Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BRUSSELS3668
2006-10-27 15:23:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Brussels
Cable title:  

A/S FRIED'S OCTOBER 20, 2006 MEETING WITH BELGIAN

Tags:  PREL PINS OSCE GG RU BE 
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VZCZCXRO2526
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHBS #3668/01 3001523
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 271523Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3455
INFO RUCNOSC/OSCE POST COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 003668 

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/2011
TAGS: PREL PINS OSCE GG RU BE
SUBJECT: A/S FRIED'S OCTOBER 20, 2006 MEETING WITH BELGIAN
FM DE GUCHT


Classified By: Ambassador Tom C. Korolgos, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 003668

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NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/2011
TAGS: PREL PINS OSCE GG RU BE
SUBJECT: A/S FRIED'S OCTOBER 20, 2006 MEETING WITH BELGIAN
FM DE GUCHT


Classified By: Ambassador Tom C. Korolgos, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: EUR A/S Fried met Belgian FM and OSCE CiO
De Gucht in Brussels on October 20. Fried and De Gucht
agreed that the U.S., EU, and OSCE needed to press Russia
on treatment of ethnic Georgians in Russia. De Gucht
repeatedly stressed the importance of having the
Secretary attend the December 4-5 OSCE Ministerial if the

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OSCE was to put effective pressure on Russia. Her presence
would lend greater credibility to any OSCE message about
recent Russian actions in Georgia and elsewhere. The
Minister claimed also that elements were in place to secure
deferral of action on the Kazakh bid to assume the CiO
office in 2009; De Gucht will visit Astana early in
November to seal the deal. On Transnistria, De Gucht
disagreed with arguments about the utility of concentrating
on re-establishment of the peacekeeping force, arguing that
it was more important to get all parties to agree to talks on
the status issue. He endorsed the suggestion of a
Belgian-hosted brainstorming session on
Moldova. End summary.

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OSCE Ministerial
--------------


2. (C) In the context of a discussion about A/S Fried's
just concluded trip to Georgia, De Gucht expressed full
agreement on the need for the OSCE to deliver a forceful
statement denouncing recent Russian actions toward Georgia
and Georgians at the conclusion of the December 4-5
Ministerial in Brussels. De Gucht emphasized he was
prepared to "run risks" to promote a successful conference,
especially since a successful meeting "meant being prepared
for an unsuccessful one."


3. (C) Achieving a successful meeting would be much easier,
De Gucht maintained, if Secretary Rice were on hand when the
Ministerial was drafting its communiqu. De Gucht was
adamant
that having the Secretary on hand was critical. Given new
and increased Russian recriminations against Georgia and
other actions throughout the Caucuses, her presence would
lend weight and credibility. Her absence
would prompt the Russians and others to draw the
"appropriate" conclusions about U.S. views of the OSCE's
importance. A/S Fried said he would raise the Minister's
concerns directly with the Secretary but did not promise
anything (noting difficulties in the Secretary,s schedule)
and adding that OSCE statements and actions were
already of great utility. De Gucht responded that
he would write to the Secretary shortly in his
capacity as CiO to urge her to attend the meeting.

--------------
Kazakh Assumption of CiO Post in 2009
--------------


4. (C) The Belgians believed the elements were in place to
resolve the continuing difficulty surrounding the Kazakh
bid to become CiO in 2009. The Kazakhs appeared ready to
take several useful steps, including agreement to a
deferral of any vote on their candidacy for 2009, and the
issuance of a statement announcing new democratization
measures. Following a long session on October 19 in
Brussels with the Kazakh parliamentary speaker, De Gucht
said he planned to visit Astana early in November to
resolve any final details. He expected the anticipated
Kazakh actions to take place shortly before the
ministerial. The Kazakhs realized they were the leading
candidate for 2011, "but didn't like it." That said, it
seemed they would not cause problems, assuming nothing
occurred to cause them a major loss of face.

--------------
Transnistria
--------------


5. (C) Responding to A/S Fried's demarche, De Gucht said he
disagreed with the U.S. on the need now to concentrate on
the peacekeeping force for Transnistria. The Belgians
thought it more useful now to push all parties to say they
were open to talks on final status; without Russian
approval or acquiescence, this would probably prove
impossible. He hoped further that the Secretary would
press Moldovans and Russians to be more flexible.
Referring to one of A/S Fried's suggestions, De Gucht said
he favored the idea of a Belgian-sponsored brainstorming
session on Moldova.


6. (U) This cable has been cleared by A/S Fried. Imbrie

BRUSSELS 00003668 002 OF 002


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