Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BRUSSELS4099
2006-12-12 16:43:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Brussels
Cable title:  

MUSLIM ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY 2006-2007 FOR BELGIUM

Tags:  KISL SOCI PGOV BE 
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DE RUEHBS #4099/01 3461643
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 121643Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3839
INFO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0530
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS BRUSSELS 004099 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KISL SOCI PGOV BE
SUBJECT: MUSLIM ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY 2006-2007 FOR BELGIUM

REF: STATE 185834

Background
----------

UNCLAS BRUSSELS 004099

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KISL SOCI PGOV BE
SUBJECT: MUSLIM ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY 2006-2007 FOR BELGIUM

REF: STATE 185834

Background
--------------


1. (U) The Muslim populace in Belgium, a country of
just over 10 million people, forms nearly five percent
of the total population. Although the Government of
Belgium does not keep statistics on ethnicity or
religion, most estimates for the total population of
Muslims in Belgium range from 450,000 to 500,000. The
largest representations of Muslims in Belgium are from
Morocco (approximately 300,000) and Turkey (roughly
160,000).


2. (U) Muslim integration and participation in Belgian
society, like elsewhere in Europe, is an evolving and
complex issue. In some communities, there are now
three or more generations of Muslims: foreign-born
grandparents who migrated to Belgium during the '60s
and their Belgian-born children and grandchildren.
Muslim integration into other cultures and societies
has not always been easy. Some Muslims face
documented discrimination in employment or housing as
well as social prejudice based upon a combination of
complex factors that may include: family name, outward
religious symbols (such as a veil or scarf),or a
perceived desire to "remain separate" or even a
"refusal" to integrate.


3. (SBU) Some far-right parties, most notably the
Flemish Vlaams Belang, have anti-immigrant elements as
part of their platforms. The party has earned up to
25 percent of the vote in Antwerp and it remains a
very real force in Flemish politics. In Wallonia, so
far the gains of extreme right party the Front
National have been limited (15 percent of the vote in
industrial city of Charleroi) mainly because of poor
tactics and legal restraints on party activities, not
entirely because of a lack of public receptiveness to
their message. As a result even some mainstream
Belgian politicians, sensitive to their
constituencies, have taken a harder line against
immigrant communities. Whether the perception is real
or not, there are some Belgians who do feel threatened
by concentrations of "non-Western foreigners" who have
different customs and values and who stand out as
separate from the relatively homogeneous society.


4. (SBU) Belgium is further burdened with a very
complex political system. It is a federal state with
three regions: Flanders in the north where Dutch is

the official language; Wallonia in the south where
French is the official language and Brussels, the
capital, where French and Dutch are both official
languages. In addition, there is a small German-
speaking minority of 70,000 in the south. The regions
are empowered with a high level of autonomy,
especially in the educational and cultural spheres.
Many Moroccan immigrants can be found in Brussels and
in the Walloon region while Turks often settle in
Flanders. Integration policies differ from region to
region with Flanders adopting what many Belgians
consider a more "Anglo-Saxon" integration model,
Wallonia following the French example and Brussels, a
mix of the two. Neither system has worked well.
Muslims in urban centers face high unemployment,
particularly among the youth. All non-EU nationals,
including Muslims, have higher rates of unemployment
than their EU citizen counterparts. Muslim immigrants
are often further handicapped by limited education or
language proficiency in Belgium's two official
languages. These very real educational and socio-
economic factors can inhibit full integration.


5. (U) Embassy Brussels has been actively engaging the
Belgian Muslim community since early 2002. Post soon
discovered that there was nothing to be gained by
discussing foreign policy. This would only exacerbate
their suspicion and confirm their negative images
about the U.S. and the U.S.G. in particular. Instead,
Post focused on issues that affected them most,
namely, religion and empowerment. In 2002 ? 2003, the
Embassy-invited speakers such as Imam Yahya Hendi,
civil rights leader Rev. Soaries, and "Karamah: Muslim
Women Lawyers for Human Rights" founder Azizah Al-
Hibri were all extremely well-received. In 2004, a
first ever Iftar dinner was organized by the
Ambassador. Based on this experience, the Embassy
organized a major conference which brought together an
impressive group of 32 American Muslims to meet with
an equally impressive group of 65 Belgian Muslims to
discuss everyday, practical matters regarding Muslim
participation in society. This two-day conference,
titled "Muslim Communities Participating in Society: A
Belgian-U.S. Dialogue" took place in Brussels on
November 16 & 17, 2005 and was highly successful. It
built trust and constituted a tremendous boost to our
credibility with this highly critical, suspicious and
sometimes even hostile audience.


6. (U) This dialogue, in turn, led to a number of
follow-on initiatives which Post promised it would
help materialize. Some of the follow-on activities
have taken place already such as Belgian participation
in the ISNA Education Forum (April 2006),Belgian
participation in the Karamah leadership program (July
2006),and a one-day seminar on Media Portrayal of
Minorities (June 2006). Others will take place
throughout 2007. In order to maintain the momentum of
this goodwill and our credibility, we must continue
the dialogue with moderate Belgian Muslims, and expand
our contact base, as we continue these follow-on
initiatives. Our Muslim strategy for the future,
therefore, will reflect this.


7. (U) The Embassy also works closely (and will
continue to work closely) with the Muslim Executive
Council which was founded by Royal decree in 1998 and
which consists of a 17-member "Executive" and a 68-
member "General Assembly", all of whom are elected by
the Muslim communities of Belgium (the elections for
the current Executive and Assembly took place in
March, 2005). The Muslim Executive of Belgium is
officially recognized as the interlocutor for the
Belgian authorities (a) at the federal level, to deal
with the administrative management of the religion
(nominations of imams and chaplains, management of
local communities),and (b) at the regional level,
with regard to Islamic education (appointment and
inspection of Islam teachers, curriculum oversight,
etc.).


8. (SBU) As the October 2006 local elections in
Belgium demonstrated once again, Belgian Muslims have
become a real political force and the Embassy works
with Muslim members of Parliament and local government
on a variety of political issues. Also, whenever
there's a crisis affecting the Muslim communities
(e.g., the Cartoon crisis),the Embassy is able to
draw on its Muslim conference alumni and Muslim
political contacts to obtain first-hand information on
the reactions inside the various Muslim communities.

Negative Narrative:
--------------


9. (SBU) Overcoming suspicions of mainstream as well
as Muslim audiences: The integration (or lack
thereof) of Muslim communities in Belgian society is a
very sensitive topic. The Embassy's engagement with
Belgian Muslims is seen by some members of the
majority community, and some Muslims also, as
interference in Belgium's internal affairs; a majority
of Belgian Muslims remain highly suspicious of the
USG. Yet, more and more Belgians, including Muslims,
see the U.S. model as a better example for integrating
minorities than most European countries. We will
therefore continue to inform Muslim as well as
mainstream Belgian audiences about America's
experience in dealing with multicultural issues.


10. (SBU) By doing so we not only hope to advance the
integration of Muslims into Belgian society but also
increase our credibility with both Muslims and
mainstream Belgians with the ultimate goal of creating
a more positive image of the US, its policies,
society, and values.

Media Environment:
--------------


11. (U) Brussels has a complex media climate. As the
capital of Europe, Brussels hosts one of the largest
press contingents in the world, with more than 1,000
accredited journalists. The media we wish to reach
are those who cover the problems of this small country
which straddles the Anglo-Saxon/Latin divide in
Europe. In fact, it often seems that from a public
diplomacy point of view, Belgium is really two
countries -- Dutch speaking Flanders and French
speaking Wallonia -- united by little more than the
King, the postal system, the railroads, and social
security. Each language group marches to a different
drummer. The Dutch-language press is more often than
not inspired by the Anglo-Saxon media; the
Francophones take their cues from Paris. Issues that
make prominent headlines in one media may, or may not,
merit mention in the other. Depending on one's
expectations, one might be surprised either by the
magnitude of the gap between the two linguistic
communities or by the fact that they manage to coexist
in a more or less harmonious fashion.


12. (U) State-owned radio and television stations RTBF
and VRT, which historically ran closely associated
French-language and Dutch-language operations, have
long become completely independent from each other.
The only vestige of their common past is that they
share the same premises and some technical
installations. The other television stations, RTL/TVI
and AB3 on the French-language side, VTM and VT4 on
the Dutch-language side are completely independent
from each other.


13. (U) Belgium has a very well-developed information
network. There are some 20 dailies, with a combined
circulation of some 1,700,000, and numerous
periodicals. Several dozens of local low-powered FM
radio stations are in operation. Four state-owned
television channels broadcast in Belgium -- two
francophone (RTBF) and two Dutch-language (VRT) -- in
addition to one independent francophone channel
(RTL/TVI) and two independent Dutch-language channels
(VTM and VT4). All have editorial autonomy.
Legislation governing the broadcast industry is
different for the French and Dutch-language sectors,
since it is determined by the two language communities
and not the national government.


14. (U) Almost 100 percent of Belgian homes subscribe
to cable and, depending on the region they live in,
are able to receive TV broadcasts from England (BBC 1
and 2; ITV and Channel 4 also in the coastal area),
France (TF1, France 2, France 3, Arte and TV5),
Germany (ARD, ZDF and WDR),Italy (RAI),the
Netherlands (Holland 1, 2 and 3),Spain (TVE),
Portugal (TPE),Turkey (TRT) and the USA (CNN). In
addition, there are several local TV stations -- such
as, for instance, TV Bruxelles/TV Brussels for the
Brussels region -- as well as economic stations (Canal
Z, CNBC.)

Strategic Goals:
--------------


15. (SBU) OVERALL GOAL: Improving understanding and
perception of the United States, its society, its
values and its policies by

-- Deepening of already existing relationships within
the Muslim communities of Belgium
-- Widening of our network of Muslim contacts with
more focus on youth
-- Maintaining the dialogue about integration between
Belgian Muslim and non-Muslim communities

Top Humanitarian Assistance Goal: N/A

Target Audiences and suggested programs for each
Strategic Goal:

Goal 1: Deepening of already existing relationships
within the Muslim communities of Belgium

Target Audience: Members of the Muslim Executive
Council and Muslim community leaders (including
political leaders, businessmen, imams, political
activists, journalists, NGO leaders, educators and
field workers and other multipliers). Their
perception of our activities shapes the way the
members of their communities view our outreach
efforts, which in turn determines the level of access
and success we can have.

Suggested Programs:

-- Inviting Muslims and other minorities to various
Mission events, not only Muslim-oriented events: All
Mission elements will continue to include Muslim
contacts on guest lists for representational events as
appropriate.
-- Bringing over American Muslim speakers: Both in-
depth discussions with past speakers who have
successfully engaged with Belgian Muslims, and
bringing over new speakers who can elaborate on issues
of genuine interest to the community (e.g., Post has
re-invited Karamah Founder Azizah Al-Hibri to come to
Belgium in May ?07).
-- Sending Belgian community leaders to the U.S. on
IV, Volvis, and other exchange programs;
-- Co-sponsoring (with the Islamic Society of North
America, one of our 2005 conference participants)
travel by five Belgian imams to attend ISNA?s Summer
Imam training program in Chicago.

Goal 2: Widening our network of Muslim contacts

Target Audience: Youth
The Muslim population in Belgium is young: up to 35%
is less than 18 years old and with a population growth
rate significantly greater than that of the majority
Belgian community, the number of Muslim youth in
Belgium is growing rapidly. Most of them suffer a
serious identity crisis feeling alienated both at home
(Belgium) as well as in the country of their families?
origin where most of them return every summer. In
addition, these youth are disadvantaged in comparison
with their Belgian peers: not only are they less
likely to succeed in the secondary school system, much
less likely to pursue post-secondary education, and
even less likely to find a job, they are already
economically disadvantaged to start with. 38.7% of
Turkish immigrants and 25% of people with a Moroccan
background have to make ends meet with less than 500
euros ($664) each month. These findings are even more
staggering when compared to European poverty line set
at a monthly income of 777 euros ($1,033) per month.
Thus, almost 60% of people of Turkish descent and 55%
of people of Moroccan descent are living in poverty.
Those who feel the impact of poverty the most are the
young. It is critical, therefore, that we concentrate
more on reaching out to younger generations in order
to counter the spread of extremism.

Note: Belgian youth in general, not only minority
youth, will take a more important place in the
Mission?s public diplomacy efforts so that Muslim
youth will not only be targeted with specific
programs, through specific channels, but also through
programs addressed to youth in general.

Suggested Programs:

-- Setting up a network of young people who can serve
as multipliers as we develop outreach programs to
improve their image of the US. In order to achieve
this, a mix of outreach tools would be used, including
speaker programs, cultural events and educational
exchanges mainly through IV and/or VOLVIS grants.
-- Empowering existing youth organizations to make
them more efficient by bringing over their peers from
the U.S. to share experiences and successful programs.
-- Co-sponsoring (w/ISNA) six Belgian youth (three
Turkish, three Moroccan) as summer interns at ISNA
Headquarters.
-- Co-sponsoring (w/KARAMAH) a delegation of five
young women to attend Karamah's three-week Summer
Leadership Program in WashDC

Goal 3: Maintaining the dialogue about integration
between Belgian Muslim and Non-Muslim communities.

Target Audience: Journalists, political leaders,
government and non-government organizations working on
integration issues

Suggested Programs: Exploring with host governments
and local communities the ongoing debate over
integration, and offering insights and understanding
into the US struggle with integration for Muslims and
non-Muslims working on the issues.

In terms of media portrayal, we intend to monitor
developments with regard to diversity in the
mainstream press and follow up as well as build on the
media portrayal conference we organized in June 2006
entitled "Them and Us: Moving Beyond the Cliches."

In FY 07, half of Post's IVs are Muslims: one
E
academic, one journalist/political party advisor, and
one NGO leader of Moroccan origin as well as one
Turkish Muslim parliamentarian/Imam. All will look at
integration policies and programs.

In FY 08, a series of events centered on the 40th
anniversary of the killing of Dr. Martin Luther King,
Jr., highlighting the U.S. civil rights struggle.

Embassy's Top Three Program Priorities:

Following up on successful past outreach program is
absolutely essential to our credibility. Post's
program priorities, therefore, reflect this.

1) Visit of Dr. Azizah Al-Hibri, Founder and Director
of Karamah: Muslim Women Lawyers for Human Rights, to
deepen and widen discussions about (a) the role and
status of women in Islam; (b) setting up a Belgian and
eventually a European Karamah center.

2) Co-sponsoring (w/ISNA) six Belgian youth (three
Turkish, three Moroccan) as summer interns at ISNA
Headquarters.

3) Co-sponsoring (w/KARAMAH) a delegation of five
young women to attend Karamah's three-week Summer
Leadership Program in WashDC. In FY 06 Post co-
sponsored a group of five Francophone women; in FY 07,
Post wants to co-sponsor a group of five Flemish
women.

Measuring Effectiveness:

Post will track media coverage of Post outreach
programs, program attendance and opinions by our
Muslim contacts, as well as the number of exchange
participants, focusing on minority issues. Since
effectiveness cannot be measured by statistics alone,
anecdotal evidence will be collected in order to
complement this.
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