivoire and expressed concern about recent events, which
forecast a "long, uphill battle." Vervaeke surmised the
events demonstrated the power struggle between Ivorian
President Gbagbo and Prime Minister Banny with the added
"nuisance capacity" of cocoa production. He noted the
difficulty for the Prime Minister to properly function in the
absence of media access/level of control. Vervaeke concluded
that without a climate of trust, peace would not occur. He
added that the IWG was under pressure to maintain a hard
line, consistent with the UNSC, and highlighted that
sanctions may be a necessary next step.


11. (C) Belliard indicated that one optimistic sign was the
fact that the overall Ivorian population appears fed up with
the political disruption and opined that less of the general
population is involved in disturbances in the country -- a
favorable sign. He wondered if South Africa could be more
helpful in resolving the crisis.


12. (C) In response to Frazer's question regarding Nigerian
President Obasanjo's role, Vervaeke responded that he was not
helpful given his position on the IWG. He noted possible
changes with new African Union (AU) leadership and the need
to take a closer look at Angola's interest in Cote d'Ivoire,
especially given Angolan support for Gbagbo. Vervaeke noted
the importance of having the next IWG meeting be a success
and believes European Commissioner Louis Michel may
personally participate.

-------------- --------------
Eritrea and Ethiopia: A Visit to the Disputed Border
-------------- --------------


13. (C) A/S Frazer recapped her recent visit to Ethiopia and
to the disputed border at Badme. She noted the situation as
difficult and commented that both Eritrea and Ethiopia must
be flexible. She added that perhaps an UNMEE observer
mission to facilitate demarcation is necessary and that the
Algiers witnesses should remain consistent in their approach
to a resolution. Frazer also recommended that UNSYG Annan be
consulted. Frazer indicated she hoped the Eritrea Ethiopia
Boundary Commission (EEBC) could convene in March. Belliard
responded that the report of Elections Observer Ana Gomes,
which was critical of the Ethiopian electoral process, would
not be "published soon."


--------------
Somalia
--------------


14. (C) Vervaeke indicated the EU will "step up" support for
the Aden Declaration for National Reconciliation, consummated
in Yemen weeks ago. Belliard added that Scandinavian
countries, Italy, and Germany were outspoken in support of
the declaration and that the AU had asked the EU to lift the
arms embargo on Somalia. Belliard indicated the EU was
assessing what technically could be done to help with a
security plan, which might include an integrated police
concept and security sector reform. Approximately 15 million
Euros could be made available to help with security sector
reform, although the details on specific allocation remain to
be discussed, according to Vervaeke. (COMMENT: Belliard
previously indicated to USEU that the EU had an interest in
moving more aggressively in committing political and
financial support to Somalia Prime Minister Gedi's efforts in
Jowhar, citing that the longer the international community
waits to become more involved, the greater the risk Somalia
will become a haven for Islamic extremism. See USEU Today
01-05-2006. END COMMENT.)
--------------
Comment
--------------


15. (C) Subsequent to the meeting with A/S Frazer, an EU
political/military assessment team departed Brussels on
January 29 for DRC in order to assess the UN request for EU
assistance to ensure stability in DRC during and after
elections. Results of that mission along with Vervaeke's
consultations with UN representatives in New York (planned
for February 2-5) will provide a basis for briefing EU member
states prior to an official EU response (see USEU Today
01-27-2006).


16. (U) Participants:
United States
--------------
Jendayi Frazer, Assistant Secretary of State for African
Affairs
Kendra Gaither, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary
Margaret B. Diop, USEU Political Officer

European Council
--------------
Koen Vervaeke, Head of Africa Task Force
Jean-Christophe Belliard, Africa Specialist


17. (U) Assistant Secretary Jendayi Frazer has cleared on
this cable.

GRAY

.