EUROPEAN COMMISION AND U.S. WORK TOWARD PROGRESS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRUSSELS 000508

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV EAID XA EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: EUROPEAN COMMISION AND U.S. WORK TOWARD PROGRESS
IN DRC, SUDAN, CHAD, HORN OF AFRICA

Classified By: USEU POLMINCOUNS EARLE D. LITZENBERGER
FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (U) SUMMARY: Assistant Secretary Jendayi Fraser met in
Brussels on January 26 with European Commission (EC) Director
General for DG Development Stefano Manservisi to discuss the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC),Sudan, Chad and the
Horn of Africa. Mutual perspectives and targeted assistance
were discussed with an eye toward moving the countries
towards peace and stability. END SUMMARY.

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DRC: Elections and Security - Trouble Ahead?
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1. (C) Manservisi emphasized the importance of upcoming
elections in the DRC and noted that EC Commission Louis
Michel was heavily engaged in working to support peaceful
elections. Manservisi stated that the planned June 30
Presidential elections will be a "benchmark of credibility8
for the entire elections and the people of the DRC. He,
nonetheless, predicted the electoral process would likely be
delayed. A/S Frazer expressed concern about the delays,
noting that elections could be flashpoints for violence and
questioned the legality of delays and the fact that elections
are routinely costly. She expressed a desire that elections
should all be held at the same time to minimize the
possibility for violence and presented Nigeria as a case
where, even given its large size, had the ability to conduct
three elections. When Liberia -- even though much smaller in
size -- is considered it again proves that point, she
asserted.


2. (C) Elections are important for state-building and failure
during the electoral process will be &disastrous8 for the
country, offered Manservisi. He said the elections would be
difficult to manage, but believed them to be the only way
toward progress. Manservisi highlighted the security
situation in the DRC and mentioned that dismantlement of the
military with its various factions prompted the creation of a
truly national army. He added that he personally discussed
the general security situation with General Juana, who
indicated the need for 12 to 14 brigades as a type of
&safety net8 for the elections. Manservisi cited the
massive displacement towards eastern DRC due to the number of
soldiers who would be demobilized and characterized that
scenario as quite fragile.


3. (C) In response to Manservisi's question regarding a
possible role for Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda (Tripartite Plus
group minus DRC) in the security/stabilization process, A/S
Frazer countered that an active role on their part is
undesirable and that it would not be helpful to have the
three countries remaining in DRC for any length of time. A/S
Frazer offered that perhaps communication of a general
message of restraint transmitted by the three throughout the
region would be a more productive role for the group.


4. (C) USEU Charg d,Affaires Michael McKinley questioned
whether DRC President Joseph Kabila had thought seriously
about the implications of the international community,s
approach to merging the elections. He cited the fact that
the DRC December 2005 elections demonstrated to most that
elections could be peaceful and completed on time. McKinley
opined that fewer &balloting opportunities8 offered the
best chance for a smooth, peaceful electoral process.
Manservisi noted the EC would discuss the issue with
President Kabila in the next week when the UN Security
Council debated the issue. He added that he believed the DRC
is entering a &trouble zone.8 He asserted that the EC
believes the UN Mission in Congo (MONUC) is making a credible
effort and that police sector reforms are a high priority for
the EC.


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SUDAN: No Easy Road to Peace
--------------


5. (C) A/S Frazer, who had just arrived from Sudan, noted
that the security environment in Sudan is breaking down. She
stated that while she was visiting, attacks were occurring in
Darfur. The fluidity of military and political alliances, as
well as recent attacks on humanitarian workers, were cause
for grave concern. She noted the situation in Sudan as quite
dangerous.


6. (C) A/S Frazer stated that the Sudanese peace process
must be moved along quickly and that security arrangements
were an issue. There is a need to energize the Abuja Peace
Talks and push for cohesion, she added. The security
situation must be improved as the African Mission in Sudan
(AMIS) forces were &stretched thin,8 and required
additional training, financing and capacity-building.


7. (C) Discussion on AMIS,s role and possible transition to
a UN (&blue hat8) force ensued with A/S Frazer pointing out
that there was no debate at the recent Sudan-hosted African
Union (AU) Summit on this issue given the presence of the
Sudanese delegation. Consideration of keeping AU forces as
the core of the peace-keeping mission and ensuring the force
commander or deputy force commander was an African national
could serve to enhance the peace-enforcement environment and
result in minimal resistance to this transition, offered
Frazer. Determining how the U.S. and the European Union (EU)
could support AMIS and a UN &blue hat8 force during the
transition (AMIS to UN) period was critical, she noted.
Frazer suggested that perhaps a NATO role consisting of 15
planners from NATO Headquarters could be an option, although
a financing mechanism would be required.


8. (C) A/S Frazer indicated that some observed the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA),signed in January 2005,
was overshadowed by the conflict in Darfur and that the
leadership of the Sudan People,s Liberation Movement (SPLM)
was thin. She personally observed, however, that the SPLM
and the Government of Sudan (GOS) are interested in joint,
integrated military units. Manservisi interjected that the
death of John Garang impacted the spirit of the SPLM and that
he had the impression that First Vice President Salva Kir was
more interested in building the south of the country, not a
North/South unified Government. A/S Frazer pointed out the
distinction in style between Kir and the late Garang in that
Kir has a more consultative, consensus-making decision style.
She added that attempts to divide the parties slow down
implementation of the CPA, but did not believe there existed
a lack of commitment to implement the CPA.

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Chad: Fragile, too
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9. (C) Manservisi characterized the situation in Chad as
fragile and noted that Chadian President Idriss Deby visited
Brussels in December -- prompted by the World Bank,s
decision to suspend funding of the Chad-Cameroon pipeline --
and asked A/S Frazer her assessment of the growing problems
in Chad. A/S Frazer responded that the U.S. was assessing
Chad and noted that its fragility stems, in part, from
problems within Deby,s own government. For example, the
change in the Chadian constitution to permit a third
presidential term created problems. In consultations with
several countries, including Libya, there was consensus that
if Deby,s government collapses, it &would be a mess.8 A/S
Frazer recommended a need to look at a transition strategy.
She cautioned against a strategy focused on &protecting
Deby8 to the detriment of pro-democracy efforts and
questioned whether France could increase its patrols. Frazer
also cited a need for an international force to patrol the
border between Chad and Sudan.


10. (C) Manservisi observed that political opposition to Deby
is very divided which makes for a high risk environment.
Manservisi said the EU did not exclude the possibility of a
mediation role and was considering a joint assessment, an EU
Joint Action and a political dialogue. He clearly
distinguished the potential EU role from that of the World
Bank's. Manservisi and Frazer agreed that the sooner Chad
was addressed, the better. Referring back to Sudan,
Manservisi added that time was a key factor and financing was
an issue. The EC, he noted, had taken funds from the overall
Africa, Caribbean, Pacific (ACP) account and is looking to
find funds quickly near the end of summer 2006. He estimated
that 50 million Euros could potentially be made available and
that the EC has already begun discussions on assistance to
Sudan with EU High Representative Solana and Special Envoy to
Sudan Pekka Haavisto, as well as EU member states.
-------------- --------------
Horn of Africa: Need to Move Quickly on Border Demarcation
-------------- --------------


11. (C) A/S Frazer advised a need to look clearly at the
options set out in UNSCR 1640 for the UN Mission to Eritrea
and Ethiopia (UNMEE). She concluded that UNMEE soldiers
desire to complete their mission, but were very concerned
about the problem of medical evacuations due to the lack of
air mobility. Even minor injuries were left untreated for
long periods of time due to the absence of efficient means of
evacuation.


12. (C) A/S Frazer questioned whether UNMEE could "draw down"
to an observer mission/role so that demarcation could go
forward. Frazer noted that during her recent visit to the
border area, she observed consensus that UNMEE could serve as
an aid to demarcation and was, in reality, not a real
inhibitor to recommencement of war.


13. (C) A/S Frazer noted that during her recent visit with
Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles, he offered that the Eritrea
Ethiopian Boundary Commission (EEBC) made mistakes in its
decision and distinguished between &delimitation8 and
&demarcation.8 Frazer suggested next steps, including:
convening the Algiers Witnesses with an aim to inform both
countries they are in violation of the EEBC decision;
convening the EEBC; and pushing President Meles to send a
credible representative to begin the process of demarcation.
Frazer concluded that sanctions would not be immediately
helpful and that UNMEE could draw down to an observer mission
so that demarcation of the border could be completed.


14. (C) Manservisi emphasized that in addition to the border
conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia, the EU and Member
States face the added problem of Ethiopia,s deteriorating
domestic problems, particularly the imprisonment of
opposition members. Manservisi added that the EU has
attempted on many occasions to communicate directly to Prime
Minister Meles that unless the latter made more progress
(release of political prisoners, allowing free press,
permitting visitation of prisoners),Ethiopia would likely
face a withdrawal of European assistance. He further noted
the EU had begun a political dialogue with Meles on these
issues and believed that if Meles could make progress in
these areas, it would strengthen his domestic situation
vis--vis Eritrean President Isaias.


15. (C) A/S Frazer questioned how the EU characterizes
Eritrea,s domestic situation in the area of human and
political rights and urged a balanced view of both countries
given that Eritrea is a totalitarian state. Differences in
how we address these issues for both, she stated, are
problematic. Frazer distinguished between the domestic
situation in Ethiopia and demarcation of the border. In her
meeting with Prime Minister Meles, Frazer stated that Meles
saw his internal problems (in descending order of priority)as
caused by: insurgents, whom he could handle; foot soldiers,
primarily unemployed youth, who were motivated by the
insurgents; and lastly, and most problematic, protest voters.
A/S Frazer insisted that international parties maintain
neutrality and balance on the border issue, it was critical
for the U.S. and the EU to communicate parallel messages, and
imperative to begin border demarcation. Manservisi agreed
that different signals from the EU and U.S. should be avoided.

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Somalia
--------------


16. (C) A/S Frazer stated the U.S. was attempting to work
with all sides in Somalia and did not want it to become a
terrorist haven. She added that a joint task force had been
recommended, which would call a conference on Somalia in
order to discuss pertinent and problematic issues. She noted
that Nigerian President Obasanjo had called for an African
Union Peacekeeping Mission for Somalia.


17. (C) Manservisi indicated the EC was interested in a mix
of security and police support -- not a strict peacekeeping
force. He added that the U.S. needs to be seen as
&on-board8 in support to Somalia because the process is
very fragile.


18. (U) Participants:

United States
--------------
Jendayi Frazer, Assistant Secretary of State for African
Affairs
Kendra Gaither, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary
Michael McKinley, Charg Affaires, U.S. Mission to the EU
Patricia Lerner, USAID Development Counselor, U.S. Mission to
the EU
Margaret B. Diop, USEU Political Officer

European Commission
--------------
Stefano Manservisi, European Commission Director General for
DG Development
Sipke Brouwer, European Commission Director for West and
Central Africa and Caribbean
Roger Moore, European Commission Head of Division Horn of
Africa, Eastern Africa and Indian Ocean


19. (U) Assistant Secretary Jendayi Frazer has cleared on
this cable.

GRAY
.