EU OFFICIALS AGREE ON NEED TO BUILD MOMENTUM ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 000429

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2016
TAGS: PREL EAID CY GR TU EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: EU OFFICIALS AGREE ON NEED TO BUILD MOMENTUM ON
CYPRUS

Classified By: Political Officer Vincent Carver for reason 1.5 (b/d).

SUMMARY
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1. (C) European Commission and Parliament officials agreed
with visiting DAS Bryza February 6-7 on the need to build on
the momentum created by Turkish FM Gul's recent proposal on
opening Turkish and Northern Cypriot ports. The EU officials
noted that Turkey could not open its ports to Cypriot vessels
without the political cover of movement toward ending
Northern Cypriot isolation. All agreed that a halt to
Turkey's EU accession negotiations could have serious
geostrategic consequences and negative effect on Turkey's
2007 national elections. END SUMMARY


2. (C) EUR DAS Matthew Bryza met with European Commission
Director General for Enlargement Michael Leigh, Commission
Unit Head for Turkey Christian Danielsson and advisor on
Turkey to Enlargement Commission Rehn, Jean-Christophe
Filori, February 6 and with Member of the European Parliament
(MEP) and EP Rapporteur on Turkey, Camiel Eurlings (Dutch,
Center-Right) February 7 to discuss Turkey and Cyprus.
Leigh, stressing that EU accession negotiations with Turkey
would proceed on their merits and not on political
considerations, emphasized the positive effects of the
negotiations. Once "taboo" subjects were now open for
discussion, with the EU and Turkey enjoying a more
sophisticated and higher level dialogue. Given pressure from
member states, the EU and Turkey are holding a series of
monthly seminars, including on issues such as human rights
and religious freedom. For their part, the Turks are taking
a practical approach. Leigh stressed that the process is
valuable and maintaining its momentum will be key to further
promoting reform in Turkey. In this light, the EU will
attempt to avoid the risk of Cyprus, possibly with other
member states, halting accession negotiations absent Turkish
implementation of the additional protocol.


3. (C) One way to avoid such blockage, Leigh explained, is
to convince Nicosia that direct trade with the north does not
imply recognition of the TRNC. Having the UN or another body
manage trade out of Famagusta is one option worth exploring
to allow a form of direct trade, while affording Greek
Cypriots a sense that they had not surrendered their claim of
sovereignty over the North. The Greek Cypriots, however,
continue to link Famagusta with their demand for a moratorium
on construction in the north and with a hand over of Varosha,
which the Turkish Cypriots reject. Still, by potentially
opening a debate on the Famagusta-Varosha issue, Ankara's
recent Cyprus proposal seems to reflect a new political
willingness by Ankara to fulfill its obligation to extend the
Additional Protocol (by opening Turkish ports to Greek
Cypriot ships). By so doing, Leigh continued, Turkey may
convey within the EU a sense of momentum on the difficult
port issue sufficient to allow the Commission to avoid
criticizing Ankara on this matter in its October progress
report.


4. (C) In any case, the EU recognizes the primacy of the
UN's role in forging an overall settlement. Commission Unit
Head for Turkey Danielsson emphasized the positive role
Athens has played on Cyprus, noting the U.S. might want to
continue to encourage Greece to play a helpful role in trying
to persuade Nicosia to be more reasonable. Danielsson
observed that there may be a window of opportunity for
progress after the Cypriot elections in May and before the
European Commission issues its annual monitoring report on
Turkey in October or early November. DAS Bryza agreed that
Greek FM Molyviatis has indeed been helpful, including with
the Greek aide memoire regarding the Gul initiative, which
points toward the Famagusta-Varosha proposal. DAS Bryza
added that the U.S. would continue to engage Athens on the
issue.


5. (C) Leigh noted that Turkish accession negotiations were
taking place within a wider context: public opinion in many
member states opposed Turkish accession, more parties are
calling for a closer examination of the EU's absorption
capacity (Leigh observed that this was generally perceived as
"code" for opposition to Turkish EU membership),and debate
was beginning over where Europe's borders are situated. The
Commission's tactic, Leigh added, is to try to keep
enlargement, particularly regarding Turkey, as part of a
larger debate on the future of Europe. Otherwise, many
people will focus on Turkey's differences with the EU rather
than on the EU's success in promoting reform and exporting
stability throughout southeastern Europe.


6. (C) Filori, in a separate meeting, acknowledged that no
Turkish government could be expected to open its ports absent
moves to diminish Northern Cypriot isolation. The key is to
avoid "the big clash that everyone foresees" by providing
Ankara the necessary political cover to implement the
Additional Protocol. According to Filori, the Commission
wants the Council to bless its financial aid package to the
north and provide additional tangible benefits to the Turkish
Cypriot population. Confidence-building measures could help
ease the sense of isolation as well, he added, stressing that
the EU recognizes the indispensable role of the UN in this
regard. That said, Filori added that Nicosia must acquiesce
to such measures and this "will be difficult, to say the
least."


7. (C) Filori reiterated Leigh's observations regarding
Greek Cypriot calls for the return of Varosha and a
moratorium on construction in the north. Bryza noted concern
over the possibility that Nicosia, sometime this year, would
send a ship as a provocation toward the Turkish coast with
Turkey preventing it from entering a Turkish port. Filori
predicted that, in this scenario, several member states would
support Nicosia and agree to suspend accession negotiations
with Turkey. Filori and Bryza agreed the U.S. and European
Commission should think through options for responding to
such a move by the Greek Cypriots.


8. (C) Dutch MEP and EP Rapporteur on Turkey Eurlings agreed
with DAS Bryza on the need to try to build on the momentum
created by the Gul proposal to avoid a possible stalemate on
accession negotiations. Eurlings also stressed that the U.S.
can continue to play a helpful role by quietly but firmly
persuading the Turkish leadership, "as a friend," to promote
further political and societal reforms. Erdogan and others,
Eurlings stressed, should drop their "fighting their way into
the EU" attitude and concentrate more on promoting reforms
such as opening the Halki Seminary and returning some
Christian churches to their religious communities. This, he
emphasized, would go a long way in helping shape a more
positive European public opinion about Turkey.


9. (C) Likewise, Eurlings underscored, Ankara must alter its
penal code, particularly articles 301 and 305, to allow fro
greater freedom of expression. Eurlings noted that even
Enlargement Commissioner Rehn (a usually calm Finn),became
very emotional when discussing Turkish "obstructionism" on
religious freedom and property rights with a Turkish
parliamentary delegation and GOT chief accession negotiator
Babacan in December. Eurlings cautioned that the end of 2006
could result in a crisis if Turkey does not implement the
Additional Protocol. He added that the end of 2007 could
bring an additional crisis if the EU determines that Turkey
has not demonstrated sufficient progress in meeting the
Copenhagen criteria on democracy and human rights under the
Association Framework Agreement.


10. (C) Focusing on religious tolerance, Eurlings stressed
the emerging consensus in the Netherlands on the need to
train imams in the Netherlands rather than allowing them
entry from abroad. He agreed with Bryza that a key challenge
would be to ensure that the trainers were themselves
moderate. Eurlings further agreed that Turkey's Directorate
of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) could be a helpful partner in
imam training, provided that the Diyanet agreed to reduce its
efforts to exert political control over Turkish emigre
communities in Europe.

COMMENT
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11. (C) DAS Bryza's EU interlocutors appeared genuinely to
want to avoid the "train wreck" predicted by some in Brussels
regarding Turkish accession negotiations by discussing ways
to help promote Ankara sufficient political cover to begin to
implement the Additional Protocol. They recognized that
Gul's proposal indicates an increased willingness by Ankara
to try to generate some more positive thinking on how to
proceed toward a compromise. They also agreed that one way
to help provide Turkey with some political cover was to ease
the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots, through EU aid for the
region and via confidence-building measures. While Eurlings
observed that Papadopolous "always says no" to any proposal
aimed at promoting a settlement, the EU officials agreed with
DAS Bryza on the need to continue talking on how best to
convince Nicosia to engage in a practical discussion aimed at
ending the deadlock. All also agreed on the need to engage
the UN and maintain it as the primary conduit for settlement
talks.


12. (U) DAS Bryza has cleared this message. DAS Bryza's
energy-related meetings reported septel.
MCKINLEY