Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BRUSSELS2606
2006-07-27 13:50:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Brussels
Cable title:  

BELGIAN RESPONSE TO P5+1 INCENTIVE PACKAGE FOR IRAN

Tags:  KNNP PARM PREL AORC 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0031
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBS #2606 2081350
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 271350Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2691
C O N F I D E N T I A L BRUSSELS 002606 

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - CLASSIFIFICATION

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2016
TAGS: KNNP PARM PREL AORC
SUBJECT: BELGIAN RESPONSE TO P5+1 INCENTIVE PACKAGE FOR IRAN

REF: SECSTATE 119436

Classified By: A/POLCOUNS: CRAIG KARP; REASONS: 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRUSSELS 002606

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - CLASSIFIFICATION

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2016
TAGS: KNNP PARM PREL AORC
SUBJECT: BELGIAN RESPONSE TO P5+1 INCENTIVE PACKAGE FOR IRAN

REF: SECSTATE 119436

Classified By: A/POLCOUNS: CRAIG KARP; REASONS: 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (SBU) Summary. In response to reftel, Belgian MFA
Nonproliferation chief Werner Bauwens believed the Iranians
would accept the P5 1 proposal as a basis of negotiation in
mid-late August, and at the same time voluntarily suspend an
unspecified degree of enrichment activities. He also
believes Russia will take a tougher line with Iran and
confirmed that PM Verhofstadt's meeting with Ali Larijani
yielded nothing new. End Summary


2. (SBU) Reftel demarche was delivered July 25 to Werner
Bauwens, Director of non-Proliferation and Arms Control at
the Belgian Foreign Ministry. In general, Bauwens reiterated
Belgium remained fully in line with the P5 1. He stated
Belgians main considerations are immediate cessation of
nuclear enrichment activities and full access for IAEA
inspectors. If a Chapter 7 resolution doesn't attract
consensus in the UNSC, a resolution with reference to "threat
to international peace and security" without specific legally
binding reference to Chapter 7 might attract the Iranians
attention without putting them into a corner. Any resolution
should have reference to require suspension of enrichment,
cooperation with IAEA, and call on all Member States to
exercise vigilance on exports.


3. (C) Based on experience with Iranian negotiators, Bauwens'
said he believed Iran would make a statement accepting the
P5 1 package a basis for negotiation accompanied with a halt
in some enrichment activities in-or-around the third week in
August. The Iranians intend for this to be seen as an act of
their own volition and carried out on their own terms. He was
concerned an Iranian gesture seen as cooperative would prompt
the Russians and Chinese to call for lessening of political
pressure. He expects this will be a long slog through the
UNSC.


4. (SBU) Bauwens believed the Russian Foreign Ministry has in
the past been soft on Iran and seemingly unwilling to press
the issue. Putin, on the other hand, has a more realistic
view of Iranian situation, and was looking to be more
proactive as evidenced, he stated, from G8 talks. Bauwens
believes since G8, Foreign Ministry is swaying toward Putin's
side due to more hard-line statements and FM Lavrov's recent
cooperative stance on UN deadline for Iran.


5. (SBU) Bauwens said he participated in PM Verhofstadt's
meeting with a stoic Ali Larijani. Verhofstadt continued to
promote the 5 1 package, but Larijani provided no indication
of Iran's leanings. Belgians highlighted the drawbacks for
Iran should a UN resolution be adopted. This produced a
negative response from Larijani, who said a UNSC resolution
would provoke further uncooperative behavior from Iran,
primarily especially toward the IAEA.
IMBRIE
.