Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BRUSSELS409
2006-02-06 15:49:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Brussels
Cable title:  

EU ON AMIS REHATTING: BRUSSELS DONOR CONFERENCE?

Tags:  PREL PREF DPKO EUN USEU BRUSSELS 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 000409 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2016
TAGS: PREL PREF DPKO EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: EU ON AMIS REHATTING: BRUSSELS DONOR CONFERENCE?

REF: (A) USUN NEW YORK 0192

Classified By: PRMOFF MARC J. MEZNAR. REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 000409

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2016
TAGS: PREL PREF DPKO EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: EU ON AMIS REHATTING: BRUSSELS DONOR CONFERENCE?

REF: (A) USUN NEW YORK 0192

Classified By: PRMOFF MARC J. MEZNAR. REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D).


1. (C) Summary. The EU agrees that AMIS rehatting to a UN
peacekeeping operation should happen as soon as possible.
Because of funding constraints, both the AU and the UN need
to make important decisions this month. The UN has urged the
Commission to host a donor conference in Brussels. While a
February 20 timeframe would be ideal for expediting the
transition, the EU believes a full-fledged donor conference
cannot happen until the AU has formally requested the UN to
take over its peacekeeping mission in Darfur and the UN has
taken concrete steps to fulfill such a request.
Specifically, the UN needs to formulate a precise transition
plan with timetables and logistical details before donors can
decide on funding options. The Commission might reprogram 50
million euros in development funds to support AMIS during the
transition. However, African countries must agree to this,
and some may favor other priorities. Additional Commission
funds could not come online before June, meaning other donors
would have to fill the AMIS funding gap from April through
June. End Summary.

--------------
EU Position on Rehatting
--------------


2. (C) At the January 10 meeting of the PSC, the EU agreed to
engage the AU and urge it to request rehatting as soon as
possible. The PSC stressed that rehatting should: 1) portray
AMIS as a success; and 2) incorporate AMIS troops into the
new UN operation. According to Council Secretariat Sudan
policy officer Christian Manahl, neither the AU nor the UN
has a big surplus of peacekeeping troops, making the second
point important practically as well as politically.

--------------
Donor Conference
--------------


3. (C) Both Manahl and DG Development Head of Unit for East
Africa Roger Moore characterized the report of a February 20
donor conference in Brussels as a "rumor" (without completely
discounting the possibility that Commissioner Michel may have
supported such a meeting during discussions with UN
officials). They said that before a full-fledged donor
conference could take place, two things should happen: 1)

the AU should make a formal request to the UN for rehatting;
and, 2) UN DPKO should present a strategy for transition,
along with specific details about its peacekeeping plans for
Darfur.


4. (C) Both EU interlocutors insisted that key decisions must
be made this month by both the AU and UN to ensure a smooth
transition. Manahl said the AU cannot wait until the
ministerial meeting in the second half of March to make a
formal request to the UN for rehatting because this would
leave insufficient time for donors to consider the financial
needs and identify funds.


5. (C) This rationale is probably behind the February 20
date. Moore reported that the UN has "bombarded" Commission
officials with calls urging them to host a donor conference
in Brussels, but that no final decision had been made by the
Commission. He said a Brussels conference remains "a
possibility" although the issue of a date is tricky.
Ideally, a full-fledged donor conference would take place
soon after the AU makes its request to the UN and well before
the AMIS funding and mandate runs out at the end of March.


6. (C) According to High Representative Javier Solana's ESDP
Counselor, Matthew Reece, his office prefers the first week
of March as this will ensure at least four weeks interval
prior to the end of existing funding arrangements. Given
travel schedules, March 7 in Paris or March 8 in Brussels
were mentioned as possible dates. He said that for this
conference to be successful, high-level contacts with Annan
and Konare will be necessary to get an AU decision prior to
the conference to hand the mission to the UN.

--------------
EU Thinking on Darfur peacekeeping
--------------


7. (C) Manahl said that the EU was hopeful that the arrival
of a new Nigerian force commander would improve the current
AMIS mission. EU Special Representative Pekka Haavisto was
scheduled to meet the new force commander in Darfur on
February 4. However, he said the AMIS force continues to
suffer from the lack of an Addis-based strategic director.
Undoubtedly, this would change for the better after
rehatting.


8. (C) Manahl said that UN DPKO has not been in a rush to
move into Darfur or to present a timeline for transition. In
a meeting with Haavisto in Khartoum last week, Jan Pronk
discussed his own "elaborate" plans for the new UN force
(which Pronk thought should number from 12,000 - 20,000).


9. (C) According to Reece, a key question for all players on
planning the transition is what can the UN begin to provide
in the run-up to taking control in October? In other words,
can the UN gradually take overall control of aspects of the
mission? For example, the UN has agreements with Sudan for
the mission in the South. Some of those could be extended
early to cover Darfur thereby taking some pressure off the
donor community. Manahl made similar points about using
extending the UN operation from the South to Darfur.

--------------
Funding
--------------


10. (C) Both Moore and Manahl expressed concern about AMIS
funding when the operation runs out of cash in early April.
For months, the Commission has been considering reprogramming
50 million euros from development accounts to the Africa
Peace Facility in order to support AMIS. Moore said for this
to happen African countries would need to agree to give up
development projects in order to support AMIS. Although some
money would come from expiring development funds that have
not been used, other money would need to come from projects
that the Commission and African countries have already agreed
to. Moore said he was personally skeptical about putting
more development money into AMIS since there was no clear
picture at this point regarding the future of the operation.
"We keeping adding segments to this bridge that leads
nowhere," he told PRMOff.


11. (C) If decisions are made in favor of reprogramming
additional development money to AMIS, the earliest it can
become available is June. Both interlocutors wondered
whether the U.S. was prepared to plug the April-June funding
gap.

--------------
Next steps
--------------


12. (C) According to Reece, the following sequential steps
would enable the EU to support a donors conference and
increase the likelihood of further transitional funding:

-- AU decision to hand the mission to the UN;

-- UNSC decision (UNSCR or Presidency statement) to take on
the mission, which along with allocation of UN resources to
its staff to commence planning provides confidence to donors
that the final stretch of the AMIS mission has begun. Reece
stressed that this action "punches the clock" for a 6-9 month
countdown to UN control;

-- EU Council goes to Commission and to Member States with
clarity on how much money is needed and for how long with
assurances that this is the last tranche of EU funding for
AMIS;

-- The Africa Peace Facility could then predict the end of
this aspect of its funding increasing the likelihood that the
issued discussed above could be managed.


13. (C) Reece summarized further steps urging that the
political process needs "kick started" in the face of a
deteriorating situation on the ground. He concluded that
"cutting up the cake" among the participants by forcing
concessions from the Sudanese government and the rebel groups
is seen within Solana,s office as the most likely solution.
This will require both carrots and sticks in the hands of
senior people according to Reece.

--------------
Comment
--------------


14. (C) EU concerns about timing and funding with regard to
rehatting closely match those of the U.S. (ref A).
Coordinated messages from the international community,
particularly from the U.S. and EU, may help both the AU and
UN make necessary decisions sooner rather than later.

McKINLEY
.